DISARMAMENT

Hawera Star, Volume XLVI, 22 June 1927, Page 7

DISARMAMENT

CONFERENCE COMMENCED. NAVAL LIMITATIONS. PROPOSALS EXPLAINED.

BY OABI.K—PRESS ASSOCI ATION-COI’YHiaUT GENEVA, June 20.

The opening session of the conference on naval limitations was not an impressive function. An historic feature was that the United States participated for the first time in any comerence held at Geneva since the formation of the League of Nations. The early proceedings emphasised that the conference was breaking new ground, it bad no precedents to guide it and no agenda before it for, though it is a sequel to the Washington Conierence, it is unlike it, because only three Powers are represented, while the Washington gathering was more embracing and assembled in the face ox a clear-cut programme. The speeches were entirely tie void of oratory or eloquence, ail being carefully read documents. Mr. Bridgeman specially emphasised that Britain’s proposals were made with tiie consent ot all the Dominion’s representatives, but in accordance with the decisions of the Imperial Conference any resulting treaty would be made in the names of the heads of the various Dominions agreeing to participate. , Mr Bridgeman also went out of his way to stress that Britain’s proposals were formed to make it easier and not harder for France and Italy to join the conference. He added that he believed the success of the conference depend*.d more upon plain' language statement or what each nation wanted in the shape of a navy and why it wanted it than in rhetoric.

There are 150 journalists present, representing newspapers in ad parts oi the world.

The conference cabled to President Coolidge expressing its most profound appreciation of this humane and wise initiative and stating that it was hopeful of having satisfactory results. President Coolidge, replied stating that an Anglo-America-Jnpan agreement preventing naval competition would lastingly cement the present good relations and constitute a definite step towards a general limitation, of armaments. America would make the utmost effort to ensuie an agreement.

After fixing the times for committee meetings the conference adjourned. It is pointed out that under the Washington agreement, Britain and America must lay down 15 new capital ships during the decade commencing 1941. The British proposals reduce this, but retain the 55—3 ratio, lowering the first cost of maintenance charges, while fixing the life period of auxiliaries, and reducing the cost of replacement. iMoreover, the reduction of battleships from 35,000 to 30,000 tons, and guns from 16in. to 13.5 in. are logical curtailments, not affecting the relative strength, while aircraft carriers of 25,000 tons are fully practicable, as is also the reduction of their guns^ It is logical to apply the. s—sy-35—5y-3 ratio to 10,000 ton cruisers which would operate With the battle fleet. The possibility of producing <SOO ton \essels with 6iu. guns and with the qualifications of cruisers will be considered, and also the checking or increasing of the size of capital ships or cruisers. It is thought desirable, while submarines are retained, to introduce two t.\ pes, one for harbour defence and the other for more distant, operations.

EXPERTS DISCUSS PROPOSALS. GENEVA, June 20. An examination of the proposals by the British naval experts puts them in a different light from that which the actual speeches convey to laymen. interviewed, one expert declared: “The British proposals are far more comprehensive than the American scheme. Our proposed extension or the life of capital ships alone would effect an important lightening of the burden of naval armaments on the taxpayer. We suggest a definite limit to the number and power of cruisers, and favour a clear statement from every nation of its actual requirements in cruisers, destroyers and submarines. “America does not propose to reduce the power and size of capital ships, while the suggestion of the maintenance of the o—5 —3 ratio for cruisers, destroyers and submarines leaves a wide range of siz.es. Theoletieally it allows the smaller Powers to build according to their capacity. “Judging from the experience after Washington, the maximum size permitted would become the standard. A close examination shows that the maintenance of the ratios, is only in the total tonnage instead of the numbers of vessels. It means that America would be enabled to add considerably to her cruiser tonnage. Britain would have to reduce her’s and Japan’s would remain unchanged. “Yet the elfect would be that America would be able to scrap many of her old, worn-out cruisers and replace them with new and more powerful ones. America’s programme would be really to increase, and not reduce, naval armaments, because her proposed reductions do not apply to new ships. Our concrete proposal to limit the number and size of ships constitutes a real step forward in the direction of disarmament. America’s does not. Similarly, Japan proposes a shorter life and a quicker replacement of ships than we rlo.

“Under the Japanese proposition, Britain would lia\e 62 cruisers of all sizes, the United States 10, and Japan ill. The figures for destroyers would ac: Britain 176, America 280, Japan 104; and for submarines, Britain 64, America 114, and Japan 71. “The United States is unlikely to accept these. Fortunately, Japan lias intimated that she is willing to \ iew sympathetically a suggestion that the Lowers should openly state their actual requirements in the various categories of ships.’ Replying to a question, the expert said that France and Italy would be welcomed with open arms if they were willing to join the conference. Even now, in any case, Britain was anxious for their adherence to any agreement that the tnree Bowers might reach.

AMERICAN PROPOSALS EXPLAINED. GENEVA, June 20. Mr Gibson prefaced his speech with a message from Piesident Coolidge. declaring that the President was only jnterperting the overwhelming sentiment of the American people in stating that the United States would do its utmost to make ah agreement possible. Mr. Gibson added that it could he assumed that the conference started in agreement on the following points, namely, that in the interest of international understanding there should be

no competition between the three Powers in naval armaments. Thenlespective navies should be maintained at the lowest level compatible with national security, and never be of a size and character to warrant suspicion ot aggressive intent. Future construction should be kept at a minimum. The methods and principles of the limitation set down bj the A\ ashington Treaty should be extended to all categories of combatant \ esse Is of the three Bowers. The United States had no intention of maintaining a force as a threat to any Bower. It did not desire to initiate a competitive programme. The American suggestions were based on the following considerations: That the ratio principles of the Washington Treaty should be applied to cruisers, destroyers and submarines, and an agreement of the three Powers to limit the building of auxiliary vessels should be co-terminous with the Washington Treaty and contain provision respecting revision in the event of an extenshe building programme by a Bower not a party to the agreement. For the purpose of future limitation auxiliaries should be divided into four categories, three of which, namely, cruisers, destroyers and submarines, should be subject to limitations, with the fourth class of negligent combatant value not subject to limitation, the cruiser class to include surface combatant vessels from 3090 to 10,000 tons, tiie destroyer class to include all surface combatant vessels from 600 to 3000 tons, and of a speed above 17 Knots.

The United States recognised that naval requirements were relative, and if these limits were adjusted for one Bower they should be so adjusted for all. If any Bowers proposed lower tonnage levels of auxiliary crait the United States would welcome them, to obviate the scrapping of comparatively new vessels in one class simultaneously with building in another class. Mr. Gibson added the question ol abolition of submarines must be universal between all the naval Powers in order to be-effective.

BRITAIN’S DIFFICULTIES. NEED FOR STRONG NAVY. GENEVA, June 20. The British naval disarmament proposals are to fix the lite ol eight-inch cruisers at 24 years, destroyers at 20, and submarines at 15. The Rt. Hon. W. C. Bridgeman, in thanking President Coolidge for his invitation, mentioned that the Admiralty proposals were actually in the hands or Mr. Baldwin before the invitation had been received. He regretted that France and Italy were absent. The time was ripe for the extension oi the Washington principle of limitation. He thought the conference would be successful if each country frankly stated what navai force was wanted by it, and why, with their demands based purely on defensive considerations.

He defined the British Empiie’s position according to the following factors: Firstly, the insular position oEngland, dependent for raw materials and food, and for its very existence, on the free passage of the seas, which render a discussion of naval disarmament more difficult for her than for any other country Secondly, the length of her trade routes.

Thirdly’, the extensive coastline of the Empire and long lines of communications to be protected. He emphasised that he spoke with the consent, of the Dominions’ representatives. Whatever treaty might result from the conference would be made in the names of the heads of the States participating, several parts of the Empire being shown by appropriate geographical entries in lieu of plenipotentiaries. The object of Britain was economy, but she made a reservation, namely, that owing to the position o Britain in relation to Europe, it was necessary to guard against an increase •of the naval strength of non-signa-tories to any' agreement relating to the United States, Japan, and the British Empire. Therefoie, provision for reconsideration would be needed, but be honed that the European Powers would adhere to the agreement.