ZAPATA.

Hawera & Normanby Star, Volume LXII, Issue LXII, 18 May 1912, Page 10

ZAPATA.

(By RICHARD BARRY in Harper's Weekly.)

In the Spanish newspapers published in the City of Mexico, Zapata, the bandit, who is now terrorising three or iour btates, is frequently referred to as "the Arab of the youth!" Tnis is, perhaps, a grandiose phrase to apply to an outlaw in a protessedly civilised country. In Mexico the .Latin sense of romantic drama has become mere absurd sensationalism where it is not degenerate deviltry, and to apotheosise a brigand until he is compared even by the authorities which are seeking Ms destruction to one of the great generals of ancient history is entirely in j keeping with the generally debauched perspective. HIS HISTORY IS STARTLING. One day in December, 1910, there entered Madero's camp in northern Sonora a dashing fellow less than thirty years of age. The slouchiness, the laziness, the stupidity and the cowardliness, of the average Mexican were absent from his make up. Instead, Zapata was lithe in figure, mentally quick, and decisive in manner. These qualities being the opposite of Madero's own, and matched elsewhere in the revolutionists' camp only by Orozco, Madero's chief of staffs the recruit made an instant impression. The information he brought, however, was more telling than his person. He declared that his native State of Morelos, next to tne smallest in the republic, but very populous and with its eastern border contiguous to the State of Mexico, was ready to rise against Diaz at any moment —in fact, as soon as arms and ammunition and a suitable leader were supplied to its inhabitants. Madero thereupon caused Zapata to be furnished with the war material he desired, and the intrepid young rebel started south on what then seemed a desperate adventure, but which proved to be the splendid career of a revolutionary conqueror. His operations in the States of Morelos, Oaxaca and Guerrero, in which he burned haciendas, looted villages, killed foreigners and routed the continuous detachments of federal troops sent against him, covering the first four months of 1911, formed a conclusive argument in forcing Diaz to resign. Eyen the newspaper's avowedly-loyal to Diaz referred to Zapata in big red headlines as "The Scourge." The story of that; four months' hard work would fill a volume, but it is of Zapata, the bandit of today, rather than of Zapata, the rebel, of last year, that I intend to tell here. When peace had been declared, Madero sent word to Zapata to lay down his arms. Zapata's answer was to ride into the little town of Xuaittl at the head of a band of lawless men who could never have been called an army save by the euphemism of a desperate politician, rout the small federal garrison, loot the stores, and kill all who opposed him, as well as a number of innocent Mexicans who merely happened to have the ill luck to get,in the path of the invaders' bullets. Shortly after this, on May 27, Diaz who in his prime would have known how to deal promptly and effectively with such a desperado, left the shores of his troubled country. A week later his successor entered the City of Mexico as a private citizen and took up an official residence, from which, ostensibly, he passively awaited the outcome of the fatal elections, but from which, in factj he issued the executive orders and made the proprietary appeals which, after his inauguration, issued constantly from the presidental palace. One of Madero's first moves was to send for Zapata, who promptly came into the city to see him. "Don Pancho'' (a popular derivative of Mr Francesco which is Madero's first name), "implored"—to use the phrase of his vociferous journalistic applauders —Zapata to cease fighting and lay down his arms, and he promised that if this were done the young leader should' have a substantial place In the Government forces once the elections were over. Zapata agreed to all that he was "implored" to do, but, before he left the city, he induced Madero to advance him 30,000 pesos (about £3000). This advance was made from Madero's private funds, as at that time he had NO LEGAL WAY OF REACHING THE PUBLIC EXCHEQUER, Within a fortnight "the hordes of Zapata," as they have ever since been called by the Mexican yellow press, were loose again, and the "Attila of the South" had begun his newer and more glorious career. By the middle of July the numbers which had risen at his command were incalculable, and El Mexicano Heraldo published a news despatch from Morelo reporting that he had an "army" of 15,000 men. Early in August El Imparcial reported that he had 20,000 men under his command. The provisional Government, under De la Barra, made a number of futile efforts to stop the depredations, which differed from those made when Diaz was still in the presidental chair only in their accelerated ferocity. However, instead of making a swift campaign after the person of Zapata, arresting him promptly, and executing him following a hurried court-martial, as Diaz would probably have done, the orders issued against him were merely defensive. The Federal garrisons in the various towns were ordered to be on the watch for him and to "resist" his approach. The effect of this, in several cases at least, was to make certain lesser Federal officers ignore the coming of Zapata, in reward of which ignorance they received a share of the booty that the bandit was thus enabled to take from the more prosperous townspeople. On the very day when Madero was inaugurated President, .November 6, the various bands which were operating under Zapata broke loose in eleven different places m the States of Morelos, Oaxaca and Guerrero. Whether by design or accident it seemed as if THE WILY AND AUDACIOUS BANDIT was determined to serve a formal and terrible notice that his former chief must walk the plank that Diaz had walked. Since then, every few days, there is reported a "raid," or an "outbreak," or a "battle" in which Zapata is always invariably the victor. In the Federal reports these affairs are '''battles"; in the political language of the capital they are "raids," and in the .mouths, of. the anti-Maderistas they are "outbreaks."

The whole State of Morelos is now practically under the control of Zapata. By "control" I do not mean that he has any organised political or even military government. It would be more accurate to say that he has the State terrorised. The Federal Governor no longer dares to maintain a permanent residence; several of the cities have been depopulated through the inhabitants hearing of Zapata's approach and fleeing to the hills, leaving their goods and chattels behind; while practically all the foreigners have lett. Early in December Zapata started out at the head of a maurading band of perhaps a thousand lawless followers, determined to "throw a scare" into the city of Mexico. He rode within sight of the city, set on lire three small villages, and ro&e away again. Tho smoke from Eis devastation could be seen from the spires of the cathedrals in the capital, then made a long detour to the west and south, and on Christmas Day again appearea near Tenancmgo, in the State of Mexico, within easy telephone distance of the city. There he overtook twenty rurales, and killed thirteen of tuem, the rest escaping. Some women, wives of the rurales, and a child, who witnessed the butchery and protested, were killed, and THEIR BODIES WERE THEN MUTILATED. Whatever becomes of Zapata—and there must be some end to him soon, or else he will accomplish what is freely asserted as being his object, the amassment of a large amount of money with which lie will flee abroad —lie will doubtless go down in history as the most remarkable bandit the North American continent has ever seen. The United States has had remarkable outlaws, but none which ever threatened the life of the general government itself. Mexico has had bandits of many kinds and degrees, but none before whose scope of operations has been so wide or whose magnified outlawry has been, so continuous and so audacious. At the same time, Zapata may not be called either a politician or a general. It is not apparent that he has any desire for office, and his military discipline is purely Corsiean; formally he appoints no subordinates, he has no roil calls, no drill, no organisation. His success is due to the intensity of Ins personality and the weakness of the present Government of Mexico. He creates a follower in the simplest manner —by handing him a rifle. A firearm in Mexico means wealth and ! power. To give one to a peon at once makes him a de facto government in himself. Killing him is the only effective answer to his invincible belief that, by grace of his rule, he has as many rights as "Don Pancho" himself. The only political reason for Zapata's increased strength since Madero's inauguration lies in the fact that Madero INDULGED IN MANY EXTRAVAGANT PROMISES before his revolution was successful. He assured the people that it' they would drive out Diaz and place him in power he would divide up the great estates and place them under the ownership of the whole people. Of course he has not fulfilled these promises, and the result is that Zapata finds an easy and effective argument to use-with many who might otherwise hesitate to become mere outlaws. "As Don Pancho has not given you what is yours," says Zapata, in effect, "take this rifle and follow me and I will give you what you have been promised and have not received." Thus Madero's fills? political preaching has reacted. A large number of foreigners holding property in Southern Mexico have been forced to "contribute" to Zapatn, who evidently possesses the cool sauvity of the traditional bandit as well as tho ferocious cunning. Thoso "contributions" are made in the hope th.it thue devastation and murder may be avoided, though they are not always successful. *