THE GAS WEAPON

King Country Chronicle, Volume XXVIII, Issue 4634, 11 December 1934, Page 7

THE GAS WEAPON

HOW BRITAIN PREPARED. FOR OFFENSIVE OF 1919. If the war had continued into 1919 Germans would have been assailed by a new chemical weapon whose "effect on the enemy, both moral and physical, would have been overwjhelming,"writes Captain M. Liddell Hart in the Daily Telegraph. This weapon, described in a book just published, was the "M" device — therom-genereators which produced a cloud of arsencic in minute separate particles by which even the latest patterns of German gas masks could be "easily penetrated at a distance of several miles."

"As the particular cloud was effective in one-hundredth the concentration of the gas cloud, and the German protection against it was nonexistent, complete success was absolutely certain if only the secret could be kept."

The effect of the cloud was not lethal, but was calculated to disable the victim completely for a time. "It would open the road for our infantry in the minimum of time, without any warning a'nd practically without loss; and trench warfare would be converted into open warfare in a day."

A new "Green Band" container was devised to give protection to our own assaulting troops, and this was to have been issued at the last moment — to prevent the enemy gaining any clue to the surprise prepared. Tanks were to be employed in swarms to exploit the success gained.

This account of the "M" device is contained in "Gas—The Story of the Special Brigade," by Major-General C H. Foulkes, who commanded this force of chemical troops during the war.

Appointment Surprise.

So great has been the outpouring of evidence that it is rare now to come upon a new war book which adds materially to cur knowledge. But this is empahtically one that does. Not only is it the fullest account of the chemical service in the war, a service long shrouded in secrecy, but several of its disclosures are more completely fresh than that of the 1919 project, while hardly less significant. One of the earliest is General Foulkes's candid admission about the circumstances of his own appointment. For it certainly illuminates the attitude of the military hierarchy towards the need for expert knowledge. Summoned suddenly to G.H.Q* in May, 1915, he was ushered into the presence of Sir William Robertson, the Chief of Staff, who asked him: "Do you know anything about gas?" Major Foulkes honestly replied: "Nothing at all." At which General Robertson remarked: "Well, I don't think it matters; I want you to take charge of our gas reprisals here in France. .Something- is going on in London and you must cross over and find out all about it. Then come back here and tell me what you propose to do." With that he was dismissed, and shortly found himself "promoted to lieutenantcolonel, with the title of 'gas adviser"!" The book adds to the mass of evidence already available as to the amazing number of warnings the French and our own higher command received of the German introduction of gas at Ypres in April, 1915—only to poh-pooh them. It gives personal testimony, by contrast, to the insight and instinct for surprise of Mr. Lloyd George when the author first discussed gas reprisals with him. Haig, to his credit, seems to have shown a marked appreciation of its possibiliites. Kitchener is once again shown as an obstructionist.

More Than Realised.

The author gives much evidence from the German side to show that our first gas attack at Loos had much more effect than was realised, and in so doing taxes the Official History with certain errors. He also gives figures to show that only ten of our men died from the drifting back of our own gas.

The value that might have been devised from our gas discharges in the Somme offensive was forfeited, because Rawlinson, the Army commander, left the arrangements to subordinate commanders, "the result being that the o'ne big operation that had been planned was broken up into a number of smaller attacks, thus putting the enemy on the alert after fhe first had taken place." It is shown that nearly all the Army commanders were sceptical as to the value of gas attacks, which had a natural influence on the action, if not on the attitude, of G.H.Q. Gough is quoted as taking a disparaging view both of gas and tanks. General Foulkes believes that we lost many opportunities by substituting gas shells for gas clouds, for which "the wind was favourable for the Allies ten times as frequently" as for the Germans. The development of our offensive measure was interrupted by the Ger-

man offensive of 1918. General Foulkes considers that the Germans failed more signally than ourselves to profit by the chemical weapon except for the success scored when they introduced mustard gas, with its longlasting inflection of an area. An important piece of 'new evidence on the disaster of March 21 is that from March 15 onwards the German mustard gas bombardments "ceased entirely on the Third and Fifth Army fronts, except opposite Cambrai. Thus the enemy gave us a clear indication of the exact extent of this intended attack—a warning from which we might have profited better in disposing our reserves.