Hawke's Bay Herald THURSDAY, APRIL 14, 1904. THE ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT.

Hawke's Bay Herald, Volume XXXIX, Issue 12731, 14 April 1904, Page 2

Hawke's Bay Herald THURSDAY, APRIL 14, 1904. THE ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT.

The negotiations which have been carried ou between Lord Lansdowne and M. Delca-sse, and which, we are given to understand, are largely due to the initiative of King Edward and President Loubet, mark a very important point in the political history of our time. The movement which led to the institution of The Hague Tribunal was inspired by generous motives, no doubt, but it has not so far shown itself of any great practical value. The great Powers light shy of it, and very naturally prefer to manage their own affairs in their own way. Great Britain has always exhibited a preference for arbitration, even although, as on only too many occasions, her enemies have taken advantage of her peaceful disposition. Now that France has adopted similar Hews, and that the two great Powers have without any fuss arranged a basis for the settlement of a number of outstanding questions we may regard the principle of arbitration on a give-and-take basis as likely to find favour. It seems to us that the simple fact of this treaty is likely to do more for the world than the Czar’s visionary enthusiasm or the vapourings of the Peace Society. It is, perhaps, hardly possible to contend that any of the questions at issue were quite as serious as those which the Japanese and Russians are fighting about. But we may compare the man - ner in which negotiations were carried on in either case. The Russians had certainly no intention of giving way in any detail. They adopted the principle of bounce. They tried to bluff the Japanese into conceding their demands. Such a plan, one must admit, has often proved successful, but it is a dangerous plan, for it is impossible to know beforehand just where it will fail. It failed in the case of the negotiations about Manchuria just when it was impossible for either party to draw back, and the present disastrous war is the result. The negotiations between Great Britain and France were conducted in another spirit. There was a genuine give-and-take about them which was calculated to lead to a satisfactory result. It is, indeed, possible to consider that Great Britain has given more than she got. That is so, perhaps, if we consider merely the areas affected. But in a Jarger view.

it is possible to believe that the concessions she has made are amply compensated by the settlement of long outstanding disputes quite upatt from the actual concessions which she receives in return.

For example, in the case of Newfoundland, Franco abandons her claim to the treaty shore, and the colony has now clear and undisputed control over all her coastline. That the French retain the right of fishing and are allowed to obtain bait will hurt fichody, particularly as the French industry has been for years on the decline. We presume that the concessions in Africa are intended to make up for the renunciation of the French shore. We are told that they amount to some 8000 square miles, mostly of desert. The real value is that at two points the French boundary is rectified, giving her direct access on the one hand to Die Gambia river, and on the other to Lake Tchad. Some day, of course, we may find that we have given away valuable properties. That is only too frequently the way with our frontier treaties. But at present there is no evidence that we have conceded anything of any importance to ourselves. The case of Morocco is different. England’s rights here are purely commercial, and these are protected by the treaty. It is very unlikely that the Powers would ever allow her to annex the Sultan’s territory, as this would enable her to close the Mediterranean to all intents and purposes. If her trade rights are conceded and the provisions against fortifying the coast observed there is little more that is of value. It is Spain who is the aggrieved party, and we shall be surprised if she does not vigorously protest against the agreement. Senor Rios, the President of Die Spanish Senate, recently contributed an article to an English review on tins subject. The writer throws serious doubts upon the alleged near demise of the Moorish monarchy. The present troubles are only a continuation of what have prevailed for more than half a century. On the contrary, he holds that the alarmist exaggerations of Moorish troubles tend rather to bring about a more complete state of pacification, and to postpone future developments to a more distant date. But if ever the time for liquidation arrives, the writer considers that Spain has the prior claim in the distribution of Morocco’s inheritance. He draws an interesting contrast between French failure and Spanish success in colonisation, and it will be observed that he regards the fusion of the Spanish with the aboriginal races as one of the glories of Spain. “More than seventy years have passed since the conquest of Algiers,” he says, “and the two races, the conquerors and the conquered, still live face to face and apart, unable to produce a population in which the two elements are fused and constitute one undivided family. The Spaniards have ever possessed such aptitude for colonisation, that whenever they came in close contact with the aborigines a new race was founded ; and if this has taken place in the case of peoples so alien to the Spaniard as those of different colour, it is clear how easy it would be to bring about a fusion between peoples of the same blood who live and develop under conditions, geographic and climatic, which are practicaly identical. France has witnessed a practical demonstration of the truth of my assertion as to the superior qualifications of the Spaniard as regards the promotion of every form of civilisation in Africa, for it is the fact that her own colony of Algiers owes its prosperity to assistance afforded by emigrants from our eastern provinces.”

The other great African question is the position of Egypt. Practically, France admits Great Britain’s predominance there, as Great Britian admits France’s predominance in Morocco. We could not expect her to do more. But the practical side of the treaty is of great importance. France will no longer prevent the Egyptian Government from spending her Customs surplus in developing her resources. This will set free a large sum of money and enable many important works to be put in hand. This appears to us a very solid concession, and worth far more than any merely verbal recognition of our position in Egypt. In Siam France is acknowledged as the predominant influence in much the greater part of the country, but as Siam’s integrity is guaranteed we do not think there is much to he said against the settlement. In Madagascar we admit the right of France to set up a tariff against ns, but as our protest has been entirely unavailing we can hardly be said to lose much. In other words, Lord Lansdowne has in most cases recognised the facts of each case and conceded barren claims. In return he has secured some substantial advantages. It is to be regretted that the dispute in connection with the New Hebrides is not much nearer to the solution which our Australian friends would desire. It is, however, plain that it is no fault of Lord Lansdowne’s if it is not so, and, perhaps, an occasion may ere long be found of making an exchange by which these islands will come completely under British control.