CONTROL EXPERIMENT

Hawera Star, Volume XLVI, 14 July 1927, Page 5

CONTROL EXPERIMENT

WEAKNESS OF CO-OPERATION. MR. COATES REVIEWS POSITION. HOW TO STfclP INTERFERENCE. BY TELEGRAPH—SPECIAL TO THE STAR. WELLINGTON, .July 13. Dairy control occupied a good deal the Prime. Minister’s attention during his contribution to the Address-in-Re-ply debate. Air Coates commenced by showing that he. had a long experience as a farmer and co-operator, and with this knowledge was able to point to some weakness in the co-operative system, and to make important suggestions for their elimination. He traversed the whole story of the failure of price-fixing, and answered several points oi personal criticism made against him by the Leader of the Opposition.

The Prime Minister declared that of course, t-he Opposition felt it a duty to criticise, and at was making a desperate effort to get on side with the producers, endeavouring to show that it was*the real friend of the farmer. As a matter of fact, he happen id to be a producer himself; his instincts were the land, and if he ceased connection with politics lie would return to the land. He was acquainted first-hand with the co-operation movement .among the farming community, and had always worked along co-operative lines, iso that lie could claim first hand and inside knowledge of it. His concern was not the political aspect, for which he did not care a rap; but his concern was for the dairy producer, and 'lie would like to ask the Leader of the Opposition a question. If he had been Prime Minister in London when a similar position existed, would he have refused to meet Toolev Street?

Air Holland: ‘1 would certainly have invited the chairman of the Control Board, who was in London, and not held a meeting secret, from hiim.” Air Coates : “I shall be able to show that the honourable gentleman is in error. Would he- have refused to- see these men?” Air Holland: “I have never made any complaint about that, but you .saw themi behind the back of the chairman.”

'Air Coates continued to say that he was not burning to enter the dairy' control controversy. _ but he became concerned about the dairy producers’ interests and what lie was going to get for his produce. His line of action wasclenr. He would see those men, discuss with them any matters of interest and any effect- it .might have on the producer in New Zealand. This he did. and later informed them that he had no part in the board’s policy, and' it was a matter entirely for the Dairy Board. He pointed out to the London committee his opinion that they were making a mistake in their policy ol forcing price-fixing, .and he took up this attitude: “If vow are not going to bei forewarned, let us see if you can make a- success of tout scheme; whether bv combined efforts von can push your scheme into successful operation.” WEAKNESSES OF CO-OPERATION.

A question lor consideration was whether there were any .structural weaknesses in co-operation. There had been extraordinary strides, made through cooperation in securing excellent qua At a and efficiency in handling, but the ‘question arose whether there mas a weakness in marketing. Wnen it came to setting up the Control Board an element ot politics came in, and where consistent and acute management was essential, it was difficult to secure it where the members were responsible to the electors. There were so many people outside 't'he board who. could manage things much better than the .board, whose policy was'constantly interfered with. T'he Leader of the Opposition consistently advocated an open policy, but -his reply to that was that no business concern con d possibly run on t-ho.se lines. It was impossible, .and such a policy would wreck any commercial concern which carried it- out. It was certainly wrong to make it a. political question. The board should be allowed to settle down and become an independent council. Mr Lysnar: “Rut out the commercial element.” Mr Coates: “There is another suggestion : that these boards should hand over to an independent council of one, two or three- men, who have a perfect know edge of the business. It may be a method of getting much further and with more success than with so many having a linger in the pie.” Air Wilford: “Who will appoint them?” , Air Coates: “The board, delegating its own powers. Strangely enough, in co-operative concerns, where they have made a success, they had handed the affairs over to a manager and one or two assistants to run the show, eliminating constant interference from, men who have not the same knowledge ol the business.”

The Government’s experience of other boards was that they kept in very close contact with the Government. The Hairy Board hqd done so, but not to the extent of other boards. The Prime Minister went on to .give a. survey of the opinions presented to him in London by merchants. The cable he sent was composed, after he had been in contact, not only with the London representatives, hut members of the trade in the provinces. “I am convinced that had the board .steadied up at that time, they probably would be very much further ahead than they are.”

While the Government and its party were not implicated in the Dairy Control Board policy, they were certainly concerned about the success of its policy. Me was afraid the board was in the position that where it produced only a small portion of the product in demand it must be subject to competition. As lor the Government’s responsibility for appointing Mr. Batterson to the London board, he would remind Parliament that the name of \li'. Patterson and one other was submitted to the Dairy Board, and Mr. Patterson was approved. At the meetings with the merchants in London, 9S" per cent of the trade was represented.

Any argument as to Mr. Patterson’s influence against price-fixing was completely nullified by the revelation of Mr. iorns on his* return that of the London committee two were against price-fixing and one favoured it. “I deny that we have- ever, at any time, directed our members on tlie board or London committee as to what they should do.”

FARMERS SHOULD PULL TOGETHER. The Prime Minister declared that bis advice to farmers was always to work together. It was this constant dissension which caused trouble. Both sides were strong-minded, and in the end the publicity given enabled those who are against them to drive a wedge amongst the farmer. He gave Mr.

Grounds a copy of his cable three days after it was sent. Mr. Holland (Leader of the Opposition): “Secret matter had been going out from the London agency to Tooley Street.” Mr. Coates: “The information Tooley Street got came from New Zealand,* following the publication of my confidential cable here.” “I’VE A GOOD MIND TO RESIGN.” Quoting from notes of the interview with Mr. Patterson, the Government representative on the London board, the Prime Minister said that- in November Mr. Patterson said to him: “I have a good mind to resign, but I will not, because I can still save a great deal of trouble.” Mr. Coates said that be answered: “It is not for me to dictate what yon should do, and if you feel that you can be of use it is for you to remain.” It all came back to the point of whether the price-fixing policy was sound. If New Zealand produced all the butter available in England this monopoly could have fixed prices, but was- that fair? The- veal position was that New Zealand was only supplying a portion of the requirements, and when it fixed prices the dairy produce could not be sold. An impression had been created in the minds of the English public that if they were in the hands of the New Zealand producer that they would be in a dangerous position. Foreign butter brought- about competition and, said the English consumer, prevents any one from forcing the last copper out of us. “It is a clearly wrong impression, hut it has been created,” concluded the Prime Minister. ,