N.Z. ARMY

Grey River Argus, 29 January 1946, Page 7

N.Z. ARMY

General Puttick’s Farewell WELLINGTON, January 28. In a broadcast, Lt. General Sir E. Puttick, K.C.8., D. 5.0., said: As you may know my work as General Officer Commanding the New Zealand Military Forces, and as chief of the New Zealand General Staff, came to an end on December 31, last year. I therefore regard this broad cast in the nature of a farewell.

During the last few months of 1945, I visited many parts of New Zealand and spoke to Officers' clubs and to thousands of our secondary school cadets. The latter were showing great, keenness ard had made very good progress in their military work —due in the main Io the very interesting syllabus, the modern equipment, and to the high standard of the cadet instructors. These instructors were selected noys, the majority of whom had attended Army Schools of Instruction. As I told the cadet units, I regard the cadet system as a very important part 01. the army organisaiion, provided it is properly supported by annual Barracks and N.C.O. courses of instruction; by the provision of varied and modern equirl- - and all working to an interesting and comprehensive syllabus of the type in force at the present time. Colonel Meyer, the United States Military Attache accompanied me on the tour, and he had an opportunity to see the principal source from which New Zealand’s leaders come. It was my hope too, that our association was strong visible evidence of the importance we attach i:.> the continued friendship and association of (he American and British peoples. At- the Officers’ clubs I gave my views on the principles which should govern any plan for the provision of armed forces by New Zealand. Perhaps I might usefully repeat one or two of the main points.

The most, important principle, in my view, is that of concentration of strength at the decisive point of points—that point or those _ points from which the British Empire can most easily defeat the enemy, or from which the Empire may most easily be defeated. In a group’ of widely-sep-arated countries such as those that make up the British Empire, it is imperative if we are to make proper and common-sense use of our strength ■—that we combine and utilise our forces where they will have most effect on the result of the war. For it's the result of the war—whether you win it or not—-that matters, and not incidental injuries or temporarylosses suffered, however grievous they may be locally. This was the principle on which I based the advise I gave the New Zealand War Cabinet on the employment of New Zealand troops and which resulted in our implacable operations against the Germans over the whole period of the wa'r. We refused to be distracted and have our strength dissipated by the secondary enemy, Japan. When Japan entered ” the war, the immediate threat to the Pacific countries was so great that it created a strong temptation to withdraw our overseas forces for our home defence. Such an action would have rendered our forces inactive in both theatres of war for several months, at the very time when it was of the utmost importance to increase the pressure on the enemy and not to reduce it. And even more important still,-one of the most critical items of Allied equipment—namely shipping—would have been wasted on an unnecessary movement of troops. At such a time all shipping should have been concentrated on bringing Allied troops from non-ac-areas, such as the U.S.A., to active theatres of war and so increasing the pressure on the enemy. There can be no question of doubt about the soundness of the action taken by New Zealand in this matter.

During 1942 especially, it seemed necessary that New Zealand, situated as she was in the South Pacific, should stretch and strain her remaining resources to “hold the fort’’ there till the United States was able to raise, train and move its forces. Thus comparatively strong New Zealand forces, with most valuable equipment, were moved into Fiji to increase its security. This would have macle it necessary for Japan to send a much larger force to capture it than would have otherwise been the case. The third division, and various New Zealand forces in Tonga and Norfolk Island were also intended to increase the security in the South Pacific and to aid the United States forces in developing the strongest possible offensive against the Japanese. The help thus given by New Zealand in the early years of the Jap war had a very special value both in intensifying the offensive against Japan and in increasing the security of New Zealand. Our home defence mobilisation was made necessary by the startling successes of the Japanese in their southward drive, and was a necessaiy piecaution against the possibility 01 their attacking New Zealand. But—as I emphasised in my talks at the Officers’ clubs—the strong home defence forces were made necessary by enemy success and far from helping to win the war, which was the measuring rod which should be applied to all our activities, they were in fact hindering our war effort generally. That’s why it was highly important that our Home Forces should be heavily reduced at the earliest possible moment that it was reasonably safe to do so, and this was done. Also, in furtherance of the principle ol concentration of strength at the decisive point, our war equipment—which came principally from overseas in such vast quantities —was immediately made available to the overseas authorities. Great, quantities were in fact shipped from army stocks in New Zealand. They were used on the European invasion front, in Italy and in Burma. Regional interests, and local or home defence measures are apt to b? very dangerous to sound military doctrine for they tend to obscure the plain fact that local success or local safety are cancelled out by the defeat tre of war. Furthermore, the forces of our main forces in the main theaand resources used in securing locai safety might well have avoided defeat if they’d been used in the main theahas been a special application to the tre of war. This aspect of security British Empire because of its wide distribution throughout the world, and the varying degrees of danger a war presents to t.he various British communities. We must all guard against any tendency towards local defence or'regional security at the expense of Empire or global defence The question of the atomic bomb and lhe effect of the United Nations Organisation naturally comes up in any disunion p*. this character. So

tar as the United Nations Organisation is concerned, the principle of concentration of forces at the decisive point is the very essence of its security requirements. The ability of the British countries to concentrate their forces in this manner would be in direct furtherance of the objects of the United Nations. It’s also the duty of nations to be prepared to defend themselves until such time as some development makes this duty no longer necessary. That time is clearly not yet. As for the atomic bomb it is too early to assess properly the effect of its development. 'Those nations which know the most about it give no evidence of discarding normal forces -far from it. Possibly some development may neutralise it or control its use, or perhaps destroy the bombs in the custody of their users. It seems clear that until it is certain—certain beyond any reasonable doubt—that atomic power renders other forms of forces useless, it cannot be adopted in substitution for the lighting services. The atomic bomb must be regarded as a part of them. Whatever form New Zealand forces may take in the future. I am certain in my own mind that they must be based on the general principles I have mentioned. They must be organised -.so that it’s possible to expand rapidly our peacetime establishment to the maximum strength of which the country is capable. Defeat through inability or failure to use one’s full strength seems to me to be too tragic to contemplate. At the same time those who advocate defence measures, must be practical and remember the limitations which cost and the relatively short life of military equipment imposes. And in New Zealand we have a small population and can’t manufacture many of the most vital items of equipment. These handicaps emphasise several things—the importance of combining with other countries, especially with those within the Empire; increase of population; reduction in the number of unfit; conserving all equipment which'is likely to be of any use in an emergency. Morale of the forces and of the civilian population is very important in wartime and it receives constant attention. The morale of the forces is maintained by training, discipline, good administration, and good leadership; and it’s very important that the confidence of the troops in their leaders and in themselves should be built up and not broken down. The maintenance of civilian morale is more a political than a military question, but civil confidence in military leaders and in the forces is obviously very important. It is evident that the civilian can affect the morale of the soldier to a considerable degree, especially when you consider persona’ relationships. To help maintain morale is therefore one of the duties of the civil population— and that includes -its various agencies such as the Press. By demonstrations, parades, and other such evidence of strength and confidence, the armed iorces have a beneficial effect on civil morale in times of crisis, 'the effect on public morale for instance of the installation of coast artillery guns at all the secondary ports of New Zealand during the war was most beneficial. ’The whole question of lighting forces—their organisation, training, employment in war, and so forth—is a complicated and highly .technical matter. Mistakes may not. only increase casualties and lengthen a war —they may lose it. The high military education of al! those responsible for the fighting forces is to my mind a first essential. Those officers of the New Zealand Regular Forces who seem likely to attain senior rank should all graduate at a Staff College overseas and those not able to do so should be given staff courses in New Zealand. I am satisfied that the number of our regular officers who were given this framing before the war was complete.y inadequate. Their duties in peace are important enough but their duties in war are so much expanded and so much more important that it is only fair to the country, the forces, and the officers themselves that they should receive the benefit of such training. The most startling success of our New Zealand Staff College T. Palmerston North, during tho war, where the staff courses of three months were attended by several hundreds of regular and territorial officers emphasises the importance of the training. ihave yet to hear an officer pay anything but the highest tribute ‘o the training he received there. Naturally public opinion has an important effect on the forces of the country, and may vitally influence the nature and direction of their employment in war. In my view the creation of an informed public opinion—especially in peacetime—is a matter as important as it’s difficult to achieve. Before I leave the microphone I would like to take this opportunity to thank publicly all those organisations, state departments, public bodies; and individuals who did so much to assist the army during the war. As to the army itself, the achievements of all ranks in all spheres Oactivity, the splendid assistance rendered by the women’s services, and the great loyalty, devotion to duty, and assistance rendered to me. personally by my staff, are a source ol very great pride and thankfulness to me. I wish them all farewell witn deep respect and my warmest gratitude.