TREASURES IN PUBLIC LIBRARY

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume XXVI, Issue 112, 24 April 1936, Page 9

TREASURES IN PUBLIC LIBRARY

The Great War and the Years Before

(Contributed by H. R. FRENCH)

In our library are books, which if read with care, would or should end tho free and easy manner with which a growing number of people aver first that alt statesmen hud nearly an equal responsibility for the Great War; second that it was mainly caused by trade rivalry between Germany and Great Britain; third that financiers were the principal sinners. It is necessary to stress the freedom of the British press, and the consequent liberty and power of British public opinion. If we wish to interpret the Hanger clouds of 1936 by the tragedy that developed in 1914, this primary fact must be emphasised. Prior to the assassination of the Austrian royal pair, which was the incident that set the world in a blaze, the relations between the peoples of Germany and Britain were better than they had been for years. Visits were interchanged between prominent groups of citizens, and as Sir Edward Grey points out in his “Twenty-live Years,’’ even official variances on several viewpoints were in process of adjustment, though suggestions from Britain for a naval shipbuilding holiday were not accepted by Germany. Unfortunately the war lords ruled in that land, and that their head was one who is the chief witness against himself. In Ludwig's “Kaiser Wilhelm ll.’’ tho author constructs the portrait wholly from the Kaiser's own deeds and words, together with the reports of those who stood in close relation to him. lu that book no adversary of the Emperor is culled on to Lear witness. His own parents could not endure him. Bismark sought to prevent him from making marginal notes oa official documents, but the habit persisted and those notes are his condemnation. The book is there for subscribers to read. Suffice to state, that the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia which was intended to bring war, was duly laid before the Kaiser, who inscribed the marginal note “Now or never!’’ His Ambassador at Vienna reported, “1 seize every similar op portunity of advising, very quietly, but very decidedly nnd earnestly against any rash steps.’’ When Wilhelm read that necessary and wise advice, did he say “Well done.’’ Not he. This is the report of one present: “The Emperor broke out furiously in the course of perusal, ‘Who gave him ary such instructions? It’s idotic! He has nothing to do with it. . . . Tschirsehky, if you please is to have done with that nonsense! The Serbs must be wiped out, and at once!’ ” No wonder Sir Edward Grey’s wholehearted efforts tc effect a settlement were to fail. Of Grey’s sincerity many responsible Germans have testified. The Kaiser played the part his war lords desired. They had toasted “Der Tag” so openly ami so long that there must have been some reaction in British circles as well as in French.

Most illuminating are the two volumes dealing with Lord Fisher’s life. He was the apostle Of naval efficiency. He was in charge of the British Mediterranean fleet during the time of the Boer War. All the Powers knew with what swiftness and precision every movement of that fleet was carried out. Noto this: At the close of that war Fisher received two letters, one from the Emperor of Austria, and the other from tho Sultan of Turkey. In both “very secret” epistles, which the end of their regimes permits tho world to know, Fisher was told war would then have spread to Europe but for the preparedness of his fleet. Just as Henry Wilson and Douglas Haig were convinced for years ithat the German military machine would move to action at the opportunity regarded as favourable, so was Fisher likewise minded. He went further. Some years before he set the start of the conflict as October, 1914! He was fully persuaded that, his production of the dreadnoughts would postpone the outbreak until the German Navy Lords could take counter measures, one of which necessitated the widening of the Kiel Canal, He considered wi:o should have command of our Grand Fleet in that contingency. He deciued on John Jellicoe, and his recommendation was confirmed. Step by step Jellicoe's seniors were retired, so that in July, 1914, Jellicoe was in command.

It was awful to consider that the peoples whose main desire was to live in peace were simply treated as insignificant pawns. The same danger was led to tho tragedy of 1914-18 exists to-day. We ought justly and fearlessly to face the history of the reactions of that period to seek guiding principles for the present. Whatever action was taken by British authorities they had the restriction of a peace desiring public. That did not apply in Germany in 1914 because the ponce desiring public there could not exerciso the same power of restraint. Can it to-day? Can it in Italy ? Can it in Japan? It is necessary to set out some of the evidence available as to British ro actions. The British Cabinet, though well aware of the growing German menace, would probably have never decided ou an ultimatum to Germany but for her pledge to maintain the neutrality of Belgium Before the fateful decision there were three parties in the Cabinet. What would Lloyd George do? He had, whether rightly or wrongly, opposed the Boer War. (Upon that subject Bernard Shaw has something pertinent to say. It is recorded by Frank Harris.) He bud accepted the responsibility of clearly indicating to Germany that Great Britain must in self protection answer any challenge to her senior service. In Lord Riddell’s interesting book, ho records how Lloyd George responded to the German Ambassador’s approach. Lloyd George told the Ambassador that though he was strongly opposed to armaments, ho would not hesitate a moment to ask Parliament for £100,000,000 to ensure the navy against rivalry. Unless the Germans showed care they would drive Great Britain into conscription. The Ambassador smiled and said, “But we should not wait.”

This Ambassador, Count Metternich, hnd frankly declared in July, 1908, that tho English Ministers were all for peace and only wanted a reciprocal diminution in the Navy Estimates. Ludwig publishes the Kaiser’s marginal notes on that declaration: “A veiled threat! Wo will suffer no dictation. It is a piece of boundless impudence, a mortal insult, to the German people

and their Emperor; it must be imperatively and finally discountenanced. . . . The law (for naval construction) will bo carried out to the last fraction, whether Britain likes it or not is nothing to us. If they want war, let them begin it—we are not afraid!” Lloyd George would not know of that comment till after the war, but he did know that the Ambassador would have nothing to do with him utter his frankness. And he did know how Sir Arthur llardinge in 1908, and Lord Haldane in 1912, were repulsed by the Keiser for daring to suggest naval limitation agreement betw-een the two countries. Still he was for peace, if Germany was raithful to her pledge to Belgium. It was the breaking of that pledge that made the path of duty clear. Morley and Burns resigned from tho Cabinet. Not till Sir Edw-ard Grey stated tho issues to Parliament and received tin, support of that body, did the Government know whether the nation would follow its lead. It was not the pressure of financiers, it was not the fear of trade rivalry, or even of naval challenge, but the deep sense that the growth of law and subsequent peace depends upon the observance of the solemn pledge given by one nation to another, was the determining factor that led to British intervention.

The library has more evidence. Before the Cabinet’s decision was made Lord Rothschild on behalf of Loudon financiers pleaded with tears that war would bring ruin. Mrs. Asquith tells us in her books, how her husband, the Prime Minister, called the bankers a lot of ninnies. Lord Gladstone declared he would take’ the platform against Britain’s participation until persuaded by his friend Pringle to re-read what his great father had to say about pledges to Belgium. What a tussle there was 111 the office of the “Daily Mail’' between Lord Nortlicliffie and Editoi Marlowe, which Tom Clarke records In his “Northcliffe Diary.” Nortlicliffie vehemently opposed the dispatch of a British force to France. “Not a single soldier shall leave.” The printers received two separate leaders, one prepared by Northcliffe, the other by Marlowe, and two separate articles and banner lines for the news pages m direct contradiction to each other. Both were prepared for publication lu page form. Euitor Marlowe placed his linger on the shoulder of the foreman printer and said, “Neither of these pages go through without my express order.” The whole edition was held up waiting for the’ dramatic decision. When it came, it was seen that the Chief, as Lord Northcliffe was termed, had been persuaded to change his mind. Nor was ho the only powerful journalist to show opposition. Sir William Robertson Nicoll, editor of the widely read non-conformist paper, the “British Weekly,” Lord Riddell tells us, stated his intention to rouse his lighting companies against the war. Again when the real issue became clear to him, that it was not financial pressure, nor trade rivalry, nor naval challenge, but the necessity to vindicate justice to which Great Britain was pledged, did he change his view. When the American Ambassador to Germany, Judge Gerrard, asked the Kaiser it' his armies would not soon reach Paris, the Kaiser replied in words to tho effect, that now tho British had entered the war the position was changed, for the < British were obstinate and would keep on lighting. He was right. These men whose evidence is indicated herein who hesitated with profound dislike to what war involved as soon as they recognised the moral issue involved, and the efforts made for the avoidance of the conflict, became unshaken that violators of treaties must not be allowed to crush the tiny plant of international right. The library has many witnesses of the unconquerable spirit of Lloyd George. His own books should be read. Though the Rothschilds and Lloyd George had been strong opponents yet their willingness to aid when hostilities began won the respect of the Welshman. Gladstone ever hating war went to the front and gave his life to vindicate the call to defend inter-

national Law. The work of Northcliffe IS referred to in many volumes. He definitely risked all be had to tell what he thought the nation shoulu know, and when he believed those services justified his inclusion in the peace delegation Lloyd George told him to go to a warmer climate. Robertson Nicoll did not reveal the physical weakness from which he suffered. As ever his lead was clear and strong. Tne Kaiser knew something of the British people, more than some of our nationals, who will not trouble to read and weigh the evidence. These folk think it judicial to remark, “Lvcryone was to blame. Lveryone acted much alike.” lx such a charge is true let it be verified. Because it has been bred in Britishers to endeavour to be just and because press and public opinion would arraigu King, Lords, aud Commons, if they failed therein; we should be at least as competent to see tho real issues, which are always moral; as uny people on earth. So a witness in our library records that while some hundreds of Germans were arrested in their own land for espionage, not one British bora citizen was ever so charged. Two other books should be read, as interesting as they are historic. They are Captain Whitfield’s story of the steadfastness and courage of our Mercantile Marine, and the way in which sailors were shelled as they swum for life after their craft had been sunk. Buch things should cease, but they never will while solemn promises are allowed to be broken. The other book is Gir Geo. Aston’s “Secret Service.” Also turn to Gerard’s “My Four Years iu Germany.” He writes, “During that time in Berlin 1 learned to have a very high regard for the British character. Tire prisoners of war kept their uniforms clean and their buttons polished and maintained the same cheerfulness as the nation has done through the depression from which Great Britain is emerging.” With the same courage Great Britain is now emerging from a greater depression. Not one word is written to lessen the story of tho heroism of other nations, nor to imply that any but a small portion of our enemies failed in the dictates of common humanity. 1 do suggest that unbridled power made the minority callous to justice and to human rights. It was the failure to tell the Kaiser the plain truth that allowed his egotism to grow and gave him an increased unbalance that despite good intentions he became the tool of his war lords he thought he ruled. This testimony ought to be preserved, for the chief actors are here on record. Much more could be said on subsidiary matters, such as war munition makers and the understanding between Great Britain and France, but my space is full. ■