The Star. Delivered every evening by 5 o'clock in Hawera, Manaia, Normanby, Okaiawa, Eltham, Mangatoki, Kaponga, Awatuna, Opunake, Otakeho, Manutahi, Alton, Hurleyville, Patea, Waverley. SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1916. THE WAR.

Hawera & Normanby Star, Volume LXXI, Issue LXXI, 19 February 1916, Page 4

The Star. Delivered every evening by 5 o'clock in Hawera, Manaia, Normanby, Okaiawa, Eltham, Mangatoki, Kaponga, Awatuna, Opunake, Otakeho, Manutahi, Alton, Hurleyville, Patea, Waverley. SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1916. THE WAR.

The week lias been marked by important incidents and developments. Germany has been actively engaged on the offensive in France, but so far she has obtained no decisive advantage, and her minor gains have been afterwards wrested from her. There is an opinion that her operations, so far, are merely, preliminary incidents in a campaign of comprehensive and continuous assaults on the French and British fronts. Such a campaign was talked of months ago, but some observers now believe that it has been precipitated by the Allies themselves because they are of opinion that the circumstances are favorable to results that will be favorable to them. One critic thinks that the dispositions made in the Balkans by the Allies have been made with a view to compelling the Germans to do in France exaetjy what they are now doing— that is 3 to attack. By attacking, the Germans are rendering it unnecessary that the Allies should attack, in order to get that mobility which was impossible without the heavy losses that would be entailed by having to force the Germans out of their defensive positions. It is also his opinion that the I present German activity in France is a j proof that the Allies are now imposing their will upon the German strategists and constraining them to play into the hands of the Allies by immolating their men upon the Allied ring of steel in France and raising the German wastage to the maximum rate, which the Allies believe will soon exhaust the German reserves. It may be that this is not an unwarranted assumption, and the progress and results of the campaign may justify it. At the same time there are strong circumstantial reasons why Germany should act on motives and with objects entirely her own in the matter. Her weakness in the Balkans and the Middle East, and her designs on Egypt, are enough to induce her to try to subject the Allies in France and Flanders to such pressure that it will at least—if it does not lead to any other results decisively adverse to them—make it more or less impossible for them to spare or move any more troops to the Balkans or Egypt; indeed, she may count on succeeding to an extent which may even constrain the Allies to withdraw men and munitions from those quarters. Anyway/ whatever Germany's reasons may be, she is certainly conducting a vigorous offensive against the French and Briish fronts in France; but, so far, not only without any decisive discomfiture to the Allies, but at the cost of serious losses to herself. Ethically regarded, her action appears to be akin to that of the desperate -gambler who takes extravagant risks in the hope of making a great coup. A similarly reckless spirit is manifesting itself in connection with the Balkans, where Roumania now has placed all her forces on .a war footing, and the Kaiser is even savagely threatening her to throw in her lot with Germany. "If (says the Kaiser) Roumania disbelieves the fate of Belgium, if is because Belgium is distant. I hope she will not be blinded to the spectacle of Serbia. If that does not awaken her from her dreams, the Austro-Germans, Bulgars, and Turks have sufficient troops to throw across the Danube towards Bucharest." Even if the text of this threat should be conjectural or exaggerated, it is substantially in keeping with German methods and with the spirit of des-1 peration which has for some time been so noticeable in the- whole German policy—civil and military. And the momentous reverse which the Kaiser and his friends have received by Russia's magnificent achievement in capturing Erzerum, is certain to increase that spirit, for it may turn out to be as important to the Allies as the capture of Met-z was to the Germans themselves in the Franco-Prussian War. The capture is at least the great event of the weel: and one of the greatest since the war began. We have already referred to some of its far-reaching results favorable to the Allies, and other consequences equally as important may be expected to come shortly into view. Concurrently with this great gain to them, the Allies have been developing a unity in political administration and in military authority designed to increase their co-operative effectiveness, so that when all the conditions and circumstances are reflectively considered, they are seen to justify substantial satisfaction and confident hope in the minds of the British people and in those of their Allies. Nevertheless, to guarantee the continuance of this satisfaction and this hope, and to ensure the results to which thoy point, it is necessary to continue the organisation of ultimate success, by vigor-ously-maintaining every effort now in hand in every part of the Empire; such as our own recruiting scheme, provision for sxifferers by the war, the maintenance of productive and industrial energy, and wise and constant economy on the part of individuals and the State. Only in this way can we truly help to ensure the Empire's success, and fit ourselves and the country to face the conditions that will confront when the war is over.