DISARMAMENT

Hawera Star, Volume XLVII, 24 October 1928, Page 7

DISARMAMENT

: j NAVAL COMPROMISE. AGREEMENT DISCUSSED. ANGLO-FRENCH DIVERGENCE. (British Official Wireless.) » RUGBY. Oct, 22. A White Paper dealing with the Anglo-French proposals for the limitation of naval armaments was issued this evening. It is a comprehensive document, covering the history of the negotiations leading op to the exchange of Notes containing the terms of the proposed compromise and the subsequent correspondence with the other chief naval Powers. As a. result of unauthorised and incomplete disclosures the compromise became the object of public speculation., often of an erroneous and misleading character, and it is believed that the White Paper will place the matter in its true perspectve. ... , In a circular despatch to British representatives in the capitals of countries represented on the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament. Lord Cushendun. emphasises that “the Anglo-French compromise cannot be regarded as a detached or isolated event; it is the most recent link in a. long chain of endeavour to implement the provision embodied in the article and covenant of the League of Nations, to the effect that mernhers of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety. _ “The first steps taken by tiie League to fulfil this obligation were turned in the direction of comprehensive schemes of mutual assistance in the belief that the creation of a general sense of security was the most promising avenue to an all-round: reduction and limitation of armaments. In the face of continued failure to reach an agreement on any such scheme this line of approach was abandoned in favour of more direct methods, and in December, 1925, the assembly set up a special commission with a mandate to nrepare the ground for the general conference. This commission. known as the Preparatory Commission, attacked its main task at its third session from March to April, 1927, at which British and French representatives each put- forward a draft skeleton convention as the basis for discussion. There was a wide divergence between these two drafts on the naval side. The British draft provided for limitations of vessels of war in nine categories. _ The French draft was for limitation, broadly speaking, by total tonnage. It was between, these two principles of limitation. by classes or limitation by total or global tonnage, that the chief controversy has turned. Other Governments represented on the commission ranged themselves some on one side and some on the other. In the hope of bridging this divergence the French delegation, some days later, put forward a modified proposal which went so far as to meet the British view as to introduce classification _ t>y four classes. It contained a provision, however, for an unlimited transfer of tonnage from one class to another, and partly for that reason and partly owing to the. small number of classes it proved unacceptable to the British delegation.

NO PROGRESS MADE. Confronted by these l acute and seemingly irreconcilable divergences, and anxious to do nothing which might prejudice the success of the naval conference to which- the -United _ States Government had recently issued invitations, the Preparatory Commission adjourned without having made any progress towards an agreed upon text of the j skeleton convention. Two months later the naval conference met in Geneva, only to break down after seven weeks of effort.

“In the face of the deadlock in the Preparatory Commission, followed by the failure of the Geneva conference, all prospects of immediate progress appeared to be extinguished. Informal conversations, however, were frequent at Geneva, and ultimately culminated in a conversation between M. Briand and Sir Austen Chamberlain in March, 1928, which led to the compromise under review. In tlie- course of their discussions Sir Austen Chamberlain mentioned that certain suggestions had been made hy the British Admiralty, and subsequently communicated a written note of them to M. Briand at the latter’s request. _ They provided for limitation by six classes, all types of vessel being included, but they were not acceptable.

THE DIFFERENCE IN PLANS. “In considering these successive steps towards a compromise it should be- borne in mind that the British contention had always been for limitation in detail; the French contention for limitation by total tonnage. Thus the original British plan had been ‘for classification by nine classes but under the modified British proposals as submitted to M. Briand after the March conversation the number of classes had been reduced to six, but these included vessels of all types. On their side the French Government, no less anxious than the British Government to promote an agreement, had shown a disposition to meet the British thesis so far as possible. In the end the compromise was reached on a basis of limitation applicable to four classes of war vessels. While admittedly incomplete ns a. final solution of the naval limitation question, they would, if adopted, have added two further classes of vessel to the two classes limited under the. Washington Treaty. They could only lead to useful if the other principal naval Powers were ready to regard them as offering a possible basis for a resumption of negotiation in the Preparatory Commission.

MILITARY MATTERS. “As in the matter of naval disarmament, the question of classification versus global tonnage had hitherto impeded -progress, so in the matter of. land disarmament the question of limitation of military trained reserves had proved a stumbling block. The French Government and the majority of governments represented on the Preparatory Commission had held that- the reserves should l>e excluded from limitation, while the British Government had consistently supported the opposite. For some time. however, they had realised that further opposition on their part- to the exclusion of these trained reserves could, in face of the attitude maintained by the majority of the Preparatory Commission, only have the effect of preventing progress indefinitely. So long ago as April, 1927, Viscount Cecil clearly foreshadowed a withdrawal, for the sake of agreement, of tlie British opposition. When, therefore, the two

Governments were advancing towards a compromise in the matter of naval limitation, it was felt that the process of agreement could only he- facilitated by a formal intimation that a concession made to the views of the British Government on the naval classification would enable them to withdraw their opposition to the French standpoint in the matter of military trained reserves.”

NO SECRET CLAUSES. Referring to the criticisms of alleged secrecy of negotiations, Lord Cifshendun recalls the March announcement that the conversations were proceeding, and points out that when the compromise proposals were ready for submission to other naval Powers the fact was announced by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons. “I myself gave to the Press on August 30 a full account of the circumstances in which the compromise was reached, and an emphatic denial of the speculations as to the existence of secret classes and political understandings The whole case is revealed in the correspondence, and any suggestions to the contrary are totally devoid of foundation. The proposals were submitted at the end of July to the Governments of the United States, Italy and Japan. While the Japanese Government express concurrence in the purport of the proposals, the United States and Italy, for reasons clearly and cogently exDlained in their Notes, have not seen their way to accept them. These communications are receiving attentive consideration, and a reply will be made in due course.”

REPLY TO GERMAN INQUIRY. LONDON, Oct. 22. Sir Horace Rumbold, the British Ambassador, telegraphed from Berlin on August 4 that the German Goveniment was disconcerted by the news of the naval compromise, and feared it might imply a- concession resnecting the limitation of land forces. To this Sir A. Chamberlain replied the following day: “Text- of compromise refers exclusively to naval limitation, butthere is an understanding with the French Government, made before the text of the compromise was actually drawn up, that if France could meet His Majesty’s Government on the question of naval limitation the latter would he prepared to withdraw opposition to the views of the French and most other Governments on the question of trained reserves.”