THE H.B. TRIBUNE WEDNESDAY, MARCH 6, 1929 FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume XIX, Issue 67, 6 March 1929, Page 4

THE H.B. TRIBUNE WEDNESDAY, MARCH 6, 1929 FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

As was entirely appropriate to tho occasion, President Hoover, in his inaugural aiddress last Monday, avoided anything that might be called a contentious international question. He, on the other hand, stressed America’s aim as being the preservation of peace, and disclaimed any thought of her seeking to assume an attitude of domination in any international sphere. At the same time, sooner o». later, he will have to face the question of naval armaments that has been so much in the air of late. This question has ultimately, for America, resolved itself mainly, so American speakers and writers have said, into one of preserving the “freedom of the seas” in wartime. The avowed policy of both the British and the American Government has been to bring about further limitations of naval strength, if only a mutually acceptable formula can be devised upon which it can be based. Yet the American Senate has now authorised the building of fifteen new cruisers of the largest type permitted by the Washington Five-Power naval treaty of 1922. This, we are told, is America’s answer to the British proposals put forward at Geneva in 1927 and to the so-called Anglo-French naval pact of 1928, which created such an unnecessary stir. Also, the Senate has passed a resolution that America favours a restatement of the international law governing the rights of neutrals at sea.

As this latter proposal would now seem to provide the real crux of the problem, it may be as well to note how it is discussed by an anonymous writer with some apparent inner knowledge on the subject. It is, of course, aimed at the methods whereby blockades have hitherto been enforced; it raises a question which has engendered bitterness between Britain and the United States in the past, and may jeopardise their relations in the future. We are wont to say, rather complacently, that war between these two countries is “unthinkable.” But it is hinted that the very fact of this comfortable belief being affirmed so repeatedly suggests that such a war is not beyond the bounds of contemplation. Were Britain and America the oniy nations that had to be considered we could put faith in the assurance. In disagreements affecting . themselves alone their reliance upon arbitration is established.

But there is a possibility that Britain and America might be embroiled as a result of measures which the former would be constrained to adopt in pursuance of her obligations to other Powers. As a member of the League and a signatory of the Locarno Treaty, Britain may be required to take disciplinary action against a disturber of the peace. In many instances a blockade would be the most convenient weapon, and that would involve the denial to neutral shipping of access to the ports of the State concerned. This could be done with comparative impunity if the neutrals whose interests were prejudiced were weak and incapable of active protest. But the United States is a different proposition. British interference with American vessels during the Napoleonic War was the chief cause of the AngloAmerican war’of 1812. During the earlier part of the Great War it was responsible for intense irritation in America, which abated only when America joined the Allies. Colonel House has left it on record that President Wilson’s views on the “freedom of the seas” almost wrecked the Versailles Conference.

This, then, appears to be the fundamental issue which has prevented Britain and America from reaching common ground. It far transcends in importance the controversy whether tonnage should be calculated in the aggregate or by categories. Britain insists that she requires a large fleet of light craft to protect her communications and ensure her food supplies in time of war. But were she absolved from this necessity her needs in this direction would be less extensive. America’s contention is that neutral vessels should be entitled to go where they will without let or hindrance, provided only that they, are not carrying contraband. Meanwhile a school of opinion in Britain asserts that she has more to gain than to lose by accepting the American standpoint. Its exponents maintain that the freedom of the seas should be unequivocally recognised by international law —in other words that commercial blockade should be abolished, and that interference with the commerce of one Power be regarded as an unfriendly act by the others. At fills t glance the scheme may appear quite fantastic. Is Britain to renounce her traditional, indeed her principal, offensive weapon? The blockade did more, perhaps, to bring Germany to her knees than did the victories of the Allies. If blockade is to be outlawed, Britain’s naval supremacy is virtually useless to her. But it is pointed opt that there is another side to the question. Conditions have changed. ' A /?et of circumstances which may not recur combined to make the blockade of Germany a stranglehold. The Central Powers were almost encircled by hostile neighbours. Germany has a short coastline with narrow exits to the open sea. Imports could only reach her through the Scandinavian States and Holland, which the Allies were able to ration. A blockade of other Continental countries with an extensive seaboard, such as France or Italy, could not hope to be effective. Moreover, although the Allied blockade of Germany succeeded, the German U-boat blockade of Britain missed success by only a slender margin. Britain is more dependent on imports than any Continental nation, and as submarines increase in size, range and armaments, merchant craft will have greater difficulty in running the gauntlet. In short, with the retention of blockade as a legitimate operation Britain, it is contended, would stand to suffer more serious injury than she could inflict upon others. These, in brief, are the arguments advanced by the writer quoted, and certainly his case is stronger that it might seem on the surface. A matter to which he attaches the utmost emphasis is the improvement to which abolition of the blockade would lead in Anglo-American relations. “It would,” he concludes, “once and for all lay the bogey of British ‘navalism’ and, at a stroke, turn the British and American fleets into co-operators instead of competitors.”