THE H.B. TRIBUNE. SATURDAY, SEPT. 23, 1922. HOLDING THE STRAITS.

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume XII, Issue 240, 23 September 1922, Page 4

THE H.B. TRIBUNE. SATURDAY, SEPT. 23, 1922. HOLDING THE STRAITS.

This morning’s reports with regard to the situation in the Near East do not really carry us very much further forward towards a definite conclusion as to what the outcome may ultimately be. What we piay be very suFe of is that Mr. Massey is in no way exaggerating the continuing gravity of the position when he says that “we are not yet out of danger, nor are we likely to.be for another week or ten days.” Possibly, indeed, he might, without stretching the truth, have extended the period of uncertainty to some considerably greater length, for there is by no means any absolute assurance that, even should diplomatic negotiations be initiated, hostilities, in one quarter or another, will be finally averted. Conditions are such that no one can pretend to say that almost anywhere within the wide sweep of what was the Turkish Empire, and even in certain regions outside it, the grim game of death and destruction will not be resumed. It might be that we could draw some hope from the apparent delay on the part of the Turks in making a beginning of military operations, for it is very obvious that their best chance of success lies in immediate action while the Allied defences are weak. But in this it has to be remembered that their forces and supplies have to be carried over very considerable distances with by no means efficient transport facilities available for the purpose. As it is, we are told that the Kemalist vanguard has reached the neutral zone of the Dardanelles, whose defence is left to a British force said to number only some 12,000 to 15,000 men. Il is evidently here that the Turkish military leaders see their best opportunity of achieving a dramatic coup such as would secure them still more enthusiastic support not only from the mass of the Turkish people, but also from their potential Allies in a war to come, Bolshevik Russia and Bulgaria, to say nos thing of German underground assistance. It can easily be seen, too, that a complete withdrawal of the Allied defences from the Asiatic side, after the declaration of intention to hold on there that has been made by Britain, would have almost as profound a moral effect as a victory in the field. As to the military situation generally, and the critical point of the eventual attitude of the French with regard to co-opration on the Asiatic side, the cables received up to the time of writing leave us in considerable doubt. As has been indicated, there seems, however, to be none as to the position on the Chanak front, which protects the Dardanelles. There the small British force stands alone, with such support as the Allied naval strength can afford it in waters poorly adapted for naval operations, and with a presumably stronger Allied force behind it on Gallipoli, across the Straits. It is here quite easy to adopt the French military opinion as to the jeopardy in which an

inadequate force is placed, fighting thus with its back in such close proximity to the sea. On the other hand, while Marshal Foch, whose saying cannot be disregarded, states that Chanak cannot be held, “in the face of a real enemy attack,” without 100,000 men and a fleet to back them up, the general in command of the little British army declares that it “can hold any attack.” This confidence, however, does not seem to be shared by

“military circles” at home, where the British Cabinet is said by them to be “aware that, if the Turks wish to seize the Dardanelles, the British at Chanak could not prevent them.” Reading all together, 'there canncft but 'remain serious anxiety as to the fate of this devoted body of men should the Turks really decide on actual fighting to justify their aggressive threats.

The defence of the Bosporus does not seem to be a matter of such serious difficulty. Here the boundary of the neutral zone held by the Allies runs from Ismid across the base of the peninsula. But even here the cable news as yet to hand leaves us in some doubt as to the ultimate decision of the French war authorities with regard to joining in the effort to hold it. One message dated from Constantinople on Thursday last states that “the flags of the Franco-Italian detachments have been removed from the Istnid and Dardanelles' (Chanak) neutral zones,” and that ‘‘the lines are now held exclusively by British troops.” Then we have another, but rather self-contradictory, message dated from London yesterday. This, while in one place it says that “entrenched British troops are defending the Bosporus, whence the French and Italians were withdrawn,” states later on that “a British infantry and air force are holding the line on the peninsula,” and that “Allied troops are with ours here, which gives a better moral effect than the new dispositions at the Dardanelles.” However this may be, it is made quite clear that the British and French authorities aro most unhappily at wide variance with regard to the policy to be pursued, and that this has prevented the adoption of any scheme of cordial co-operation in the defence of the Straits. From the purely military point of view it may readily be thought that the French opinion as to attempting to maintain a footing in the Asiatic zone is the sounder one. On the other hand, it is equally easy to unde.rstanji/ the considerations which weigh with Britain in the determination not to yield the position without a struggle and thus afford ground (for an assumption among the Turks of a general admission of weakness. Beyond this, it may very well be that delay gained by risk of sacrifice here is deemed necessary to permit of preparation to meet attacks feared elsewhere. France is probably possessed of no such immediate apprehensions where she happens to be in direct contact with Moslem populations. zThe day may bring us some more definite, and, we may hope, more reassuring news. But, failing that, there cannot but be reasonable anxiety as to what may be forthcoming on Monday, particularly if there is anything in the reported threat of the Kemalists m. “advance unless satisfnntevv guarantees about Thrace are received within forty-eight hours.” The may, of course, be only another move in a Turkish game of bluff. But by this time we should surely have learned that it is for possibilities, not probabilities alone, that we have to be prepared. It has cost the British much as a people not to have learned this so obvious lesson long ago.