The Hawera Star. FRIDAY, JANUARY 30, 1925. PACIFIC NAVAL BASE.

Hawera Star, Volume XLVIII, 30 January 1925, Page 4

The Hawera Star.

FRIDAY, JANUARY 30, 1925. PACIFIC NAVAL BASE.

Delivered every evening by 5 o’cloc* In Hawera., Manaia, Normanby, Okaiawa, Eltham, Mangatoki, Kaponga, Awatuni, Opunake, Otakeho, Manutabi, Alton, Hurleyvi , Patea. Waverley. Mokoia, Wbakamara, Ohangai, Meremere, Fraaar Road, and Ararata.

,The suggestion made by Lieut.-Com-mander Kenworthy, M.P., that the Pacific naval base should be constructed at Sydney rather than at Singapore is bound to . attract wide interest throughout the Empire, but particularlytin Australia and New Zealand. Comparatively little money has been spent at Singapore to date, so the alternative proposal is not made too late for serious consideration. But Commander Ken worthy surely does not suggest that the responsible officers of the Admiralty have not examined the Singapore project- most thoroughly, on strategical and on every other ground. The British race has somehow managed to build up a reputation for blundering, but the senior service has never shared in that reputation, and when eventually the nation has “got there ’’—blundered through, as the critics put it—more often than not it has been thanks to the Navy. In face of that it is difficult to imagine that the Admiralty did not weigh all the evidence most carefully before deciding on Singapore as the site for the Pacific base. And without doubt Singapore is a key position—the real gateway to t-lie East. Sydney may have other advantages, but it lacks some which the present choice possesses in marked degree. To the layman it is passing strange that a naval officer should speak of a base, at Singapore as a white elephant. The question seems to resolve itself down to a consideration of the objects behind ‘the establishment of a naval base in the Pacific of its prime purpose. From the summary of his article published in to-day’s cables, it is apparent that Commander Kenwortliy is chiefly concerned "with the growing power of Japan. A possible attempt by Japan to conquer Australia is the hypothesis which he uses to demonstrate the alleged strategic weakness of Singapore. It- is an unfortunate truth that some similar thought is at the back of the mind of most of us when we try to pierce the veil of the future in our own ocean; unfortunate, because the surest way to precipitate wa'r is to regard it as inevitable. The position is undoubtedly difficult, since neither Britain nor the United States would be justified in shutting its eyes to the possibility of race conflict; a pity it is that we cannot be prepared for emergencies, while vet believing in our heart of hearts that, the day for which we. have prepared will never dawn. But. human nature may have to be altered before that, becomes possible. Y’et. even the wav things are it is not- right, that Japan should fill our Pacific horizon to the exclusion of all else. Singapore is a link in the chain of Empire and —if only we can keep the Japanese out. of our thoughts for a moment —a most important strategical point in that it commands the passage-wdy between two oceans in which Britain, has vital interests. To that, extent, the suitability of Singapore for a base could not be improved upon. If, on the other hand, we taken Commander Kenworthy’s view that the chief purpose of the new station will be to block the path of a. yellow attack on our own quarter of the Empire, the thought at once presents itsejf that Suva, or some other port in the Pacific Islands, has

claims more substantial than Sydney’s. The Australian Navy is based on Sydney now, so that the Commonwealth is not without defence by water. If an attack, were launched from the Marshall Islands —Japan’s southernmost footing, lying about ten degrees north of the Equator—it would be to the advantage of Australia and New Zealand that it should be met as far north as possible; and that, could be assured were a British unit operating from, sav, Fiji- But we cannot, think that, the Admiralty’s view is so restricted as that; it sees Singapore as one of the most important in that system of naval stations which keeps the White Ensign flying in every ocean, flying for the protection of commerce and the maintenance of peace. The* can be no doubt that a larger naval base at Sydney would be popular in Australia. It would make work; it would keep money in the country; quite possibly it might aid recruiting. On the grounds of economies and polities Commander Kenworthy’s scheme has much to recommend it; but after all it is naval strategy which must- be the deciding factor, and, reviewing the whole position, we cannot see that the claim of Sydney over Singapore has been sustained.