MILITARY STRENGTH

Hawera Star, Volume XLVII, 24 October 1928, Page 7

MILITARY STRENGTH

LIMITATION DISCUSSIONS. MAKING THE COMPROMISE. TEXT OF MAIN CLAUSES ■iit,-il IV°M Association—By Electric Tplrgr.ipl Copyright.) (Australian l’rps» Association.) LONDON, Oct. 22. A circular despatch is included in the documents now -brought together in the White Paper on the naval compromise between Great Britain and France, which begins with an extract from the opening speech by the president at the 'third session of the preparatory commission. The British and French draft conventions are set out and the discussion of them is summarised in extracts from the speeches of the delegates of naval Powers. Viscount Cecil’s speech, 'to which Lord Oushendun refers, was delivered at Geneva when, later in the session, the modified French draft was submitted to the commission. Referring to the British view that, some account ought to be taken of the reserves of trained militiamen iu different countries, Viscount Cecil said: “We have felt and I have stated i't all along, that that is a matter which, however strongly we may feel about it as a mattei of principle, does affect other countries very much more than ourselves, and that if a limit of military strength can be arrived at which would not include any limitation of trained reserves among other countries, I do< not think it would he at all likely my Government would insist on its view with respect 'to that.”. On March 8 of the present year, at Lord Oushendun’s suggestion, the British Foreign Minister, Sir Austen Chamberlain, discussed with M. Briand the French Foreign Minister, the disarmament position with reference to the meeting of the preparatory commission called for the following week. A record of the conversation says: “Sir A. Chamberlain began by regretting that on two crucial military and naval questions the French and the British were diametrically opposed. British public opinion,. with its 'traditions, believed that voluntary armies were defensive and that conscript armies implied offensive war.”

DEMANDS OF PUBLIC OPINION

Whereas he was fully aware that to the French mind compulsory military service seemed a guarantee of a pacific policy and a voluntary army appeared in the dangerous light of being b.u’i “Praetorian guards,” Sir Austen went on to say that -Great Britain had been reconsidering what she thought essential from the naval point of view. He told M. Briand of 'the modified proposals drawn up by the Admiralty. Public opinion realised that concessions were necessary from all parties for a general settlement to he reached, and if he could point to a concession by the French in naval matters it -would probably result in his yielding a point on the military side. On the other hand, we could not abandon the British standpoint on the question of army reserves unless we could justify this concession by pointing to a similar concession made to us in the .naval sphere. M. Briand asked for a personal copy of the revised Admiralty proposals referred to by Sir A. Chamberlain, and said that he would put them before the French naval ■ authorities. They were not accepted by the latter, but conversations between Anglo-French naval representatives to Admiral Kelly were, on June 28, officially submitted to the French Government which, in its desire to secure a' solution of the question, accepted them in principle.

AGREEMENT CONFIRMED. The agreement was confirmed and the 'terms of compromise restated in a Note to M. Briand on July 28, stating inter alia, that the British Government “is in full agreement with the French Government that khe assent of the other great naval Powers is essential to its success, and, as desired by the French Government, His Majesty's Government will communicate to the Governments of the United States, Italy and Japan the compromise which has already received the approval of Franco and Great Britain. That is to say, the limitations which the disarmament conference will have to -determine will deal with four classes of warships : Firstly, capital ships,.i.e., ships of over 10,000 tons, or with guns of more than 8-inch calibre; secondly, aircraft carriers of over 10.000 tons; thirdly, surface vessels of or below 10,.000 tons armed with guns of more than 6-inch and up to 8-inch calibre; fourthly, ocean- going’ submarines, that is, over the 600 tons." 1 “The Washington Treaty regulates the limitations in classes one and two, and the disarmament conference will only then have to consider the method of extending these limitations to the Powers non-signatory to this treaty. As regards classes three and four ; the final disarmament conference will fir the maximum tonnage applicable to ol Powers which no Power will be allowed to exceed for the total of vessels in each of these respective categories during the period covered by the convention. Within this maximum limit each Power will, at the final conference, indicate for each of these categories the tonnage they propose to reach and which they undertake not to exceed during the period covered by the convention.”