THE H.B. TRIBUNE. FRIDAY, MAY 2, 1919. JAPAN AND CHINA.

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume IX, Issue 116, 2 May 1919, Page 4

THE H.B. TRIBUNE. FRIDAY, MAY 2, 1919. JAPAN AND CHINA.

While Japan has been induced to yield allegiance to .the League ot Nations without insisting upon any present declaration in it as to racial equality, it watild seem from tie cables as if she hail done so only after assuring herself pretty well on the more immediate practical ques tion of the maintenance of a dominant influence in China. The cables received yesterday and overnight point very definitely to this aspect of the ease, and state that Japan relies largely on the clause introduced into the Covenant in order to satisfy the United States with regard ’to the preservation of . the Monroe Doctrine precluding European interference in the affairs of the American republics of both continents. Japan has evidently construed this article as leaving matters between herself and China where they were, and as also leaving her with a free hand to develop the existing situation according to her own plans, already or hereafter to lie formed.. Although it is inti- , mated that Japan is satisfied with the position thus attained, it may very well be doubted whether China is of the same mind. China has, in truth, quite frankly indicated that in the discussions of the Peace Con. ferences and the constitution of the League of Nations she recognised her first hope of obtaining relief from an economic thraldom that was already growing intolerable, and if the cables put correctly the actual results so far as they affect her relations with outside nations, and more especially with Japan. tihe.il she has been doomed to a bitter disappointment. Some couple of months or so ago Baron Makino, a former Foreign Minister and senior member of the Japanese delegation to the Peace Conference, made a public statement in which he put. the position as between his own country and China in a roost plausible shape, which;, however, may not be quite justified by a more intimate knowledge than he affords us of the inner workings of the treaties and concessions incidentally mentioned. After reciting Japan’s achievement in the capture of the German naval and commercial base of Kiaochau in the first weeks of the war, he refers to a treaty entered into with China in 191 J “under which Japan agreed to return Kiaochau to China.’’ But this apparently magnanimous action was not by any means unconditional, for in exchange Japan was to receive fresh, concessions in China, which? were confirmed, and possibly* extended, by another international agreement entered into in 1918. While Baron Makino was able to refer to the first compact as having been made openly, he had to admit that the terms of the second (had not been published. But this, he explained, was “owing to an understanding between the two countries, and because the agreement was preliminary to business matters which were as yet in an incomplete stage. Japan.” he went on “has repeatedly announced that she has no territorial ambitions in China, but- desires to live in amity with her neighbour-. The acquisition .of territory belonging to one nation, which it is the intention of th a country acquiring fo exploit to its own sole advantage, is not conducive to good will or amity. It would therefore be folly on the one hand to say flhat Japan seeks to live in amity and good neighbourhood when, on the other band she takes that from which she secures the sole- advantage to the exclusion of the original owner. . . Let me emphasize that neither in Shantung nor in Manchuria doesJapan seek to take improper advantage of China. She seeks equal opportunity, an open door, and the right of peaceful co-operation br-' tween the two nations of the Far East.”

This, of course, reads very veil, but its true value can only be. assessed whe-ti we know more precisely the quid-pro-quo which Japan secured from China in. return for the 1 restoration of Kiaoehau and the ; footing for expansion that jit affords. It must not be thought that Japan's action, even if she has exacted a heavy- price, for the re-cession oi 1 the "former German territory in China, is in any way exceptional. Bor it has to be, confessed that- inthe, past China has been exploited to her own disadvantage by almost every commercial nation of th y Globe. Britain by no means excluded. But. in the new milenniiun on which it was hoped we might be entering, we were led to expect that these things would be altered, and that, among other ideals to be aimed at, China would receive some protection from further outside exploitation and be given a chance to establish herself among . the nations. If. however, the of the Monroe Doctrine are now.to be applied to the I-a r Last, with Japan as the paramount Power, then the plight of China after the war is likely to be worse than that before it. japan, like most “nouveaux riches.” whether individual or national, is not likely to be anything but a rather exacting creditor and' patron, and, despite Baron Makino's protestations. there will always be a tendency to degenerate into' a taskmaster. Japan is a young, energetic, and ambitious Power, with a largely- oongeste i population to satisfy, and it can scarcely be hoped otherwise than that, in her hands, China will continue as hitherto. to be merely a m'leh-cow from which the most is t., 1->r- extracted Jar'an ha-s to I '' manv interests of her own to attend

to for it to be likely that she will 1 be able, even if inclined, to pay much attention to those of China, and with a Far East Monroe Doctrine in operation tlhe competition of other nations, which might have made towards China’s salvation, will be largely excluded. The ostensible policy on which the original Monroe Doctrine was laid down was, <«f course, that of affording protection to young and weak nations struggling to establish themselves, and involved no process’ of exploitation. At the same time, its application may very easily be abused much to the detriment of the protegees, and China will scarcelyrest easy with the prospect of Japanas her sole protector.