GENEVA PROTOCOL.

Hawera Star, Volume XLVIII, 13 March 1925, Page 7

GENEVA PROTOCOL.

% EXTRA EDITION.

THE REASONS WHY. BRITAIN CANNOT ACCEPT. BY CABLE —PRESS ASSOCIATION -COPYRIGHT. Received Alareh 13, 11.26 a.m.. GENEVA, March 12. Air Austin Chamberlain, addressing the Council of the League of Nations, announced that his Majesty's advisers, alter discussing the protocol with the Dominions ami India, were unable to sign or ratify it in its present form, 'iiif British Government did net believe 'the protocol, as it stood, provided the most suitable method of attempting the task for which it was intended. He had not had time personally to confer with the representatives of the Dominions and India, but. tnero had been telegraphic communication. . The* Dominions and Canada were unable to accept the protocol.

Air Chamberlain stressed the Empire’s sympathy with the themes oi tile protocol, but the changes made 1 in the protocol were formal rather than substantial, aiming at theoretical completeness rather than practical effect, and thus accomplishing nothing oi impel tahee in tne cause of peace and disarmament. It appeared from telegraphic communications that Canaan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, were unable to accept the protocol. He was not yet in possession of the views of the Irish Free State. His Majesty's Government concluded that the best way to deal, with the situation was to supplement the covenant by special arrangements to meet special iie.-ds. These must be purely defensive, in the spirit of the covenaim and close lo the harmony of the League. These were best- attained by means of treaties framed to maintain an unliulnokcn peace. A quicker remedy could be found against future calamities. The work of the League continues beneficial and promising. Though America remains m friendly nloolness, individual Americans have extended symapthy, service and generosity. It would ho most unwise to add to the liabilities already incurred by the League without further consideration The machinery of the covenant was already Weakened by the abstention of certain States. The change, especially as regards economic sanctions, amounted to a transformation. The economic sanction could he a weapon of incalculable power, but the mere existence of powerful economic communities outside the League changed all that. Referring to clause 15 of the protocol, his Majesty's Government did not desiie to relieve the aggressor from the duty of repairing damage, but they strongly held the view that frontiers should ‘b e neither lightly made nor lightly violated. They accepted tne principle of sovereign States managing their own affairs, but considered it unwise to embody these generalities lit dogmas of inflexible rigidity, applicable to all circumstances and to all time. He failed to see why the League should deliberately deprive itself of the desecration which all other tribunals were free to exercise, in dealing with unprovoked aggression or barbarous war. Mr Chamberlain said that the second half of clause 15 protected the aggressors. He asked whether i nsuch case the League Was to do nothing better than ask for money. .. , The additions made to the original covenant had destroyed its balance and had altered its spirit; and emphasis was laid on the sanctions and military procedure etc. It suggested that the vital business of the League was not so much the promotion of friendly cooperation and reasoned harmony /as the preservation of peace by organising for war, perhaps on the largest scale. The British. Government considered that anything leading, to the idea that the main business of the League was war rather than peace, was likely to weaken its fundamental task. He asked why should disarmament immediately follow the acceptance of the protocol? Why should the new scheme succeed when the old had lamentably failed. The covenant, if kept, would afford protection, but what the objec'tpfs. doubted was, when it came to the point, would the covenant be kept? Brute force was what either some faithless member _of the League, or some predatory nation outside would fear, and brute force only could in their view give the security they needed. His Majesty's Government failed to see how this Would he liettered by the protocol. While every scheme of sanctions was open to criticism, some scheme of sanctions wait certainly necessary, as without ..it the League would lie as insecure as civilised society without a magistrate or the. police. His Majesty’s Government might he content to say that it preferred the covenant unamended to the covenant amended by the protocol, but it did not wish to, be merely critical; it was willing to consider the possibilitv of approaching the question from tlie side unsuccessfully attempted in 1923.

Mr Chamberlain concluded: “Since the general provisions of the covenant cannot advantageously be .stiffened, and since the extreme cases with which the League might have to deaf would probably affect certain nations or groups of nations more nearly 'than others, his Majesty’s Government has' concluded that the best way of dealing with the situation waS with the cooperation of the League, to. supplement the covenant mentioned above.’’