THE RECALL OF SIR HARRY SMITH.

Lyttelton Times, Volume II, Issue 85, 21 August 1852, Page 4

THE RECALL OF SIR HARRY SMITH.

The following is the despatch of Earl Grey to Sir H. Smith, on removing him from the command at the Cape of Good Hope:— " Dowuiug Street, Jan. 14, 1852. « Sir, —I have received and laid before the Queen your despatches of the sth and 19th of November, reporting the results of the operations of the war since the date of your despatches by the previous mail. " 2. I learn from these despatches that another month of distressing warfare has passed away, and though the force at your disposal has been increased to a considerable amount, no advantage of any real importance has been gained over the enemy, while the loss of Her Majesty's .troops has been exceedingly heavy, that very distinguished officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Fordyce, being included among those who have fallen. "3. I have said that no real advantage has been gained, because, while you state that positions of extraordinary strength have been stormed, and it is clear that the most determined courage has been shewn by her Majesty's troops, these successes (if they can be called so) have been entirely barren of useful results ; and it appears from the reports of Major-General Somerset, and particularly from his despatch dated the 9th of November, that the ground thus hardly won could not be retained, and that the position which was carried at the price of such heavy loss to the 74th regiment on the 6th of November, was only held until the MajorGeneral ' withdrew the troops in the afternoon,' when it would seem that there was no obstacle to its being reoccupied by the enemy, and that in fact it was so. " 4. For several months your despatches have been of a similar character. You have described to me operations which I have constantly been assured had been attended with success, and had inflicted heavy loss upon the enemy, while there could be no doubt that the troops had fought with their accustomed gallantry; but at the same time I am quite unable to discover that any ground had really been gained, while it was obvious that the enemy, far from being discouraged by their supposed defeats, were from month to month increasing in boldness and determination ; and the list of casualties but too clearly proved that the loss they had inflicted was at least as certain, aud bore no small proportion to that which they were believed to have sustained. "5. It was impossible that I should continue to receive intelligence of this description by many successive mails without being led to entertain very serious doubts whether the war had been conducted with the energy and the judgment which were necessary to bring it to an early and successful issue; but, distressing as was the anxiety which these doubts occasioned, I have not hitherto allowed them to induce me to deprive you of that support which I know it is of the titmost importance to the public service that those in high military commands should be able to rely on not having withdrawn from them T>y the advisers of the crown, when, in situations of difficulty and danger, success does not at once attend their exertions. " 6. But the information I have now received has converted what was before only a very serious doubt into conviction ; and it is my painful duty to inform you, that having consulted my colleagues on the subject, they have concurred with me in coining to the conclusion that, upon a careful review of the events of the war and those which preceded its breaking out, there is evidence, which it is impossible longer to resist, that you have failed in showing that foresight, energy, and judgment which your very difficult position required, and that therefore we should not be justified in shrinking from tendering to the Queen our humble advice that the Government of the Cape of Good Hope and the conduct of the war should be placed in other hands. It has accordingly been my duty to submit to her Majesty my advice that Major-General Cathcart should be appointed to relieve you, of which her Majesty has been pleased to approve, and that officer will very shortly proceed to the Cape for that purpose. "7. I need hardly assure you that I cannot make this-communication without great pain and sincere reluctance, and that nothing but a sense of imperative duty would have led my colleagues and myself to take the course we have felt ourselves compelled to adopt. " We do full justice to the ardent zeal for her Majesty's service which you have uniformly

displayed ; we have not forgotten how greatly you have distinguished yourself on former occasions, and what a high military reputation you have deservedly obtained; but we have been compelled to believe that, perhaps from the failure of your health, and your being no longer able to exercise so close a personal superintendance as formerly over the conduct of affairs, you have failed in giving, either to your military operations or to your political measures bearing upon the war, that character of vigour and judgment which are necessary to inspire confidence in the inhabitants and troops and to command success. I must remind you that the first error which was committed, and to which I believe the failure of a policy otherwise sound, and the calamity of the war, are mainly attributable, was the premature reduction of the British force under your command. I must take upon myself a share of the blame for this mistake, inasmuch as I had probably too often and too strongly impressed -upon you the importance of reducing the number of troops as soon as this could be safely done. Still your discretion was unfettered, you were left to decide for yourself when the troops should be sent home, since this was a point on which a judgment could only be formed on the spot; and the error, therefore, was your own of supposing that a large proportion of the force which you found in the colony could without danger so soon be dispensed with.

Ci 8. I must also remind you that, up to the eve of the actual breaking- out of hostilities, you continued to send me the strongest assurances that there existed no real danger, and that the apprehensions expressed by the frontier farmers were unfounded. Even when the war began you were so little aware of its true character that you made no application to me for additional force, and neither in your public nor your private letters did you give me the slightest intimation that such aid was required: and the reinforcements which were immediately despatched, as well as those which have been subsequently sent, have all, with the exception of the last, anticipated your demands for them. It is not for me to express any opinion on the detail of your military operations; hut it must strike even an unprofessional observer that, by the employment of means which you considered adequate for the purpose, no serious impression appears to have been made on the enemy.

" It follows that you have either been entirely mistaken in your judgment, and have consequently led her Majesty's Government into error, as to the character of the war and the amount of force required, or else that you have failed in using with effect the force at your disposal. "9. With regard to the political measures bearing upon the result of the war, I must refer you to the despatch which I have been compelled to address to you by the present mail on the neglect of the precautions obviously-required in order to obstruct the supply of ammunition to the enemy. The fault in this respect must no doubt be in part attributed to the Colonial Secretary, whom you had left in charge of the Government at Cape Town, but if you had intimated to me that Mr. Montagu could not alone adequately discharge the arduous duties which devolved upon him in your absence, I should not have failed immediately to have afforded you further assistance, by the appointment of a civil Lieutenant-Governor, to reside at Cape Town during the war—a step I propose adopting now that the necessity for it has thus been disclosed to me.

4< 10. I must also observe that you have, I believe, truly represented to me, that if you had had the Caffres only to contend with, the war would long since have been brought to a close; and that which has made them such formidable enemies has been the assistance they have derived from the rebel Hottentots, too many of whom had been trained as soldiers in the ranks of the British army. But if this is, as I believe, a correct view of the subject, I must regard it as a most fatal error that the first instances of treason among this class of inhabitants of the Cape were not dealt with more promptly and more severely. I cannot resist the belief that had this been done, the contagion of disaffection would have been stayed, as the prompt punishment of the real traitors would have calmed the fears naturally excited among the white inhabitants by seeing their impunity, and would thus have prevented the colonists of European descent from being led to entertain and display that indiscriminate jealousy of their coloured fellow-subjects, which has been, as there is too much reason to t'eivv, the means of driving into

disaffection many of the latter who were not originally inclined to it. >

"11. Lastly, I must regard it as a grievous error that you have allowed the administration of the Orange River territory to remain too long in the hands of an officer in your own opinion unequal to the task, and that by this and other mistakes in your management of the Dutch inhahitants of the frontier districts, you have failed to conciliate that important class, hy whose cordial co-operation there can he no doubt that you would have been enabled to bring the war to a much earlier termination than there is now a prospect of; while, on the contrary, by the distracted condition of the sovereignty, your difficulties in Caffravia have been very seriously increased. The manner in which, by judicious management, Mr. Pine has succeeded in Natal in securing the confidence and attachment of the Dutch farmers, as described in your despatch No. 193, clearly proves that, if properly treated, they may be rendered loyal and useful subjects of the crown. " 12. It has been with much reluctance that I have entered into this review of the errors which you seem to me to have committed, but I have thought it due to your position and to your high reputation to shew that her Majesty's servants have not determined to advise the Queen to supersede you in the midst of the war without sufficient cause for doing so ; and for this reason, painful as it has been to write to you in such a tone of censure, I have been compelled to point out the errors into which you have been betrayed. It is, however, some satisfaction to me to be able to add, that I have no doubt it has been your judgment only which has been in fault, and that, to the best of your ability you have endeavoured to acquit yourself of duties of no ordinary difficulty ; nor do I doubt that in more regular warfare against a civilised enemy, and if your military operations had been less complicated by political difficulties, you would have achieved ihe same success by which you had formerly been so much distinguished. " (Signed) Gkey. "Lieut.-Gen. Sir H, G. Smith', Bart."

On the 7th of April, Sir Harry Smith issued the following manly and soldiery address to the troops, on his relinquishing- the command to General Cathcart-.— General Order. His Excellency Lieutenant-General, the Honourable George Cathcart, having been appointed by the Queen to relieve me. I this day relinquish my command. Brother officers and soldiers !—Nothing is more painful than to bid farewell to old and faithful friends. I have served my Queen and country.many years ; and attached as I; have been to gallant soldiers, none were ever more endeared to me than those serving in the arduous campaign of ISSI-52 in South Africa, The increasing labours, night marches, the burning sun, the torrents of rain, have been encouutered with a cheerfulness as conspicuous as the intrepidy with which you have met the enemy in so many enterprising fights and skirmishes in his own mountain fastnesses and strongholds, and from which you have driven him victoriously. I leave you, my comrades, in the fervent hope of laying before your Queen, your Country, and His Grace the Duke of Wellington, these services as they deserve, which reflect so much honour upon you. Farewell, my comrades! Your honour and interests will ever be more dear to me than my own. H. G. Smith. We take from the Sydney Herald the following touching account of the biave veteran General's departure from William's Town :— On the 9th, Sir George Cathcart and suite landed at East London, and arrived at William's Town on the same day. His Excellency spent the whole of the following clay in conference with Sir Harry Smith, who leit William's Town so early as three oclock on the morning of the 11th (Sunday). On his starting the whole of the troops of the garrison, although not warned for parade, and although it was quite dark, turned out voluntarily, as one man, to take farewell of their old and" revered Commander. An affecting scene ensued; and after a short time, Sir Harry started in a mule waggon, escorted by nearly every officer in garrison and many ol the leading inhabitants, as far :'s Fort Murray. At the drift of this place, the friendly T'Slambie chiefs with old Pato at their head, were assembled to meet him to escort him to EaiLt London. On his drawing up, they re-

ceived him with a shout which resounded through the hills, " Morrow! Tiikosi Inkulu ! Here his Excellency took leave of his officers ; his last words being,'» Gentlemen, take care of the soldiers ; God bless you!" He then proceeded on his journey under escort of Patoand all the chiefs, Umha'la excepted. He was joined further onwards by other parties of friendly Kaffirs, horse and foot, forming a most romantic spectacle ; and, under this escort, the only one which Sir Harry would accept,, he proceeded to East London.