THE BURMESE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume III, Issue 129, 25 June 1853, Page 9

THE BURMESE WAR.

(Prom the ' Times.')

The history of our Indian empire hitherto is, happily, one which must be written under the title of " Rise and Progress,'' not " Decline and Fall." No Gibbon as yet is required to record the reverses which have neutralized the signal successes of a Clive and a Wellington. When we come to inquire how this enormous section of Asia, which extends from the Himalayas, to the seas of Bengal and Cape Comorin, from the Malayan Peninsula to the Indus, has been brought and retained under the dominion of the British flag, we find that we are dealing with a contest between mind and matter —between intellectual and moral energy and the mere simulation of these qualities, trapped, it may be, in barbaric splendour and magnificence, but still a mere empty pageant. How was it when the countless myriads of Asia were leagued together against our fathers, and the inefficiency of such armaments was as yet unknown, that the East Indies—we adopt the common form of expression—were reduced into possession ? Either history is fiction, or such a result was obtained by the unhesitating confidence placed by British officers in the steady valour and discipline of .British troops. Some few errors, the result of over-confidence, not of over-timidity, excepted, the military history of India is a simple calendar of the conquests of hundreds over thousands. It is impossible to read the military history of British India with any degree of attention, and to resist the conviction that audacity, carried to a which under other circumstances would seem almost madness, has been the key to all our Indian success. More than this, the well grounded impression which is rife among the native population, that they are dealing with a Power irresistible as fate, is the reason why we continue masters of British India at the present hour. A reverse or two may come, but so long as we are true to ourselves the millions of India will not long waver in their allegiance. The massacres of the Khyber Pass were signally avenged. The successors of Runjeet Singh had little reason to congratulate themselves upon their momentary stand against the power of Great Britain. Transitory mishaps such as those which occurred in the course of either of these operations do not unsettle the prestige of our rule. One English officer may be in error as to the character of a country —a second may

he caught unprepared—even the mind of a barbarian may appreciate contingencies such as these. We have erred because we have courted a contest with nature as well as man-^-or because Indian dissimulation for the moment may have outwitted English frankness; but woe to our adversaries when we rectify such errors as these. There is one mistake, and one mistake

only, which is irredeemable, and that is when we ourselves show ourselves sceptical to the belief in our own superiority—when we regard an assemblage of barbarians as really formidable

antagonists to our own troops —when we hesitate to advance, and conduct our operations against such an enemy upon the principle recommended by Montecuculi or Turenne when contending against an equal foe. Who so good judges of our relative position to our antagonists as ourselves ? If we have fallen off from the valour of our forefathers, or if our Indian opponents have caught us up in the race of military efficiency, certainly our own acknowledgment should weigh for much in the scale. The hordes of Asia will eagerly catch at such a confession from such lips. Let us look.for a moment on the recent operations of General Godwin in Burmah, and examine the manner in which he has maintained the prestige of British rule. It is now clear enough that the aged Commander has had no other idea present to his mind than a repetition of the disastrous campaign in which he took a part upon the same ground a quarter of a century back. He has learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. Had an offer been made to him to convey his troops by express train from Rangoon to Ava, the veteran soldier would probably have rejected it with scorn. The men must march through the same jungle, wade through the same swamps, storm the same palisades, perish by the same fever as before, or the campaign will be no campaign at all. It is clear enough that early in October, when Prome was captured, or even long before, Ava might have been taken by an advance of the steamers, but the General refused the permission which was demanded of him with something more than importunity. The campaign must be conducted according to the rule of 1825. We now hear that even as far as the secondary operation— the capture of Prome—is concerned, the military and naval attacks were conducted in an equally inefficient manner. The steamers, it is said, which carried 32 and 68 pounder guns, completely commanded the banks of the river. This advantage, however, was cast aside, and the landing party was despatched in gun boats, with light 12 pounders, to make their way as best they could under the fire of the enemy. Most fortunately for the men who were exposed to so unnecessary a peril, the fire of the enemy proved to be exactly what Indian fire, save in rare instances, has proved upon such occasions. Prome was taken,' and with the loss of only a single life. This brilliant operation concluded, the river suddenly fell, and the most powerful steamers attached to the expedition are hopelessly stuck in the mud at Prome for the next eight months to come. Is not this a contingency which might and should have been foreseen by any person upon the spot who was interested in ascertaining the natural phenomena connected with the stream at certain seasons of the year ? Meanwhile General Godwin—while the steamers were quietly settling down in the mud—was on his way back to Rangoon, to fetch up the second division of his army, which he had left inhaling the balmy breezes which ever play at the mouth of the Inawaddy. What he will do when he arrives at Prome does not so clearly appear. He may either remain rusticating at that delightful spot for any indefinite time to come—or he may march on to Ava by land, exactly like his predecessor in the same business. There is only one tiring evident, which is that the golden occasion has been let slip by unimproved, and unless diplomacy shall come to the aid of war, many hundreds, if not thousands of lives will be uselessly sacrificed under the pestilential influence of the Burmese climate. We are informed that a force of 250 elephants has been despatched to the assistance of General Godwin from Calcutta—overland of course—and that it is impossible that this reinforcement can reach Prome before a time at which the river will be impassable to any but the very smallest steamers. For the time being all we can say is, that the Burmese war is in a state of abeyance ; that our principle steamers are lying- in the mud at Prome ; and that about a fortnight from the date a troop of elephants may reach Prome, it is probable that General Godwin may advance by land upon Ava.

We confess that we cannot read this account of inaction, where action is required, and of hesitation where boldness would have been discretion, without the deepest feelings of mortification and regret. »Has the English soldier who bled and conquered on the banks of the Indus and the Sutlej so degenerated that he may not be led agaidst a rude barbarian horde who ask no better than to lay down their arms ? No. The army is not inferior to that which fought at Meeanee, at Sobraon, aud at Goojerat; but

General Godwin prefers the old traditions of the Indian wars to speedy success or to the safety of his soldiers. That the British arms will ultimately be successful, and that the British flag will, ere another twelvemonth, float upon the walls of Ava, we do not doubt; but is it not mournful that such a result was not obtained at once, as it might have been by the most ordinary display of military skill and energy ? Had the British armies in India been from the first under the guidance of such men as their present leader, should we ever have been masters even of Bengal ? Or, if by a succession of miracles we had conquered it for the moment, would not the last Englishman long since have been driven into the sea by the infirm levies of some petty conqueror ?