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NOT A FREE HAND

VISCOUNT CECIL’S REASONS

RESIGNATION FROM CABINET. BRITAIN AND DISARMAMENT. BY CABLE -PRESS association-copyright LONDON, Nov. 16. In the House of Lords, as an outcome of a reference to questions of foreign policy by Lord Parmoor, Leader of the Labour Party in the House of Lords, Viscount Cecil made a personal explanation regarding. Ins resignation. , . , He said it was the culmination ot a series of events such as the Labour Government’s rejection of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, followed by the Conservative rejection of the 1924 Geneva Protocol. He went to the naval conference conscious that his instructions would cause serious difficulties. jExficfcly wiiat he anticipated occurred. He was repeatedly out in the position of defending situations seemingly wholly indefensible. and thereby creating the impression that. Great Britain was lukewarm on the subject* *of disarmament. Viscount Cecil narrated several m•stances of what he described as depaitmental obstruction. Indeed, he said, the representatives of the Admiralty scarce!v concealed their indiffeience, if not "hostlitv, to the whole proceedings. He did not infer that was the attitude of the whole Cabinet; neveitheless, lic was unable to convince Cabinet of the importance of taking a stronger line with its technical advisors. Owing to the harinfnlnes® of many incidents, he asked fop a free hand personally to decide minor matters. This was declined. He trusted Cabinet had now seen the result of too great, deference to expert advice, and would give Lord Cnshendum (formerly Sir Ronald McNeil) greater support than it had felt able to accord the speaker. Viscount Cecil said that when lie returned from Geneva lid was exhausted and discouraged. He felt that though not a complete failure, the l advance was not commensurate with the objective. Above all, he felt there was a fundamental difference between his and the Cabinet’s views on the importance of an intemationl effort to disarm. AN ESSENTIAL WARNING. He referred to the declaration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. V rust on Churchill) after the breakdown of the Geneva Conference when he said: “England is unable now to, and I hope never will in future, embody m a solemn international agreement words binding us to the principle of mathematical parity of naval strength.'’ Viscount Cecil continued that though he did not agree he was certain Mr. Churchill was convinced that his warning was essential for the safety of England. The speaker was equally sure that, if persisted in, it would bang, bolt and bar the door against any hope of an agreement with America on naval disarmament. There was no doubt that the moment Mr. Churchill realised the delegates had .agreed on a parity ,©ven though the speaker had received experss telegraphic sanction to do so, the Chancellor began to press on his Cabinet colleagues the necessity of avoiding what he regarded as a disastrous concession.

The culmination of many telegrams was the recall of Viscount Cecil trimself, who traced at length the subseouent negotiations, and added that- the Government had taken a course which he believed had caused the failure of vital negotiations. If he had remained in offire he would have had to take the responsibility for that, as well as to defend it, and that was impossible. Earl Balfour regretted that Viscount Cecil had thought it necessary to level serious charges at his late colleagues. The speaker did not see how the. course of events at Geneva, justified the extreme course adopted by Viscount Cecil, who, it appeared to Earl Balfour, had allowed inevitable differences to accumulate, to a point at which his temper gave. way. The speaker did not believe that two great pacific countries would fait to reach a friendly agreement on the point at issue. Great Britain did not object to America building as many small craft as she thought necessary, but we had duties to perform to the Empire and to the people of the Homeland. “Le ns say to America : ‘Do not ask ns to diminish our small craft beyond the point we deem necessary for our safety.’ Surely,” said the speaker, “that line of policy was not so inherently unreasonable that America will even refuse to listen.” Earl Balfour said he regarded the Geneva Conference as interrupted, not ended. Compared with the great issues at stake, the. differences that had arisen were, small nnd petty.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/HAWST19271118.2.24

Bibliographic details

Hawera Star, Volume XLVII, 18 November 1927, Page 5

Word Count
721

NOT A FREE HAND Hawera Star, Volume XLVII, 18 November 1927, Page 5

NOT A FREE HAND Hawera Star, Volume XLVII, 18 November 1927, Page 5

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