IHE H.B TRIBUNE SATURDAY, APRIL 15, 1933 THE BRITISH NAVY.

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume XXIII, Issue 105, 15 April 1933, Page 6

IHE H.B TRIBUNE SATURDAY, APRIL 15, 1933 THE BRITISH NAVY.

Possibly one of the most significant items in President Roosevelt’s economy programme is to be found in the intimation that there is to be a substantial reduction in the appropriations for the building of warships. In carrying this expressed intention out he will possibly meet with a good deal of opposition from the ‘‘Big Navy” group that has hitherto exercised considerable influence in Congress. It may be, however, that even it will, for the time being, be silenced by the financial difficulties that have so unexpectedly overtaken their country. On the other hand, we hear from London that there is to be at least an appreciable increase in the amount the House of Commons will be called upon to vote for the now current financial year’s expenditure upon the Navy. Nor can it be said that this is in any way unjustifiable. As a London correspondent has pointed out, probably few of us out here have realised that the British Navy, on which we depend for our security, is now relatively weaker than it has been since the opening of the Napoleonic Wars. The effect of the Washington Treaty of 1922 and‘the London Naval Treaty signed some eight or nine years later has been to reduce the Empire’s sea forces, in several important factors, to quite secondary rank and to make it doubtful whether, in the event of war, the lines of even our essential ocean communications could be kept open. Political, official and public* opinion in the Hid Country, it is averred, is that unless some definite and universal scheme of fleet retrenchment is adopted at Geneva, then a substantial navy programme will become immediately necessary. Tt is also agreed that, in the event of the Disarmament Conference ending in failure, Great Britain, for her own safety’s sake, will refuse in 1936 to renew naval treaties in anything like their existing form.

More than a year ago the respective Ministers responsible for the services warned the country that the drastic cuts in expenditure then reluctantly accepted could not be repeated without seriously undermining the strength and efficiency of the nation’s defences. The naval bill was at that time some £5O-1 million, representing a reduction of more than a million upon the abnormally low figure of the previous year. The increased vote to be asked for the financial year just entered upon arises from the absolute need for making up some at least of the dangerous leeway in naval construction. The Admiralty has, indeed, indicated that such an increase will be required not only for 1933-34, but also for some further years to come. It is regarded as an alarming aspect of the present position that since the London Treaty was signed some three years ago the principal foreign Powers have added very materially to their naval strength. France and Italy have each built more than eighty new war vessels, and there have also been impressive additions by both Japan and the United States. Each of the latter countries, so it is said, has a greater number of modern cruisers in commission than Great Britain, who, to make matters worse, now occupies merely fifth position in modern destroyer and submarine tonnage. Moreover, the British naval personnel is some 27,000 fewer than that of America and only 3000 more than the Japanese. Considering the immense and scattered area that has to be protected, this wastage in personnel is a grave problem in itself. Although at a time of emergency new ships may be speedily built, it is not so easy to provide properly trained men to command and fight them. It had, of course, been hoped that an agreed scheme of naval disarmament would long ere this have been evolved at Geneva, but that hope has so far been sadly disappointed. Nor can it be said that it has been confidently revived by t he negotiations which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald has recently been conducting with Continental Powers. Britain’s gesture of good will, as expressed in her voluntary reduction of sea power, has as yet been without avail, and the only alternative, failing an early international undertaking, lies in rebuilding to former strength. She is, of course, bound to keep within clearly defined limits during the currency of the existing treaties expiring in 1936, but after that she can either demand drastic amendments or decline to renew them.