CRIMINAL LIBEL.

Gisborne Standard and Cook County Gazette, Volume II, Issue 192, 6 September 1888, Page 2

CRIMINAL LIBEL.

A great amount of interest was taken in the criminal action which was finally concluded yesterday morning by the defendant, John Baldwin, being sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. It is well that so much interest should be taken in a case of this nature, because it is a matter of deep concern to the public. One of the highest duties of a journal is to fearlessly expose all evil doing and to vigorously denounce the perpetrators of that evil, more especially when the offence directly concerns the public. There are times when the journalist, in his duty to the public, is even "justified in running the risk of being involved in heavy penalties allowed by an arbitrary law of libel. But when we consider the bearings of the case under notice, we can only stigmatise it as a foul blot on journalism, and the remarks of the Chief Justice were to the point. At the same time the gentlemen of the jury were perfectly right in hesitating as they did before finally deciding, though as His Honor stated, the point they were in doubt about was a very simple one. If we understand arightly they were averse to hastily convicting the accused because they were not altogether satisfied that he had written the libel upon which the action was founded. Looking at it from a sentimental point of view, and disregarding the connecting facts, this doubt could hardly fail to excite an amount of sympathy. The defence would not admit that Baldwin had written the matter particularly complained of, and his statement before sentence was passed made this seem more probable. He said he had been sick at the time and had not been able to give proper attention to what had appeared in his paper, thus conveying the supposition that he was really to be punished for what he had not in one sense been directly guilty of. He also made a statement so humiliating that had it been made a couple of weeks previously, Mr Bourke would never have thought of taking further action. But sentiment cannot blind us to the facts, When a man shields himself behind a woman, and that woman his wife, we can have no more sympathy for him than is extended to those persons who have been proved guilty of other serious offences. As for the unfortunate woman she must have the sympathy of almost everyone, for we do not for a moment believe she was any party to these stabs in the dark other than that she had in a weak moment allowed her name to be used, without discerning the real object. Were it not for this black mark against the accused, and inferring from his own remarks that he himself had also been wronged in the matter and was sorry tor what had been done, it would have excited a feeling of pity for him, while on the other hand there could be nothing but a feeling of regret and disgust that the principal slanderer had not been given his due. Of course, as matters stood, the plaintiff had only the one honorable course to take. He, in reality, was the one most entitled to sympathy, but he has triumphantly emerged from the vile slanders that had been heaped on him. The words of the accused himself, though rather inconsistent, clearly exonerate Mr Bourke, W e should have thought better of the accused had he said nothing, for his words before the sentence was passed were of the most damming nature as agajnst himself, except for the implication that ho had not written the one particular libel. That in no way lessened his offence, but it tended to prove that if he had acted badly some one else who could not be got at, except through the accused, had acted worse. If that were really so, at least one trajt of the accused’s character commends itself to qqr admiration, though not to our common-sense.