COL, WHITMORE'S DESPATCHES.

Hawke's Bay Herald, Volume 13, Issue 1016, 23 January 1869, Page 3

COL, WHITMORE'S DESPATCHES.

The following despatches from Colonel Whitmore to Colonel Haultato, relative to the recent actions of our forces on the East Coast* bave been courteously handed to us (Independent) by the honorable* the Defence Minister, for publication :-— Head Quarters, Ngatapa, Dee. 30, 1868. SiE,—ln continuation of previous despatches, I have the honor to inform you that, having satisfied myself by recon- ( noitring expeditions on both flanks, that the enemy was not attempting any movement in force on either flank, I moved forward on the 25th instant, from Fort Fraser, at Patutahi, and passed on my material and stores from that post and Fort St. John, as far as I had been able to make wheel traffic good to my front, a distance of perhaps eight miles. Here my advanced parties captured two of the t enemy's spies, one an old man, whose insolent bearing so provoked the Arawas that they shot them. What little the I elder one (whom I had hoped to save) | said was to the effect that Te Kooti was in my front a few miles, with his men, I having received large reinforcements from i the Uriweras. He said "Go back, go back, the land is full of Hauhaus; did you not see the « star.' " I have since had reason to believe that all he said was untrue. However, I built a small redoubt to protect a tent of stores, with a garrison of a dozen men, and on Christmas Day moved on, making the road good for pack transport, and took post beyond the high range whioh terminates the valley. Here, again I erected a small defensible post which I christened Fort Roberts, and collected all the burdens I could in two trips get from the pack animals. From the highest ranges I could obtain no sign of the enemy, hut I found the trail of his scouts leading away from me. I this day learned the arrival of the Ngatiporo. On the 26th, I marched leaving the detachment previously sent on hy the Ngatiporo to guard my artillery and stores, and to await the arrival ofthe rest of their tribe under Ropata. I reached this evening the late camp ofthe Nga tikahungunu and slept. The enemy's position was now in full view, hut he made no movement to oppose my march. Nevertheless I took precautions to prevent his surprising me on the march, or lying ambuscades, in which the young Arawa division proved extremely valuable. On the 27th, having drawn the rations brought up by the packhorses the preceding night I pushed forward to within a mile of Ngatapa and occupied the ridge opposite the enemy's fortifications. Here I Bivouacked and strengthened my position, sending hack parties to improve the track, which was trying to the pack animals. I now learned that the Ngatiporo were marching, but delayed by the illness of their fighting chief Ropata. Although the difficulty of supply was increased by every day's delay, and my arrangements did not contemplate any very protracted operations, I placed myself in the hands of the Hon. Mr. Richmond, who had kindly consented to remain to assist me, and trusting to him the difficulty of the campaign, I resolved to await the Ngatiporo and to make a simultaneous movement when I marched to cut off the enemy's retreat at the same time as I closed him in in the front. The position of Ngatapa is hy a great deal the most difficult and strongest I have ever seen in this country, and of those in my camp none, European or native, has ever met with a stronger. Rising abruptly and of a confused and " tormented" mass of forest clad hills, a single cone shaped mountain rises conspicuous from its height and isolation. It is covered with bush which has been to some extent cut down and burned.. The apex of the hill, which is perhaps 2000 ft. high, is girt by a triple line of fortification, and of these the two inner ones rise to a height of 12 feet. Rifle pits guard the water, which is distant some few chains, and a scarped ridge, said to be impractical for the descent of the garrison, terminates two if not all three of the parapets. These latter are built as we build fortifications, with fern and sticks. I learn that behind the ridge the apex is descended by a ladder to a second knoll on which the women stand, and by this alone, I am informed, can the garrison escape to the rear. My plan has, therefore, been to send a strong party to the rear to intercept escape, while, with the hulk ofthe force, I approach the main body of the place by flying sap, when necessary, or even by single sap, so as to render all attempt to burst out impossible. I have brought up the cohorns with the view of employing vertical fire, which I believe has never yet been used in Maori warfare, and with which they are possibly unacquainted. I now press forward small reconnoitring parties, but to all appearance th. "enemy's garrison consists of only 150 men, who are all employed in adding to tho defences. The 28th passed without any tidings from the rear, tho pack horses bringing up a report that the Ngatiporo would not march. I assembled the senior officers, and having ascertained their views, decided that, as the supply was difficult and expensive, and as we could not abandon the enterprise because we could no longer calculate on a complete success, we should send to the rear to ascertain for certain whether the Ngatiporo wore coming, and if they were not to attack the place in front only. The natural consequence of doing so would be, at best, but an imperfect success. But the spirits of the men were, flagging, and a movement was absolutety necessary. I employed most of tho men in practising the single and flying sap. < Early on the 29th I heard that the Ngatiporo were really advancing, and were actually at Fort Roberts. I therefore completed a small redoubt for my stores, and rode down to meet the Ngatiporo, whom I met at the Ware Kopa stream. My reception was most cordial. The tribe flocked round me, and appeared in the highest spirits. Ropata, however, was so ill as to be compelled to halt. He said he had feared I was impatient, and that Mr. Richmond had given him permission to j return, but he knew if he did so the tribo : would be littlo use, so that ho had decided to come on as fast as he was able, how- ; ever slow. He promised to come up next day. Meanwhile, under great difficulties tho pack transport was being pressed forward by Mr. Richmond, and Captain Newland and Mr. Smith, whom I had engaged for the service. The deficiency of carrying animals was a considerable obstacle, but working with a will it was going on favorably. Tho meat supply was also difficult, as animals could with difficulty bo kept at night. To avoid this, I constructed sheep yards, and had small flocks of sheep driven up for slaughter. Mutton is inferior to beef for the field, hut it posses- 1 ses a great advantage in being more.manageable sort of stock. On the 30th, at 8 a.m., Ropata arrived, and soon after the Ngatiporo, who were very well received by the Arawas, of whom they speak in terms of admiration. I sont out this day another party to scout, and auothor road party to facilitate the transport, and sent the pack-train up to Fort Fraser to obtain further supplies and more ammunition,

If Te Kooti does ren lain till moifning, there is a very fair pro spect of emtirely c Hitting him ofr', and I tn Ist some cer tainty fcl iat his stronghold wili he taken, tiaough the time occupied may he some days, possibly ten or twelve- The account of fch c scouting party is r>iOt as favor; able as I c 'ould wish with regm*d to tho road of the party sent found, to intercept the 3nei nys rear ; but distant views of country » lo not convey accurate ideas of localities, always, and the guides seem iwrtain they are right, so I shall make no change of pi an. — v # * # • i # I have, &c, G. S. Whitmoee.

Heftcl Quarters, Ngatapn, Jan. 5, 18'<39. Sm —My lasft despatch, of the #oth ult brought my . operations up to the es';. tablirfrawmt of th* . depot for my siege operations, on the nexb ridge to this place. I there built a redouil <t, and named it Fort Richmond. I couM get pack animals to this point, after m. iproving the track* easily enough, though the hi Is were high; but there wasv no grasi «, and horses had tb go baok to Fort Rober ts directly they delivered their loads. B\' tyond this road, the track was across too 1 nigged a region to . admit of pack transport till I had demoted labor to improve it;, ant 1 1 was compelled to trust to the men .oarr, "ng their, "rations and ammunition up ano I down the two hills on their backs. On the 31st Imarche &- at daylight to a conical rise on the sa V* & , M(3 S e as Ngatapa pa, but about 70 *> 7^as from it. The' apex of this rise J fortified and christened the Crow's , * e ?t. Here I posted a few of the' best sh ?ts of the force as a picket to prevent the .natives firing away any ammunition jf the 'enemy should open fire upon my position. ', The Hauhaus were plai nly visible, strengthening their fortificatio ( ns when we arrived, and I turned the morn hig to good account myself, strengthening my camp, and improving my road to the rear with Nos. 6 and 7 A.C. At length, about 1 p.m., the ? enemy opened fire, discharging a volley s addenly, but all his bullets fell short. Ou r sharpshooters replied by a dropping 1 Jut welldirected fire, which continued til 1 night, the enemy replying by volleys ) aow an d again. In the evening, after receiving the reports of the scduts, and consultjijg'wifch. the chief Ropata, I decided tha<;/ijj would be better to change the route b y I | had intended to send the port'/ to the rear of the place. The right flan , j c gully was evidently the better adapt' ed for such a | march, and I ascertained tliat it was also the shortest. Our scout s, moreover, informed us that from the apparent fortifications round to the rear entrance there were no fortification s at all, and that on the enemy's left, the' cliff was so steep as to render attack or escape alike impossible. The cliff on his right flank was not so steep or high. Not having enough men to undertake both cliffs, I decided to neglect that on the enemy's^ left, about 250 yards of which I left without a guard throughout the seige. After carefully considering the subject with Ropata and Hotene, I gave orders to Major Fraser to march at dawn with 200 men (100 of Hotene's Maoris, and 100 Armed Constabulary), descending by the bush into the bed ofthe creek, and keeping in concealment, to work his way to the point A. on the plan ; o n reaching this he was to send back for orders. Ropata with 60 No. 8 ."Division, A.C, and 60 Ngatiporos, was to take a parallel but shorter route, and to g;ain the crest of the ridge about G., where he too was to | halt for orders. j Major Fraser, after some few hours, sent hack for ammunition and reinforce- ! ments, having carried out his instructions, a,nd shot four of the enemy, t sent his requirements on at once, and ordered him -to get as close as possible to the pa. ! Ropata, • without being discovered, .gained his position and entrenched himself, sending back to ask for orders. I ;now moved on tho Armed Constabulary and more Ngatiporos, sending orders to .Ropata to extend. to his left, and close in •to the work. By night the investment, as far as it <can be so called, was complete — Major , Fraser from^ my extreme left had com- ! municated with me along my line. Inspector Roberts with No, 6 division was posted on Hotene's right, under the cliff in the position shown in the plan, with a few Natives to assist him in keeping watch; Wickliffe and Albert prolonged the line to Ropata, who in turn touched, the Artillery, which now came up with : the morfcar and the Division No. 7 A.C, with the Turanga Volunteers, under my personal directions, guarded and formed t he trenches of the main attack, whilo No. 8 A.C (Arawas) were posted on the right. The line was exactly 750 yards long. F^om No. 8 to Major Fraser the cliff was to some extent flanked by the fire of both, bui\ aot guarded for the reasons above explai Tihed. _ It now came on to rain, an unfortunate circumstance, because while on the one hand the enemy obtained water, on the other the formation of the approaches p;»gressed very slowly, the natives not working with the zeal they had hitherto displayed, and my force of Europeans with the main attack being exceedingly small. Moreover, the rain added enormously to tho difficulties' of the pack transport, already heavily taxod, and utte rly without . any reserve of animals (for! the resources of the district did not affoi'd them) to fall hack upon. As I perceived that in consequence of the weatiher some delay must occur in reducing the place, I called Captain Towgood, who had volunteered his services to Mr. M'Lean, to ride hack and to endeavour by every means in his power to push on the supplies and ammunition. This gentleman kindly undertook to do so, and, I may here observe, throughout the siege was earnest and energetic in his efforts to forward my wishes, and to carry out Mr. Richmond's directions. All the 2nd the enemy was watching for an outlet, and whenever a few shells were thrown into the place, mado a rush somewhere along the line to try to got out. Major Fraser repulsed several sorties, in one of which the men oame to a hand-to-hand struggle, and three of our men were hurled over the precipice, while four of tho enemy were killed. The mud in the ' trenches, and the continual rain without shelter, made the European troops suffer greatly from fatigue, but they managed to keep up their spirits, and turned out after their brief intervals of sleep willingly. During the morning, Major St. John, trusting to the mist, endeavoured to approach the enemy's works almost by himself. Hemight, perhaps, have gone actually to the outer wail had I not ordered him back when I learned the melancholy fate of Captain Brown, commanding No. 7 Di-

*Eorco marched 31st :~ Ofilcors. Mod. No. 1 Armed Constabulary ... s . Gi 'No. « '„ ,-, ..; 2 01 No. « „ „ ... 2 S5 No. 7 „ „ ... » «2 No. 8 „.- „ (Arawns) 1 <50 «Armnd Constabulary, total ... 11 . 302 INfjatlporo ' ... ' »"0 Head Quarters, Spfes, Snouts, ; McHcal Department, &c... 5 0 Tofal ... iq IS

vision, who had been shot dead in the trenches at that moment. Being short of officers, a great deal of duty devolved upon Major St. John besides staff duties, and it was very fortunate that Mr. Capel, the only other officer with the attack, turned out, though so young, so good an officer. The enemy employed sharpshooters all day to watch our trenches, but our cover left him little opening ; nevertheless a few I wounded or killed necessarily fell to our lot. J t On the third I made a careful inspection of the whole line, and satisfied myself that there was no point especially weak. I also recalled Mr. Gascoigne from Major Fraser and his natives to do duty with his division (No. 7), Mr. Capel having meanwhile been wounded. The natives repulsed several sorties during the day, and Major Fraser was attacked very determinedly, and lost a few men. Ropata was indefatigable iv inspecting his line and keeping the men to their duty. The great difficulty was the chasm between Fort Richmond and Ngatapa. Across this all our provisions were " humped" by the men (30) left behind by me in the last camp. The greasy state. of the hush track, ahd the steepness of the road made it a painful duty, still Mr. Stopford and his men carried it out without one murmur. These men often came into camp very late at night carrying as much as 500 rounds on their backs, after having twice before struggled across those slippery hills the same day, with supplies, ammunition, or shell.'* - On this day also the enemy made several sorties, and a few escaped naked. The shelling of the place occasionally at the hours for the reliefs during the night kept the ene/jiy uneasy and without sleep, while it assisted in awakening the tired portion of our men whose duty it was to rise. Several attempts were made during the early morning to escape by small parties, wnich only . resulted in the death of those who tried to break through our line'j. During the night Captain Skeet sto'ie up to the outer wall, and found it a r pparently untenanted. It was a gallant effort, but I heard of it too late to take advantage of it. The shell practice was very good all day, notwithstanding the difficulties of weighing the charges in the rain without a tent, and was equally so at night. We thought it likely the enemy would have tried to break through during the night, and very little sleep fell to the lot of any, but he made no general sortie. On the Ist I had offered in loud language, which they heard and answered, to allow any faithful persons, or women and children, to pass my lines in safety. This summons was three times repeated, and each time, though our fire slackened and ceased, we were fired upon by the enemy before we re-opened. I considered, therefore, that every fair opportunity had been given, and that the enemy had accepted the evident alternative. Tho weather was beginning to clear, and the native allies began to come out from their little sheltering erections like butterflies, and all the force began to take heart. All this time, thanks to tho exertions of Mr. Richmond and those in rear, among whom I may especially mention Mr. Stopford, Quarter-master Anderson, Captain Newland, Mr. George Smith, Captain Towgood, and Mr. Bower, the supply was well kept up. Sheep were driven up to the front, and our meat supply was never a cause of disquietude. We made yards at every post, and without trouble easily kept our sheep ready for killing. ? The narrative of this siege has been -kept better hy Major St. John than I have described it, and I shall send his notes to you. The mortar, doubtless, did us some service ; hut it also produced a moral effect, showing that no fastnesses can withstand the energy, perseverance, and determination of our troops when aroused by such horrible atrocities as had been committed by the baud of murderers under Te Kooti. — I have, &c, G. S. Whitmoee, Colonel.

Head Quarters, Turanganui, Bth January, 1869. Sib, — I have the satisfaction of informing the Government that on the sth instant the bush and mountain fortress of N gatapa — the chosen stronghold of Kooti and his band of murderers — fell into the hands ofthe Colonial Forces. Previous reports bring the account of the siege to the 4th inst. On that day the sorties of the enemy along our whole line became frequent, and Major Fraser, who had charge of the rear, sent to inform me that he feared he could not much longer prevent the escape of the enemy, unless I caused an immediate attack. I requested Ropata to send out scouts to make a more minute examination of the position, and learned from them that the outer ditch and wall might be taken by a concealed movement. I despatched a party of A.C (No. 8, Arawa) and thirty Ngatiporo to carry out this project, resolving, when in possession of the outer wall, to blow up the inner lines. The party advanced under cover of the bush, the attention of the enemy being engaged b}' a heavy fire from all the trenches, and with a bound and a cheer they scaled the edge of the cliff and took possession of the_ left extremity of the work, tho enemy immediately retreating. Meantime the right was seized by Wikiriwhi and Arapeta Avith their men. This operation was finished by dark, and by dawn our men were but a few feet from the completion of my purpose, when we learned that the enemy were escaping. The fortification was immediately entered hy our men, when it appeared that Kooti had made off, lowering his men and somo of the women down tho steepest and thereforo least guarded part of the cliff. The escape had scarcely been finished when we entered the fortification, and the enemy were so weakened by insufficient food and prolonged watching that I was confident of overtaking the fugitives. A largo part of the native force was at once in eager pursuit. By sundown the number of killed, either in the pa or in the pursuit, had reached 120. By night the following day most of the pursuers had returned, bringing two of Kooti's wives, and 136 of tho band were killed. Although the women fought, and excited the men by their cries, I am happy to say that in obedience to my orders, they and the children wero spared. Had it been otherwise, tho ordinary customs of Maori warfare, aud the singular atrocities committed by Kooti's band, might have palliated tho want of mercy, and the obedience of the Ngatiporo and Arawa is proportionately creditable. I blew up tho main fortification in the manner I had already planned, and the result was an excellent breach. I then fired a salute of twenty -©no guns from the cohorn, and on the evening oftho 7th and morning of the Bth evacuated the hill altogether. The total number of the enemy cer- | tainly ascertained to be- killed, up to the j timo of tho return of the last pursuers, is 136 ; but I am generally informed that j more were killed than havo been rocorded, j and many of the wounded must have died in the mountainous forest which extends for many milos in every direction in rear jof the fortress. Among the dead are

many men of note— Nikora of Ngatihi* neuri, the leader of the murdering party, and Rangiaho, one. of the highest of Uriwera chiefs, are the best known. The pursuers were few, if any, of them acquainted with Kooti, and it is possible he may be among the killed; at all events defeated, twice wounded, a fugitive, and failing in his prophecies, he is not likely again to trouble the district, or assemble a fresh band of assassins, even should he survive the hardships before him, or escape the vengeance of the Uriwera upon I an impostor. Thus tho murders of our unfortunate countrywomen and their children have been avenged on the spot chosen as the strongest in a very rugged forest country, by wretches who perpetrated these crimes. The harmonious working of the Colonial Force, composed of about equal numbers of Europeans and Maoris, has I thus conquered unprecedented difficulties, and I find it almost impossible to select j for praise out of a force all of whom dis- j played extraordinary zeal. Major St. John (who acted as Brigade-Major), Major Fraser, Inspector Roberts, Major Westrup (who, with the Turanga Volunteers, did most disagreeableandlaborious duty with a readiness which I feel bound to refer to specially, as I have on a former occasion made a complaint of the same corps), and tho late Captain Brown, all performed their parts to my entire satisfaction. Captain Newland and Mr. George Smith carried on the transport service by day and night with untiring energy. Mr. Stopford, who, with his detachment, carried provisions across the deep ravine and up the steep ascent of Ngatapa, must also be named. I trust that the Government may think right to recognise the services of Majors St. John and Fraser. lo no officer was I more indebted than to the Chief Ropata Wahatoaha. His courage in the fight was equalled by the wisdom of his course and the command he possessed over his men, whilst his knowledge of the position, derived from a previous chivalrous attempt to take the pa with a handful of his tribe and three or four Europeans, was of the greatest value. He was well supported by Hotene, Wikiriwhi, and other chiefs. Captain Gundry and the Arawa (No. 8 A.C), were the admiration of the force. Always in front, always cheerful and obedient, as brave as they were well behaved. Much of the credit of this belongs to their officer. I wish to bring to your notice, for any rewards or decoration that may be deemed proper, Constables Black and Biddle, who defended the advanced rifle-pits at close quarters with resolute bravery. The medical staff under Dr. Ormond ; the quarter-master's department, under Mr. Anderson ; the artillery, under Ser-geant-Major Anderson ; and the commissariat, in part under Captain Bower, are equally entitled to praise. I have also to thank Mr. Richmond, who was present during the whole of the operations, either in port, or on the road, or at the front, and who, seconded hy the energy of Captain Towgood, secured the working of my hastily-organised commissariat and transport service. Lastly, I have to thank my volunteer A.D.C Mr. Foster, and Captain Skeet, who volunteered his services as engineer, and displayed great courage. Among the list of casualties— happily a short one — two have caused great grief to all who knew them — Captain Brown, of No. 7 division A.C, and Sergeant Hetaraka, No. 1 division. Captain Brown was modest, gallant, conscientious, and his men grieved sincerely over his death. In the work he carried out and in the discipline and affection of his men, he has shown how good and faithful a servant the colony has lost. Hetaraka, one of the bravest aud highest born of the Arawa, known to the whole force by his intelligence and smartness, fell in the very front of Major Fraser's division, while in conversation with Major Fraser, and engaged reconnoitring the enemy. Very full plans and sections have been executed hy Mr. Bousfield, and accompany this despatch. I trust I shall not he thought to lay too much stress on the capture of Ngatapa, which, besides the interest attaching to the overcoming of the physical difficulties of forest and mountain at a distance from supplies, has the great advantage of reassuring our men as to their own capacity to deal with a desperate and remorseless enemy, and to perform any service which the colony can require at their hands. —I have, &c, G. S. Whitmobe, Colonel.

Casualty Return of the killed and wounded at the siege of Ngatapa, Ist to sth Jan., 1869. Officers killed.— Sub-Inspector Captain Brown, No. 7 Division, A.C. Officers wounded.— Acting Sub-Inspec-tor Capel, No. 7 Division A.C. Non-commissioned Officers and men killed. — No. 1 Division, A.C : Sergeant Hetaraka, Constable M'Ewen, Constable Sawyer, Constable Chislett. No. 3 Division, A.C. : Constable Clarendon. Ngatiporos : Hori Pourewa, Ropata Paingawaro, Hunia Huapapa, Heremaiah Taurai, Himiona Matahu. Non-commissioned officers and men wounded. — No. 1 Division, A.C. : Constable Crosbie. No. 3 Division, A.C. : Constable Smith, Constable Clancey. No. 8 Division, A.C. (Arawas) : Horepa Pokiuo, Herewini Te Mano, Riwai Pukerua. Total. — One officer and 10 non-com-missioned officers and men killed. 1 officer and 7 non-commissioned officers and men wounded. G. S. Whitmoee, Colonel.