GENERAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER ON THE DUTY OF DEFENCE.

Lyttelton Times, Volume II, Issue 82, 31 July 1852, Page 11

GENERAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER ON THE DUTY OF DEFENCE.

General Sir C. Napier has come before the world as a pamphleteer on the national defences. He thus concludes his brochure : " I have not, in this pamphlet, entered much into the question of improved arms, because writers in abundance with names and without names, have said enough to make our troops lose confidence in ' The Queen of Weapons,' viz., the musket and bayonet, which, as far as I can judge, is the best.' However, men with as much experience, and who are better soldiers tlian I am, hold contrary opinions. Still, I maintain that before the musket and bayonet are condemned, these gentlemen ought, in common fairness, to do that which they have not yet done, viz., have a musket made which costs as much money as the minie rifle, to compare with the latter weapon. They produce a highly finished, beautiful minie rifle, costing a large sum of money, and they try it on Woolwich practice-ground. Now, I have not any confidence in such a trial, where a musket, which costs about a pound, is pitted against a minie rifle that costs probably ten or fifteen guineas.1 Let the musket cost fifteen guineas, and then try it. Let the powder used with both be the very worst that can be made (for on such the fate of a campaign may, by the accidents of war, depend). Take two hardy, uncouth, stupid soldiers ; give one the simple but well-finished musket, costing exactly the same price as the minie rifle, with which arm the other soldier. Let each fire sixty rounds, and then change arms, and fire sixty more, the whole with bad powder; and if the minie beats the musket in rapid firing, in range, and in hitting the target, which should be 6 yards long by 6 feet in height, and that the minie has exactly the musket bore, and the ammunition not heavier, then I think the minie rifle should be tried by two whole regiments as a further experiment, and those regiments should fire 60 rounds of ball cartridge every day, alternately, for one year; and let two more regiments, with muskets as costly and well-finished as the minie rifles, be tried in like manner. Then the results, noted accurately in all their details, would be in some degree decisive ; but both weapons must always be used with the worst description of powder, and by two marching regiments, commanded by men who will surfer no tricks to be played off, and to be under the command of a strict general officer. I laugh at battle powder, a 26-guinea rifle, used by a dead shot, and all sneh humbug, with champagne luncheons at Woolwich, to the great damage of officers' pockets, and ' distinguished foreign travellers' applauding. This is no trial of weapons fit for war. Firing in a. dark night, rainy weather,tired soldiers,clumsy fingers, made more stiff by cold, empty bellies, not a drop of champagne to wash the experiment down, but a stern will to shoot all ' foreigners' the moment they become 'distinguished' in the gloom of the night or the dawning of the day! We do not want fire-arms in the infantry for individual combat in masses, where the nice aim of the deerstalker is not wanted, and human nature will not take it till men grow old in war and become more calm in danger than those who are less practised ; and even the veteran cannot see through the dense smoke of battle; he knows well that to level low and to load quick is his game. If the minie riffe be really an improved musket, I have not another word to say against it; but this is not yet proved ; and before the nation arms its 100,000 men with such weapons, the fact should be very clearly demonstrated. For my part, I don't think the old distich holds good as regards ' Brown Bess'—

' 'Tis good to be off-with the old love Before you are on with the new.' I would by no means c be off with my old love/ till the new one's temper has been better tried. " However, you gentlemen, whose chief work would be distant shots, avoiding a close encounter with the enemy, unless a good opportunity offers for ' skivering him,' as the soldiers say ; you may have 'battle powder,' and champagne too, if you please ; you may try the minie rifle. The weapon that best pleases yon who are dead shots is the best for you, always provided that it carries a musket ball; for there must not be two sizes of ball for the small arms of an army. This is imperative. " One subject more and I have done, for my pamphlet is already too long. It is on railroads, to which the public appears to me to attach an undue importance. Ido not much like to say

anything about this, because the subject of railroads bears on the grand general plans of defence which the Duke has no doubt formed in his own mmd, and will execute, if you gentlemen give him the means of execution ; and on these any suggestions from a humble individual like myself would be presumptuous and impertinent in the extreme. But lam free to say that I cannot see any great military advantage in the railways. The trains may perhaps be used with advantage in bringing troops together rapidly at first —say, the first two or three days. They may also possibly be useful in bringing provisions together. But beyond the first days I sse no advantage. The movements of contending armies couid not be regulated by railways for one moment. I imagine they would embarrass a commander, for they would force him to make movements to cover them or to take them up. I confess that I have not much faith in railways as regards war, except in India. "In the foregoing pages I have carefully abstained from politics. Ido not pretend to conjecture whether the President of France will invade England, or whether he will first quarrel with other powers, or maintain peace. I neither know his character nor his intentions, nor what he may be forced to do by circumstances. He may endeavour to make the Rhine the French frontier. He may attack Egypt. Pie may attack Malta. He may invade England. He may take the Channel Islands. He may invade Ireland. He may play the part of Washington. He may do all these things. He has the courage, the abilities, the strength, and the secresy necessary ; but I have entered into no discussion of such matters, because it is not necessary to my object, not would it be becoming in one who neither has nor seeks to have, any public employment, but who has none of that want of moral courage which fears to be ridiculed us an ' alarmist.' I laugh when I see men begin with ' I am no alarmist,' and go on to show that they are. I think that, when every one believes the country to. be in danger, we should prepare to meet it! Ido not believe that there is any danger if we are bold, and prepared to meet it; but I believe we are in great clanger if we are not prepared. I shall not be listened to. How can an humble individual like myself expect to be listened to, when by the Duke of Wellington you have been ' forewarned,' and are not ' forearmed ?' The greatest and the bravest men in England have sounded the alarm, and are not listened to! But if invasion takes place, I shall have the satisfaction of knowing that, in my own small sphere, I did my best to avert danger by preaching preparation ; showing that, without great expense we can, by a few hours drill in the week, place England in such a posture that to invade her would be an enterprise, if not beyond the power of France, at least demanding her whole force, and even then prove fruitless! As the number of our regular troops is small, you should recollect that from India you could recall your 30,000 old soldiers at once, and let the East India Company raise European troops for itself. It has already six European battalions of its own, which are as good as ours. " Finally, I hold that the militia and volunteers, neither of which can leave England, are the proper forces to prepare for danger in time of peace. Confined to the single object of defence, the arming of such a force can give no cause of umbrage to other nations, The whole world knows that no government can order a single man composing such a force to leave our shores. It depends on you gentlemen, to organise such a force, and, when once this is done, I should say that England is safe, because she would then have a force of such power that she could not be attacked without those great preparations on the part of any enemy, that would give time to make more extended arrangements on ours. The small increase of regular troops now ordered is a plain proof that there is some apprehension on the part of our government. "As to our naval defence, I know nothing-. It belongs to those general arrangements which I have no intention of touching upon. This letter is only to excite country gentlemen to form corps of volunteers, and aid them, as far as I am able, to prepare for any mischief which the force of existing circumstances may produce. " Since writing the above, I hear that the Government propose to call out the militia —it will I hope, meet with your cordial support. The militia and plenty of volunteer corps will place England in a position to defy invasion." C. Napieb.