THE H.B. TRIBUNE. FRIDAY, JANUARY 5, 1923. ANGLO-FRENCH CRISIS.

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume XIII, Issue 19, 5 January 1923, Page 4

THE H.B. TRIBUNE. FRIDAY, JANUARY 5, 1923. ANGLO-FRENCH CRISIS.

This morning’s news from Pdris does not put any better complexion upon the situation that has arisen out of the respective proposals advanced by Britain and by France with respect to German reparations. On the face of it, indeed, it suggests that anything like a compromise is regarded as impossible, so utterly . divergent are the views Expressed by the two Prime Ministers and so insistent does each appear to be that his proposals shall form" the basis of discussion.’ There may still be some hope that the fuller explanation promised for yesterday by Mr. Bonar Law of the British objections to the French plan of procedure may induce some modification of M. Poincare’s attitude, but it must be confessed that this hope is of the faintest. Even the Belgian Prime Minister, M. Theunis, who has more than once been instrumental in composing AngloFrench differences on various questions, has declared it as apparently useless for him to intervene on this occasion, so utterly at variance are the. stands-adopted by the political heads of the British and French nations, seemingly with the approval of the peoples they represent. So far Signor Mussolini, now very much- of a dictator in the other European Great Power of the wartime Alliance, has declined to take any very decided part in the discussion. He has indicated some inclination to deal more strictly with Germany than the British Prime Minister, and at least one French journal ’ .predict p that ultimately both Italy and Belgium will support M. Poincare’s demand that the French scheme should be the one to be first taken into, consideration. Meantime it is stated that the French President has summoned Marshal Foch to consultation with a view; presumably, to extending military occupation of German territory iti terms of the ‘ f sanctions” provided by the Versailles Treaty in case of <( voluntary default” on the part of Germany. When Mr. Lloyd George’s resignjtfion was forced upon him he said he was curious to see how his successor would manage to devise a practicable reparations scheme acceptable to Germany and at the same time retain the cordial friendship of the French nation. He has not had very long to wait for confirmation of the difficulties at which his words so strongly hinted as standing in the way of this dual achievement. When his downfall was announced all France hailed it with a rejoicing that was almost in-

decent considering the wartime services which he had rendered the Allied cause, and always in strong sympathy with the French people. The truth was that after the war ended he allowed his sentiments of continued sympathy with France to run away with his judgment. Consequently, when he found the promises made and expectations aroused were impossible of fulfilment, he incurred the personal hostility of the French, who virtually denounced him as a traitor to their reasonable demands and as cultivating German friendship at France’s expense. It was vainly thought by them that he had only to be removed from the direction of British policy for them to have Britain solidly at their backs in pursuing their claims against Germany. They now find, to their very bitter disappointment, that they -are no whit better oft with Mr. Bonar Law than they were with Mr. Lloyd George, and in the result their resentment is turned against the British nation instead of against the British Prime Minister —it is now a case of perfidious Albion, not merely perfiidious Lloyd George. The situation would, of course, not be so critical were it that the matter of the German reparations alone depended upon an agreement being quickly reached. It is quite easy to see what the effect of this placing of Britain and France at arm’s length must have upon the negotiations with Turkey, which are themselves at so momentous and hazardous a stage. The only possible hope there was of bringing them to a favourable conclusion withqut resort to force lay in the establishment and maintenance of a complete accord between Britain and France. But, far from this happy condition holding, we now have it said that France’s main hope of bringing Britain to accapt her stand on the reparations question lies in playing upon British anxieties with regard to the Near East. 'No more dangerous method of attempting to attain her ends could be adopted than this, and there is no difficulty in seeing how Mustapha Kemal and his emissaries at Lausanne will make use of the situation that has arisen. Indeed, both the Germans and the Turks must be laughing/n their sleeves at the inability of the victors to come to an agreement as to how the best may be made of their victory. There cannot but be the gravest anxiety as to what not only the eventual, but the immediate, outcome will be in both spheres of doubt.