Hawke's Bay Herald TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1899. SMASHING THE KHALIFA.

Hawke's Bay Herald, Volume XXXIV, Issue 11322, 5 September 1899, Page 2

Hawke's Bay Herald TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1899. SMASHING THE KHALIFA.

A cable message this morning announces that preparations are being made at Omdurman to pursue the Khalifa. It must not be imagined

from this that another extensive

campaign with British troops is contemplated. It is only part of the original plan, and is the completion of the " smashing " of the Khalifa. The delay in the final act has been due to the difficulties of transport. There is not enougb water in the Upper Nile for the transport of troopa until the autumn rains come. Then there is a considerable stretch of desert to be crossed by means of

camel transport, but during the rainy season the camelß sink in the sand, and it is necessary to wait until the rainy season is well over. Latest adviceo from Cairo were to the effect that the expedition was not expected to start until October. Since then the cable has informed us that the rainfall has been un-

usually small. This has probably caused the authorities to hurry up their preparations, so as to get to their destination and back before the river again falls too low for transport Bteamers. In June it waß known that the Khalifa was then in South Kordofan, not far from Lake Shirkeleh, whence he has been raiding the inhabitants in all directions for food supplies. The Khalifa's camp is about 140 miles west of the nearest point on the White Nile, and thus about 170 miles from the British fort at Duetn, which is garrisoned by an Egyptian battalion and some artillery and camel corps. Advices received at the military posts on the White Nile and telegraphed to Cairo were to the effect that the Khalifa's parties were raiding villages on the White Nile, and had even ventured within a day's march of the post at Dueni. In fact, villagers all along the western bank of the White Nile between Duem and Kaka, near Eaßhoda, have no security for life and property, in spite of the fact that gunboats are continually patrolling this section of the river. This can easily be explained when it is stated that the White Nile above Khartoum does not flow in a single channel, but meanders over a wide space of country, and, frequently, in as many as three or four channels, so that the extreme banks of the river are frequently eight miles apart. When the river is low the channels flow between mud banks and sudd islands, and it is impossible for a gunboat to see villages which are often some distance inland. In consequence of this it is not possible effectually to protect the inhabitants of the western bank so long as the Khalifa and his raiding parties are in possession of Kordofan. The inhabitants were in consequence warned to migrate across to the eastern bank of the White Nile, and the Sirdar's officers placed boat facilities at their disposal for this purpose. Considerable numbers of the population were transferred to the right bank, but the result was by no means satisfactory on account of scarcity of food on the eastern bank. For this reason a great number were obliged to remain in their old homes, where they at any rate have a certain amount of grain buried in the desert in places known only to them, According to latest advices, the Khalifa ha» with him some 3000 fighting men, but the amount of ammunition in his possession is problematical. Of these men, a detachment under certain well-known Baggara Emirs was never in the battle of Omdurman. They must have been sent away with the view of forming a nucleus of a new force before Omdurman was reached by the Sirdar. Besides this detachment, those who escaped from the battle of Kosaries at Christmas last, and made their way across the Blue and White Niles under Emir Ahmed Eedi), are also with the .Khalifa under that chicf 1 It is also quite possible that the Dervish force under Emir Arabi Wad Dafalla, which is known to have evacuated Bor, has joined the Khalifa. Against this force are available the troopß stationed at Omdurman and atDuem, consisting of eight squadrons of cavalry, five batteries of artillery, eight battalions of infantry, and five companies of camel corps — something over 10,000 men, additional to the garrisons left on the Blue Nile in the Eastern Soudan and Eashoda districts. It ie not anticipated that any British troops will be employed in the expedition. From .Russian sources come accounts of probable assistance to the Khalifa from Abyssinia. We are told that the Abyßsinian army, which is largely officered by French and Russians, is quite up to date in both drill, armament, and general equipment, and that Menelik could easily put a force of 40,000 in the field. He is represented as hungering to extend his territory to the valley of Sobata and to Juba, and to have covetous eyes on Eashoda. Probably in these accounts the wish is father to the thought. We know that Captain Marchand confidently relied on assistance from Abyssinia, and that he was bitterly disappointed. We also know that for years French officers have been urging Menelik to seize Eashoda. But if he failed to do so when he had only the Dervishes to contend with he is not likely to make the attempt against the power of Britain. At all events these reports are diecredited at Egyptian headquarters, where the force stated above is believed to be the maximum at the disposal of the Khalifa.