The Hawera Star. WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1924. SINGAPORE.

Hawera Star, Volume XLVIII, 5 November 1924, Page 4

The Hawera Star.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1924. SINGAPORE.

Delivered every evening by 5 o'clock Manaia, Normanby, Okaiawa Mangatoki, Kaponga, Awatuna, Otakeho, Manutahi, Alton, I’atea, Waverley, Mokoia, Ohangai, Meremere, Fraser Ararata. in Hawera, , Eltham, Opunake, Hurley ville, Wkakamara, Road, and

When Lord Jellicoe made his report on the Navy after the. war, he recommended that a base for capital ships should be established at Singapore in order that the British Empire could adequately protect the Dominions in the event of a war breaking but in the Pacific. With the experiences of the war with Germany fresh in mind and with a keen desire that the British Empire should not again be caught unprepared, the investigation of proposed plans for the nation’s safety was undertaken and Lord Jellicoe’s recommendations were treated with the greatest respect, as they deserved to be. The surrender of the German Navy and its subsequent sinking by the Germans themselves were regarded -as bringing to an end for years to come the menace to the peace of the North Sea'. The storm, centre had gone and students of international affairs considered that if it reappeared it would be in the Pacific, where British command of the sea would he seriously handicapped through lack of a proper base. Japan and America each had at hand facilities to enable them to employ capital ships if the need arose, but Britain had no such facilities, and the Singapore proposal was made to overcome the difficulty. When the Washington Conference to agree to a reduction of armaments was held, it was generally known .by all the delegates that the base at Singapore was to be made and we do not know of any objection being raised against it at that conference. The British Government made a start with the work, and arrangements for its completion were well in hand when the Labour Government decided against it, and operations ceased. With the return of the Conservatives to power it is expected that the Singapore scheme will be again undertaken and the Navy provided with the facilities necessary to maintain the British power ratio in the Pacific. The Washington Agreement provided that the relative strength of British, American, and Japanese navies. should be in the ratio of 5—5—3. With proper bases in the Pacific, America and Japan are in a position to reach this ratio, but Britain cannot, for her cabi-t-f4l ships would be seriously handicapped in the event of war. Wellmeaning people argue that the construction of th*e Singapore base might prove to ,be an incentive to war, but we cannot see that such an attitude is reasonable. If one had a house containing many valuables, would one go out and leave ' the door unlocked and proclaim to friend and potential enemy that one had ndt locked up the house because, the fact of locking the door would be an incentive to thieves to attack the house to get possession of the valuables? Singapore may well be regarded as the door safeguarding two; very valuable jewels in the nation’s house. New Zealand and Australia are those jewels, and we cannot understand the attitude of those who say that the. Singapore / bafie should not be construated, when it must be patent to all that British naval defence of these Dominions cannot be adequate unless provision is made for the fullest use of capital ships. It is inconceivable that the British Empire, which is on the best of terms with both America and Japan, will ever be the aggressor in a war in the Pacific, but it is very likely that our nation will take the role of peace-maker in the event of these rivals adopting a hostile attitude towards each other. Now, a peace-maker to be successful must have strength to insist upon the right being upheld against the wrong, for a nation in the wrong is likely to say to a well-intentioned hut weak peacemaker: “Mind your own business.” If British naval strength is not maintained in the Pacific, it may be said that our nation has permitted the position to go by default, and we cannot. see that such default would be an incentive to peace. The nations interested in the Pacific naturally expect that Britain will provide adequate protection for the Dominion, a fi our people expect them to provide for the safety of their possessions, and Singapore has not given rise to anxiety in America, nor do we believe that the construction of the base will lead to any naval or military preparations beyond those already contemplated by the other nations. Japan appears to be anxious about Singapore. Why? The construction of the base will not be- a menace to Japan, and she must know that so long as she does not ber-onhe an aggressor in the Pacific she will not be interfered with by Britain in any way. Singapore is, as it were, a British insurance against possible dangers to parts of the Empire, and in paying the premium the British people will certainly not hope that those dangers will ever arise; in fact, every effort will he made to avert them. But to be able to speak with authority arid to uphold her prestige in the Pacific. Britain must have provision made for her navy, not to be used for aggression, but to resist those who at some future time may seek to cause trouble.