GUARDS IN MOCK BATTLE

Hawera Star, Volume LII, 19 November 1932, Page 14

GUARDS IN MOCK BATTLE

Gallipoli Landing in England

npHE Guards have landed on Gallipoli! 1 Embarking at the “port.” of Woking, they disembarked on the beaches of a peninsula which jutted out into the pseudo-Acgean Sea of Surrey. Here, on 15th August, 1932, was restaged the immortal drama of 25th April, 1915, writes Captain B. L. Liddcll-Hart in the London “Daily Telegraph.” More fortunate than its Twenty-ninth Division forerunners, the Fourth Guards Brigade was blessed with an unopposed landing. The “Turkish” aircraft did not discover their seaborne approach—because they had to invent engine trouble and sabotage as an excuse.for not going up in the air until later. For, as special instructions warned them, the invading forces, “which would really be crossing the sea, will, in actual fact, be eating their dinner in the middle of it.” Thus not until the Guards were safely ashore was the opposing “ Turkish” First Cavalry Brigade warned by patrols of their landing. The late 'warning and consequent lack of opposition recalled the conditions of Suvla rather than of Helles. In this 1932 “revival” the Guards had a further advantage. Instead of Aehi Baba being nearly live miles distant, its substitute plateau was barely two miles away from the beaches. And in the race for this commanding height they had not the handicap of disorder due to a battle on the beaches as at Holies, or to darkness and unknown ground as at Suvla. .So, getting quickly off the mark, with a characteristic Guards’ dash, they reached the heights. But there they were met and cheeked by the “Turkish’-’ cavalry. One must recognise that to some extent the check was invited. For, like the' Twentyninth Division in 1915, the Guards concentrated their effort on three central beaches —and thus helped'their opponents to concentrate against thorn. Moreover, unlike the Twenty-ninth Division, they did not attempt any distracting o>- feint landings elsewhere. Thus an old - lesson was brought out with a a new force.

There is undoubtedly great value in “ lighting battles o’er again,” especially when some famous problem of recent history is so admirably refrained as a test for future leaders as in this Guards’ Brigade exercise. Those who set it are to be congratulated on the closeness of the conditions they reproduced to those of 1915. In the Pirbright, Stanford and Ash “beaches,” where the Guards made their landings, we had clearly the A', W. and X beaches of Gallipoli history. At Long Bottom, just west of Aidershot, was an ideal Y beach. But it was not utilised to menace the enemy’s rear as in 1915. Nor were the five possible beaches on the other flank, stretching as far as Broadmoor.

One outstanding lesson of the original Gallipoli landing is that its initial success was mainly due to the wide distribution of the landing force at a large number of points. For this seeming failure to concentrate liis efforts Sir lan Hamilton was censured by pedantic critics. But, in fact, ho twice achieved a surprise effect such as none of the commanders in France ever did. By apparent dispersion, and by avoiding the obvious, the British commander realised an overwhelming concentration. Unhappily the opportunity was allowed to slip away by lack of “rapid and resolute action by commanders and initiative on the part of the leading troops.” Such a fault the present exercise is seeking to avoid. Another outstanding lesson of the Gallipoli landing was the need for elasticity or “variability” in the plan. It might have made all the difference if a “floating” reserve had been available in April, 3915, to reinforce along the line of least resistance or to develop a fresh and unexpected line. On the “Turkish” side the present commander aimed not merely to stop the invaders, but to “drive them back into the sea.” With this object he hoped to launch a surprise counterstroke, in flank,- more promptly than the Turks were able to do in 1915. He was certainly helped by the fact that his force was entirely composed of mobile troops. But it is a question whether he, also, did not handicap himself by a too orthodox interpretationof “concentration.” His cavalry brigade was closely assembled in a small area behind the" canal south of Frimlev Green. To emerge, -it had apparently but two routes. Concentration usually means delay, and if the invaders’ aircraft were able to block even one .exit, with a well-placed bomb, concentration might spell congestion and perhaps stagnation. In contrast, if a force is distributed more widely it can often strike a more truly concentrated blow — by bringing a greater part into action at the right time. On the invading side,- the covering force commander, in concentrating ’his effort, may have felt himself limited by his mission .of securing an adequate “base” for the main body. His plan was well designed for this immediate object, although from the longer point of view it meant that the main body, when ready to advance, might And the enemy concentrated to stop them.

Nevertheless, the threat from three beaches sufficed, to cause more dissemination of the enemy’s cavalry than he probably cared for, • and the Guards were quick to probe any openings. Although pushed off the crest of “Aehi Baba” in the afternoon, they renewed and extended their grip later.