SIR G. F. BOWEN ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF IMPEEIAL TROOPS.

Hawke's Bay Herald, Volume 13, Issue 1085, 21 September 1869, Page 3

SIR G. F. BOWEN ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF IMPEEIAL TROOPS.

Copy of a Despatch from Governor Sir Gr. F. Bowen, Gr.CM.Gr., to his Gfrace the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos. Government House, Wellington, 7th December, 1868. Mr Lobd Duke, — It may probably be interesting to your Grace to read the opinion of the present condition of affairs in this colony entertained by so able, experienced, and dispassionate a person as Sir George Arney, the present Uhief Justice of New Zealand. ' He had lately been at Wellington, as President of the Court of Appeal, and on his return voyage to Auckland, where he generally resides, he encountered the vessel carrying some of the fugitives from the cruel massacre of English settlers perpetrated at Poverty Bay on the 10th ultimo. I enclose an extract from Sir George Arney's letter to me, to which I refer. I annex also a copy of Mr. Justice Johnston's charge to the grand jury at the late assizes at Wellington. It will be seen that the Chief Justice sums up his opiniqn in the following terms : " I will not venture to speculate on what may be done ; but of this I feel convinced, that the colony must , ; . . brace' itself up to hold its own until the time may arrive when the native race may feel constrained to respect us in our strength, as they now despise us in our weakness. Meanwhile, I do not envy you having to take up the government of this beauteous country at precisely that period of its history when, I believe, it has been left more embarrassed in its finances, more crippled, relatively, in its power, and more exposed, from its advanced settlements and increased cultivations, to the savagery of the Maori race than it has been left to any preceding governor. . I only hope that we may find our respite from destruction in the distracted counoils and divided allegianoe of the natives, the mass of whom know full well that they have receired little wrong and much good from the settlers."

, Since the control of native affairs, including, practically, the conduct of the present and of future Maori wars, was transferred in 1862 from the Governor to the Ministers of the colony for the time being, a number of able public men. have succeeded each other in office in New Zealand, all doubtless animated with a sincere desire to promote the welfare of their adopted country. But if the exigencies of Parliamentary Government have sometimes embarrassed elsewhere the conduct of foreign wars, it will be easily understood that those exigencies have created still greater difficulties in the conduct of 'the internal Maori war ;

when, as in New Zealand, the Legislature is so equally divided between the two conflicting political parties that neither of them can make sure of a working majority of more than two or three votes in the House of Representatives ; when almost every leading member of both Houses has a native policy of his own, and is swayed by various kinds of personal and local feelings and interests. Under such circumstances, as will be manifest without entering into any details, there can be but little consistency of policy, or unity of action.

A portion of the population of the Northern Island of New Zealand, under the long-continued Maori war and of the recent disasters, would regard with complacency the suspension of the existing constitution in this island, or at least a return to the system in force up to the year 1862, under which the Governor, directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, possessed the control of native affairs. Former experience, however, has proved that (in the words of Mr. Merivale)^ the suggestion of establishing in the same colony responsible government for the settlers, and a separate administration of native affairs under the Imperial authori* ties, is unpractical. There cannot be two governments in the same community ; certainly not, unless some mode can be devised of having two public purses." It has often been observed that the immediate causes of the Indian rebellion of 1857-8 were mainly :— (A.) Religious and national fanaticism. (B.) The recent reduction in the number of the English troops employed in India. (C.) The annexation of the entire territories of the King of Oude. So the main causes of the long-continuance of the Maori war, which has now raged in New Zealand, with some periods of intermission, ever since 1860, are generally believed to be :— (A.) The outbreak of the Hauhau fanaticism in connection with the national, or (as it is termed), the " native king movement." (B.) The removal of the English regiments before any tender of submission was made by, or any peace was ratified with, the Maori King, and the tribes which adhere to him. . (C.) The confiscation of a small portion of the territories of the rebel natives. * # # # Of all the painful feelings excited by the present condition of New Zealand, perhaps the most painful is connected with the effect produced on the minds of the loyal natives by the official announcement, in the midst of the most dangerous crisis that has everocourred in the history of this community, to the effect that the last British soldier will be removed in next February from New Zealand. It is, of course, impossible to explain to the Maoris the grounds of the complete change which has taken place of late years in the views of the Imperial Government with regard to the military protection of the dependencies of the Crown ; or the mixed motives which induced one of the conflicting parties in the New Zealand Legislature to advocate the so-called " self-reliant policy," without taking any steps to create a permanent or effective defence force.

It is earnestly hoped and believed here, now that tho Colonial Parliament has signified its compliance with the conditions offered, thab the Imperial Government will not insist on the immediate withdrawal of the single regiment which still garrisons (besides Auckland) the towns of Taranaki, Wanganui, and Napier, that is, the chief centres of European population, in the districts where the present rebellion is raging. The recent massacre of the English settlers at Poverty Bay was accompanied with atrocities as dreadful as any perpetrated during the great rebellion in India. The Colonial Government is making every possible exertion to raise throughout New Zealand, and also in Australia, recruits for the permanont force which it maintains in the field ; while almost every adult male resident io the districts is enrolled in the militia or vul'iuteer corps. Still it is often urged that raw levies, if deprived of a nucleus of regular troops, are sometimes liable to sudden panics ; and that the garrison of Lucknow, and of other places in which our countrymen held out so heroically in India, were composed mainly of trained soldiers. In short, many competent judges believe that the entire withdrawal of the Queen's troops from New Zealand, at the present crisis, may lead probably to a general rising of the disafiected natives throughout this island, and possibly to tragedies as dreadful as those of Delhi and Cawnpore. If any disaster of this nature should ensue, I am confident that your Grace will acquit me of all blame for want of foresight; for it will be remembered that I have repeatedly, in my official and confidential communications to the Colonial Office, respectfully but earnestly, solicited attention to this question, showing that the Colonial Parliament, and the practical men of all parties in the North Island, are now convinced that it would be as dangerous to remove every British soldier from New Zealand in 1868, as it would have been to have removed every British soldier from Scotland in 1715 or 1746, from Ireland in 1798, or from British India in 1857. The impression made on the minds of the rebel Maoris by the announcement of the proposed immediate withdrawal of the English troops from New Zealand, soon after the massacre at Poverty Bay, is naturally similar to the impression which would have been made on the minds of Nana Sahib and the Sepoy mutineers by an announcement pf the immediate withdrawal of the English troops from India soon after the massacre at Cawnpore.

It may appear strange to superficial or ill-informed observers that the English settlers in the North Island are unable of themselves to subdue the Maoris, seeing that their numbers are as two to one, about 80,000 colonists to 40,000 Maoris. But it will be remembered that the Maoris were not subjugated during the years when an English army of nearly ten thousand (10,000) regular soldiers, in addition to the colonial forces, was employed in this island. Moreover, the great majority of the settlers in New Zealand are emigrants from the laboring classes in England, and had probably never carried arms of any kind until they found themselves enrolled in the colonial militia. On the other hand, every Maori is a born soldier ; strong, fleet, and intrepid; accustomed from his infancy to the use of weapons, and to the sight of blood, and trained to great skill in bush fighting by the guerilla warfare of the last eight years. Again, the colonists occupy settlements placed chiefly along and near the sea shore. They occupy, as it were, the circumference of a circle, whereas thp Maoris are entrenched in the almost impenetrable mountains and forests of the centre, whence they can send forth forays in every direction.

It is believed that in this, and in my previous despatches on the same subject, I have given a full and accurate account of the present condition of this colony. It remains for mo to suggest what should be done at this crisis, the most dangerous which has hitherto occurred (as the Chief Justice has observed) in the : history of New Zealand.

,It as universally hoped that the battalion of Imperial troops which still garrisons four of the main centres of population (Auckland, Taranaki, Wanganui, and Napier) will be left here, in accordance with the earnest desire of the "New Zealand Parliament, on the terms offered by the Imperial Government; and under the circumstances stated in my despatches, Nos. 80 and 100. It will be recollected that New Zealand alone is paying for native purposes, .defence, and the interest of the war loan of three millions sterling (£3,000,000) nearly four hundred thousand pounds (£400,000) annually, that is, far more than the aggregate payments for similar purposes otnll the Australian colonies put together ; and that these burdens render necessary taxes at the rate of £6 6s. per head of the population, double the rate of the United Kingdom. It is trusted that one battalion will be left as some equivalent for this expenditure. But that battalion (the 2nd, 18th Boyal Irish) numbers barely 760 effective officers and men, whereas there is good reason to believe that there are now as many Maoris, in arms against the Crown as there ever were, while there were 10,000 regular soldiers in the colony; and the Government has received repeated warnings that the Maori king will, sooner or later, give the signal for a general rising of the hostile tribes, and a general massacre of the colonists. With the utmost efforts that can be used, my responsible advisers appear to be unable to raise in New Zealand a permanent force of above |1000 really effective men, in addition to the militia and volunteers, who are practically available only for the defence of their respective districts. Each private in the' permanent force is paid ss. per diem, and, with his rations, clothing, arms, &c, costs the colony at least £150 per annum. The settlers in the disturbed districts of the North Island are all but unanimous in desiring the help of at least one more regiment From Australia, whence aid was procured on several previous occasions. It appears to be generally agreed that if a second regiment is sent here, it is just that New Zealand should be called upon to pay for it on the same scale as that fixed for the Australian colonies, i.e., £40 per annum for every officer and man. It is stated that the earnest and thoroughgoing advocates of what is termed the " self-reliant policy," are now almost entirely confined to the South Island, where there are hardly any Maoris, and where life and property are perfectly secure. Looking to the tenor of the despatches from home respecting the Queen's troops in this colony, and toother considerations, the present Ministers are unwilling, except in case of dire necessity, to apply for any extraneous assistance beyond that which can be afforded by her Majesty's ships on this station, and by the single battalion of regular soldiers which the Imperial Government offered to maintain here on the conditions now accepted by the Colonial Government and Legislature. But my Responsible Advisers concur in the hope (as will be seen from my despatch, No. 125, of even date herewith) that immediate instructions will be sent to General Chute, authorising him to detain and send to New Zealand the regiment which is shortly to be removed from Australia, or such other of the troops under his command as can best be spared, in case the Government of this colony should send a requisition for them. No such application will be made, except in the event of a grand rising of the Maoris, or some other imminent danger threatening the lives of a large portion of Her Majesty's subjects in this colony. It is submitted that any such additional troops, if paid for by New Zealand at the rate . paid in Australia, should be stationed and employed here as in any other provinces of the British Empire, in accordance with the rules prescribed in the Queen's Colonial Regulations. I am strongly inclined to agree with those who, from their long experience of the native character, believe that if the same number of Imperial troops, in addition to the Colonial forces were maintained in New Zealand for the next few years as was maintained here from 1846 to about 1860 during the interval between, the first and second Maori wars, that is, two battalions of the line : and if no further attempt were made to occupy lands in the distant isolated positions, or in the immediate neighborhood of hostile tribes, this colony would probably enjoy permanent peace and security. It will be remembered that the native race is rapidly diminishing, while the Europeans are as rapidly increasing in numbers. In 1848, only twenty years ago, the Maoris in the North. Island exceeded 100,000; while now, in 1868, they are under 40,000. Consequently the Maori difficulty is a question of time, probably of the next ten years. During that period, every effort should be made to push, roads into the interior. Experience has amply shown that the best weapons for the conquest of the Highlands of New Zealand in the 19th, as of the Highlands of Scotland in the 18th century, are the spade and the pickaxe.

Further, as I observed in my despatch, No. 49, of the 30th of June ultimo, "it appears to be very generally agreed thst, since the authority of the Crown and of the law was not established throughout the interior of this country, while there was an English army of above ten thousand men in New Zealand, the attitude of the Colonial authorities towards Tawhaio and his adherents must, and ought to be, in the main defensive ; that it is at once more politic and morehumaneto outlive the King movement then endeavor to suppress it by the strong hand ; that the turbulent nativesshouldreceiveevery encouragement to live peaceably; but murderous onslaughts, whether on the Europeans or on the friendly Maoris, should be punished with the rigor necessary to prevent a recurrence of unprovoked aggressions. . . Many of the leading politicians of New Zealand are convinced that the King movement in its earliest stages might have been made an instrument for ' elevating the native race, by the introduction of institutions subordinate to and in harmony with the European Government of the colony.' It has been suggested that a native pro* vince might have been oreated, to be ruled, like the territories of the semi-indepen-dent rajahs in India, nominally by a great Maori chief, but really by the advice and influence of a British resident or commissioner." Many now think that the opportunity for any arrangement of this kind has been lost. Still King Tawhaio has played so moderate a part for some years past that it may be worth while to make the attempt, especially as it is plear that his conquest by force of arms is impracticable. I will conclude by summing up my practical suggestions with the expression of a strong conviction {hat permanent peace and security may be restored to New Zealand, by adopting the following measures :— A. The presence t in addition to the colonial forces, of a garrison of two battalions of the line, to be maintained on conditions equitable to the mother country and to the colony. B. The prohibition of fresh settlements in exposed and dangerous districts. ; C. A peaceful arrangement, not inconsistent with the suzerainty of the Queen, with the chosen' chiefs of the Maoris.