WHAT IS A GAMING HOUSE ?

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume I, Issue 185, 22 July 1911, Page 3

WHAT IS A GAMING HOUSE ?

THE TERM DEFINED BY FULL

COURT

[PEE PRESS ASSOCIATION.] Wellington, July 21. A case of considerable importance to proprietors of billiard saloons was decided by the Full Court to-day. John Jackson, of Auckland, appealed against, his conviction for keeping a common gaming house. The case was heard by Sir Robert Stout and Judges Williams, Den niston. Edwards and Chapman. It was admited that the gaim-s played were ordinary English billiards and all varieties of the game, all games where skill was combined with an element of chance of varying degree. Judge Williams, in giving judgment. said he thought there could be no doubt that the term "gaming house” as used in the Statute meant, prima facie, a gaming house which would have been indictable at common law as a nuisance. He was of opinion that the games played on the premises were not only not unlawful games but games which were expressly recognised as being lawful. The practice of playing in that way in licensed billiard rooms had been carried on for many years without objection, and there was nothing very much from which it could be inferred that in playing in that way had been during those years or is now detrimental to public morals. Judges Denniston, Edwards, and Chapman agreed. The Chief Justice dissented. The conviction was quashed. Wellington. July 21.

Scott v. Jackson was a case stated under section 290 of the Justices of the Peace Act, 190 S, by way of appeal from a conviction by Mr. Cutten, S.M., of John Jackson, of Auckland, billiard-saloon keeper, for keeping a common gaming house. The question was whether allowing the playing of '‘snooker” and various kinds of pool for stakes makes the saloon a common gaming house and Jackson liable as the keeper. The matter turned upon the question whether they were the games of chance within the meaning of section 10 of tne Gaming Act, 1908. A majority of the court (Williams, Denniston, Edwards, and Chapman, Stout dissenting) held that although the games contained an element of chance they were mixed games of chance and skill, in which the element of skill predominated. and not the games of chance within meaning of section JU. The appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed.