DR. FEATHERSTON ON THE PRESENT ASPECT OF AFFAIRS.

Hawke's Bay Herald, Volume 13, Issue 1035, 30 March 1869, Page 3

DR. FEATHERSTON ON THE PRESENT ASPECT OF AFFAIRS.

I need scarcely assure you thafc it is a matter of deep regret to me that the anticipations I indulged in on opening your last session, that the depression then existing would by this time have ceased, and your finances have been re-established, nave not been realized; but it is still more painful to me to be unable to express even a hope of the colony emerging from its present difficulties as long as the present policy is pursued. It will not, I think, be denied that never since its foundation has the colony been placed in so critical a position and with so little prospect before it of any immediate relief. . It is, no doubt, unpleasant, if not humiliating, to make such admissions, both because the grave disasters which have befallen us are undoubtedly in a great measure attributable to the colonists themselves, and also because to retrace our steps, if not impossible, is beset with almost insuperable difficulties; but still, however wedded we may be to our past opinions, however diposed blindly and doggedly to adhere to them, it is not the less our duty not to shut our eyes to the realities of our position, to the magnitude of the emergency — not to persevere in a line of action which has already been so ruinous, unless we are thoroughly satisfied that it will ultimately prove the wisest and safest course. Without discussing the wisdom of the policy of confiscation adopted in 1863, or whether it would not have been infinitely more prudent to have substituted font the principle of cession, it will be admitted that confiscation necessarily implied the power to hold and occupy the lands. Has the colony ever had or has it now this power ? How much of the confiscated lands, whether on the West or East Coast, do we at this moment retain possession of ? What chance have we of reconquering it, and, if so, at what cost? These are questions thafc force themselves upon our consideration, but to which I fear no satisfactory answers can be given by the colony. For what really was. the course pursued by the colony? No sooner had it adopted a policy which could only be carried out "and' maintained by fore.c, and long before the confiscated lands were occupied and settled, than it insists upon the Imperial Government withdrawing all its troops, by whom these lands had been conquered, without making any provision to supply their place, or rather in the full knowledge that the troops could not and would not be replaced by any adequate local force. The colony challenges a large portion of the native race, almost invites them into rebellion, and at the same time disarms itself— strips itself of all means of defence — places itself at the mercy of a half-civi-lised people keenly smarting under the loss of their lands. This may be called a policy, but it is the policy of the suicide. It would indeed have been strange had the Maori resisted such a temptation, or rather invitation — not attempted to regain possession of the lands. But the course thus pursued appears still more unintelligible when it is remembered that the colony might have retained for an indefinite period three or four thousand troops, whose very presence would in all probability have prevented any fresh outbreak, at an infinitely less expense than the present colonial force costs. Upon the result of this policy — upon the fearful sacrifice of life and property it has already entailed — it is unnecessary for me to dwell. It is sufficient to know that we have sustained a succession of defeats without a single decisive blow having been struck by our Colonial Forces—however gallantly they may in some instances have behaved — sufficient in any material degree to detract from the prestige of victory implanted on the rebel standards. We may glean what is the opinion of the state of affairs on the East Coast of those most competent to judge from the simple fact that the Superintendent of Hawke's Bay deemed it necessary to prevent a body of allies, under orders to proceed to the West Coast, leaving the province. Neither must we ignore the fact that there is a greater amount of discontent, distrust, and hostility amongst the natives than ever existed before — that day by day a larger portion of the race is becoming disaffected — that even those tribes which hitherto have been and still are loyal, and who on many occasions have nobly fought our battles, are becoming disheartened and discouraged by the reverses which have befallen our arms, and so doubtful about the ultimate issue of the struggle, that they are seriously asking themselves why they should be involved in it. Let such a feeling take possession of them, and I need not say it will be most unwise to depend upon them as permanent allies. Then if these murders continue — and as long as such fiends as Te Kooti, Titokowaru, and others are at large there is no reason to beiievo that they will not — what becomes of the outlying districts if they are all involved in the same ruin which has already overtaken some ? What becomes of the towns? Where will this colony of the North Island be ? I venture to make these remarks because it appears to me that it is impossible to exaggerate the magnitude of the present crisis, and that it is your duty as Representatives of the Provinoe not to ignore it, but to take it into your serious consideration. You may not be able to Control events, but any expression of opinion on such a subject from you must ever have great weight on the Councils of the colony. My own opinion is that if Ihis Island is to be rescued from almost utter destruction, there must be an almost entire reversal of the past policy, and an immediate application for the Imperial troops on fche terms offered by Imperial authorities. Tho retention by them of the 18th Rogigiment in the colony is a sufficient proof that such an appeal would not be made in vain.