THE WISDOM AND DUTY OF DEFENCE.

Lyttelton Times, Volume II, Issue 81, 24 July 1852, Page 4

THE WISDOM AND DUTY OF DEFENCE.

(From the Times.) " One would think," said Lord John Russell on the first night of the session, to see some of the letters which have been published, and to hear some of the language which has been used, that two great nations, wealthy, civilised and enlightened, were going to butcher one another merely to see what would be the effect of percussion shells and needle guns." The " cheers and laughter" which followed this remark bespoke a state of opinion highly creditable to the pacific spirit of the age. It is perfectly right and proper that the notion of war when presented in its natural deformity, should appear so absurd as to kindle feelings of ridicule. It was the instinct of common sense which suggested these emotions, and we are convinced that throughout the length and breadth of the country there would be no other sentiment created by a proposal for aggressive war. But, now that these cheers have subsided and the question has resumed its ordinary aspect, we may look at it with a little more attention. And, in the first place, however monstrous the fact may appear, it is nevertheless incontestible not only that " wealthy, civilised, and enlightened" nations have butchered each other with, artificial implements of destruction, but that their propensity to these courses has not unfrequently been in direct proportion to their civilisation and wealth. The great wars of most countries have been contemporaneous with the culminating periods of their history and the reigns of what are termed their greatest monarchs, so that the riches and civilisation of States can hardly be taken as a guarantee for the preservation of peace. In the next place, although the argument may wear a disagreeable appearance, yet, inasmuch as " great and enlightened nations" have unquestionably been manufacturing " percussion shells and needle guns," are we not compelled to conclude, either that they intend them for the purposes of " butchering each other," or that they have constructed them, at an enormous cost, for no purposes at all ? We are disposed to think that, in strict reason, the ridicule implied in Lord John's remark should have been directed against the fabricators of such barbarous machines, and not against those who suggested that, when fabricated, they might possibly be used. In short, to state the whole question concisely, it is perfectly certain that, if wars are ever renewed, they will be carried on with all the murderous aids -which thirty years of scientific study have supplied ; and we have only to determine, by the evidence of our senses and the best exercise of our reason, whether it is or is not probable that war, in consequence of the general enlightenment, has disappeared irom the face of the earth. On this point there can be no middle ground of belief between the most transcendental doctrines of the Peace Society and the most matter of fact calculations of a conscript. If war is not at an end, we are very much behind hand in the means of defence. Mr. Cobden's arguments on this question have the merit, at any rate, of consistency and straitforwardness. He scouts the very notion of war, and, instead of improving our armaments, would knock off ten millions from their cost. If he is right in his assumption, he is right in his deduction. If the plain selfinterests of nations, plainly understood, have placed these bloody doings beyond the possibility of recurrence, we are bearing a needless charge in the army and navy estimates; but after admitting, as Lord John Russell did, that " war was always possible," and defence always necessary, it was little less than folly to laugh at percussion shells and needle guns. We are of opinion that war, even as things stand, is not probable, and we should have said, a few weeks ago, that it grew less probable every day; but as we cannot, in the face of evidence around us, accept the absolute proposition of the Peace Society, we must take up with the doctrines of self-defence; nor do we think, in reviewing our resources, that we can afford to sneer at shells and muskets of the last invention. Ministers have, perhaps, been biassed in their resolutions by the advocates of unconditional economy and the precipitate missionaries of peace ; but, as they are now impressed with a different view of their duties, it becomes of the highest consequence to see that none of the projected expenditure is thrown away or misapplied. We very much doubt whether all that is required might not be done with our

existing estimates, if the funds were properly distributed ; but, at all events, our future exertions should be in the right direction. As the whole country is unanimous in deriding the notion of aggressive hostilities, it follows directly that those who wish for war with us must come to seek it, or, in other words, that war • will take the form of invasion. Against invasion there are two methods of defence—one by obstructing the passage of the Channel, and another by encountering the invader on our own shores. A third method—that of holding our tongues for fear of giving offence—we trust the Prime Ministers of this country, whether present or prospective, will not, on reflection, be found to recommend.

If the Channel could be effectually guarded, there would be no question about the propriety of concentrating our efforts on this point. Such a course would at once make a descent impossible, and prevention is better than cure. Better peace even than victory—better stop an expedition than destroy it. Besides this, a naval force costs us both less in charge and less in annoyance. It removes the danger from the threshold to the meadow, produces less disturbance in the community, and agrees best with our national aptitudes. So cogent are these reasons, that we believe the country is of one mind as to the expediency of a sufficient demonstration in the Channel, and to this object, therefore, our attention should first be turned. We have ships in abundance, and there would be found, we trust, no great lack of steamers; but it must be remembered that the affair, if ever such a calamity occurs, will be an affair, liot of years or months, but of days, or perhaps hours. The problemn to be solved is the maintenance, in the best form and at the lowest cost, of such a force as would prevent, with all reasonable likelihood, the navy of any other State from obtaining, for however short a period, the command of the Channel. For this purpose it is obvious that we want ships in readiness and seamen at hand. The former could be promptly prepared, but the latter would be less easilycome by. At present we believe that all the seamen available for urgent duty would not be numerous enough to man more than half, if so much, of a good Channel fleet, nor can we indeed expect or desire that the personnel of such a fleet should be permanently maintained by the votes for the naval service. We must look, therefore, to the best compromise, and this we shall not be long in discovering if we recollect what are the duties before us. We should he called upon not so much for trained seamen as trained gunners. We should have to fight, or at all events to form a line of battle, on the waters of the Channel. We should not be called upon for long expeditions or tedious cruises, nor need the regular navy be interfered with in the duties of blockade. We should want to extemporise a powerful force, at a moment's notice, to fight by sea. The power of steam, combined with the improvement of artillery, has done much to assimilate land and sea combats. Hereafter, ships will be so many floating batteries, and victory will belong to that side which has the best guns and the steadiest gunners. It is said that even in a land fight the day will hereafter be invariably decided by bullets, aud the result is still "more certain on the waves. We have, or at least we ought to have, the finest war-steamers in the world, and we have a mercantile marine to back them such as no other country possesses. We have guns enough in our arsenals to blow all the fleets of Europe out of the water ; we want, therefore, but men to put these materials to use. The campaign in all probability would not last 48 hours, but as many minutes could, perhaps, hardly be spared in sending our force to sea. Clearly, therefore, our chief efforts should be thrown on our artillery, and on artillery available not only ashore, but afloat. What is required is a few thousand men so far habituated to shipboard ways as not to be actually at fault, and thoroughly well trained, we must needs add, in the use of " heavy guns and percussion shells." These guns and shells, Lord John may rely upon it, will do the business for one party or the other, and Aye have no desire to let the advantage slip from our hands. It may still be desirable, considering all the capacities of steam, to maintain something like a force producible between Dover and London, but if by a judicious augmentation of our marine artillery we show ourselves prepared for a stout fight in the Channel, the odds are greatly in our favour that we shall never be called upon to fire a gun.