Page 4 Advertisements Column 3

Lyttelton Times, Volume II, Issue 100, 4 December 1852, Page 4

balance should be left, to be divided among the six Provincial Treasuries in proportion to the amount contributed by each to the whole Revenue, and to be expended according to the wishes of the Provincial Councils and Superintendents. They will also determine what alterations are desirable in the Constitution as it now stands. On all these subjects, however, their opinion cannot become law, unless it he confirmed by that of the Legislative Council of New Zealandj and by that of the Governor. The Legislative Council or Upper House, is to consist of not less than ten members, to be appointed by the Governor in the name of Her Majesty, and to hold their seats for life. The Governor will have power to add to their number, at his own discretion. Even laws enacted by the joint consent of these three powers are subject to be disallowed by Her Majesty in Council in London at any time within two years after their reception there by the Secretary of State for the Colonies: and although such laws will come into force in the colony during the interval, they will again cease to be law on information of such disallowance being received and proclaimed by the Governor. Notwithstanding these great, and in the latter case obnoxious, restrictions, the House of Representatives must necessarily exercise a very important control over the legislative and financial policy of whatever Executive Officers, or Ministry, the Governor may entrust with the reins of power. Except as to the Civil List of £16,000, it will have the power of refusing to authorise any expenditure whatever, unless laws agreeable to the majority of its members be consented to by the Upper House and the Governor. The same power will apply to suggestions for alterations in the Constitution. It is exceedingly probable, for instance, that a majority of the Representatives may be found inclined to enact such an alteration as would give the Provincial Legislatures power to make laws independently of the General Assembly, on some subjects now reserved for the exclusive legislation of that Assembly. Such a majority may also desire to give up the power now vested in the General Assembly, of controlling, superseding, and rendering null and void, by its own Acts, those of the Provincial Councils. If the nominated Legislative Council, or the Governor, should refuse to confirm such reforms, the only remedy in the hands of the representatives will be to refuse to authorise the expenditure of any more of the revenue than the Civil List of £16,000 a year reserved by the Act. It is just, possible that, on other points as well as this, the Governor may choose to exercise his power of disallowing Acts, in opposition to the wishes of the majority of the Representatives. He may attempt to maintain Executive Officers in power, in whose policy the majority of the Representative House have no confidence. The remedy is still the same: until he. carries on the government of the country agreeably to them ; until, in short, he thoroughly acknowledges the responsibility of the Executive Government to the majority of the people's Representatives, they can " stop the supplies," except the £16,000. On thirteen subjects named in the Act, the Provincial Councils are especially forbidden to legislate. On some of them, the Society are strongly of opinion that it would be more advantageous for each Province to make such laws as it may like, than for the assembled Representatives of, all the Provinces to make laws for all New Zealand, which are almost certain to displease the inhabitants of one or more Provinces. On all subjects, even, on which the Provincial Councils are allowed to legislate, the General Assembly has now the power to render the Provincial laws null and void, by passing laws of a contrary nature on the same subject. This restriction is most objectionable; since, if it were acted upon, the Provincial Councils would have no real power of making laws at all. Nor will there be any absolute security for the force of any Provincial laws, until it shall have been clearly defined on what subjects the General Assembly should have the exclusive rio-ht of making laws, and until it shall have been enacted that laws on all other subjects, made by the lrovmcial Councils, are to be unalterable by that^ General Assembly. The electors will do well, then, before giving their votes for Members of the General Assembly, to ascertain clearly the views of the different candidates as to the abdication of power by that Assembly in favour of the Provincial Councils.