THE FUTURE OF THE SUDAN.
BRITAIN'S DUTY OF TRUSTEESHIP. Two outstanding features strike anyone who, like myself, has made a tour in the Sudan and has come into any contact with, the people (writes the Khartum correspondent of the London Times). The first is the com4plete absence of any political atmosphere. There is, in fact, no such thing as a “political situation” in the Sudan. The second is the distrust of the Egyptians and the anxiety with regard to their claim to the Sudan that exists everywhere. Since that claim is .likely to be pressed this summer in the course of the AngloEgyptian negotiations it may be as well to deal with it now.
The action we took in Egypt in Feburary, 1922, cannot serve as a precedent for what we should do today in the Sudan. The cases are wholly dissimilar. In Egypt our position was exceedingly nebulous and had no legal justification; we had repeatedly promised to withdraw; we were merely handing the country over to .its own people. In the case of the Sudan, however, we have a recognised position and predominant partner; we are being asked to hand the country oyer to a people alien to its population ; and we have made every definite promises to the Sudanese in response to their supplications that under no circumstances would the present regime be changed or British control weakened.
No one who has travelled at all in the Sudan can contend that racially or temperamentally there is anything in common between the very diverse tribes who go to make up the populartion of the Sudan and what nowadays constitutes the Egyptian nation. They are poles apart in origin, character, and intelligence. Likewise it is incorrect to say that there is community of religion and language between the two countries. In the fiorth pnd center ’ the majority are Moslem and .> Arabic-speaking, but in the south the opposite is the case. Indeed it is rib exaggeration to say that by far the greater number of inhabitants of the Sudan are pagan speakers of languages or dialects that no Egyptian could possibly understand. THE FINANCIAL QUESTION. It should be noted when we turn to consider the money Egypt advanced for the reconquest and subsequent reorganisation of the country—that Egypt, did not find a portion of the money for the 1896-1898 campaign and, up to 1913, part of the funds for the administration is not disputed—that there were very special reasons why she was called upon to meet this expenditure. The removal of the Dervish menace and the pacification of the country were absolutely vital to Egypt’s life. As a result of her abandonment of the Sudan in 1885, she had been compelled ever since to maintain a very large army on her frontier in order to protect her from Dervish attentions. Again, when she had gained the race against bankruptcy about 1890 and wanted to develop he r agricultural resources, she found that the existence of a hostile people _on the Upper Nile made any irrigation works inpossible And it was not until after the ’ Battle of ■ Omdurnian and the subsequent agreement settling the possession of the waters of the Upper Nile that the capital works at Aswan and Assiut, and later at Esneh, were undertaken. The total cost to Egypt up to 1913 has indeed been repaid to her a hundredfold by the benefits derived from l those irrigation works; and the annual [ Payment for the upkeep of the army . in the Sudan—which is all Egypt : contributes to-day towards the ad- ’ ministration, and is far less than she J would have to expend if the Sudan , were m foreign hands—may be re- | garded as a premium—and an asi founding cheap one —on an insurance policy guaranteeing her southern frontier and her ■water supply. On the other hand, while we hear a great deal about the financial obligations under which the Sudan stands to Egypt, no mention is ever made of the debt which the latter owes the foi mei. Yet that debt is very con- ' sidei able, though it dates back some time.
EGYPTIAN MISRULE The Sudan was conquered by the Egyptians in 1820 y when Mohamjed All sent up an army for the express purpose „of getting the gold he had heard was there, and of collecting slaves for sale to the Pashas of Egypt. Ever since that date down to the Mad hi st rising the steady drain in slaves went on and, as inipartial foreign witnesses have recorded, in the course of these operations the greatest atrocities and cruelties were prepetrated by the representatives of the Viceroy of Egypt. It was the terrible oppression which the country was undergoing which prompted the Mahdi to revolt against the Government; it was their sufferings that made the people rally to his standard; it was the utter inefficiency of those in authority that enabled Monamed Ahmed so speedily to gain such prestige and compelled Egypt to abandon the country. The reason, in short, why Egypt had tp find the money not "only for the pacification, but also for the reorganisation of the Sudan was that during the 60 years of her. rule before the evacuation, she had depopulated and impoverished it. Indeed, what she has so far spent on tho Sudan is but a" fraction of what she took from that country during the three-score years of Egyptian rule. But, even if Egypt were to be placed in full possession of the, Sudan, that would not give her anv really permanent security. It is, in fact, only because hitherto we have protected her that she has secured peace on her frontiers and her water rights. Egyptian troops and money may have played a part in the reeonquest, but at the same time had it not been for the weight of British influence the fruits of that conquest would have been wrested from Egypt almost before she had grasped them. Egyptians are apt to forget that the capture of Khartum found a French military force at Fashoda, and that it was only because Great Britian was prepared to go to war with France in deferice of Egypt’s sovereign rights that Major Marcliand was withdrawn and the freedom from foreign control of the upper reaches of the Nile was assured. Alone, Egypt would have been entirely at the mercy of the Power then astride the White Nile. Similary, if Egypt were left in full possession to-morrow, she would not be entirely dependent on anyone in Central Africa who cared to put pressure on her. Great Britain—now as before can alone give her the security she wants, and from her own point of view Egypt would be far better off in the present regime were to continue.
I'inally, there are th'e people of the Sudan themselves to be considered; for one assumes that the Egyptians would scarcely deny them the exercise of the right in virtue of which they themselves claimed and obtained
their indepentence. While the AngloEgyptiian Condominum recognised our right to participate in the settlement and administration of the country and made us partners with Egvpt, it was undoubtedly understood that we should be the predominant partner. In that role we - have been responsible for the introduction of a regime in the Sudan which entirely satisfies the people. It may of course be objected that the Sudanese have not as yet reached that stage of development where they can govern But, nevertheless, they have signified in a manner that is unmistakable and connot be disreKfded that they want a continuation of British control, and that they would object to any semblance of a return to the old terrible regime. From conquerors and t’hen administrators we have, in fact, gradually progressed in the eyes of the Sudanese into a position of guardianship. They look to us to protect them and hold their political rights in trust so to speak, until such time as they may be able to stand alone, exercise those rights and choose their’own form of government. In the meantime they want the present form, and no variation thereof, to continue; and in the face of their openly expressed desire that we should remain to rule them and of our own assurances with regard to the future, we should assuredly be unfaithful to the trust we have assumed, and be betraying the political future of the Sudanese were we to assent to anything that might affect the present regime in however remote a manner. The Egyptian claim to the Sudan’is but a political slogan. None of the responsible-minded Egyptians want the country, for they realise the difficulty of administering it. The general run °f Egyptians still regard it as the place of exile it was in former times, and would not serve there of their oivn free will; Even at the present moment it is exceedingly difficult to get an Egyptian to go there on duty.
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Hawera Star, Volume XLVIII, 18 August 1924, Page 8
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1,486THE FUTURE OF THE SUDAN. Hawera Star, Volume XLVIII, 18 August 1924, Page 8
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