The Grey River Argus FRIDAY, March 16, 1945. FEAR OF GERMANY.

Grey River Argus, 16 March 1945, Page 4

The Grey River Argus FRIDAY, March 16, 1945. FEAR OF GERMANY.

It is said that the reason why France has been excluded from the “big” powers for purposes of the San Francisco conference on what is called “world” security is that the Soviet objected to anything likely to upset the Yalta arrangements. Presumably, in that case, the French are doubtful of the Yalta arrangement providing for what Marshal Foch in 191 S specified, and what the French generally want to-day. That is a frontier co-terminous with the Rhine. One Yalta decision is said to have been the instant, absolute, and permanent disarmament of Germany. But that, in the light, not only of history, but of the nature of things European to-day, is regarded by the French as no guarantee of their particular security. And for their scepticism, there are reasons which are worthy of study. For example, on the other side of Germany, the Soviet on its part is not relying merely upon the idea that Germany can thus be disarmed completely and permanently. In addition to the Baltic States and East Poland, the Soviet has now strengthened greatly its position politically, and thus militarily, by its hew relation to the Bulgarians, Finns, Roumanians, Yugoslavs, and Czechs, as well as its potential influence in relation to Hungary. The Russians have declared that, once National Socialism is eliminated, and possible reparations are exacted, it is only of East Prussia they would deprive Germany, partly for their own occupation and partly to accommodate Poles going to. the west of the Curzon Line. On the other hand, as regards France, there is a case being made out, and in Britain advocated, that instead of taking away any territory in Western or Southern Germany, the guarantee of security, or peace, ought to be entirely reposed on a complete disarmament of Germany for all time. The argument is that the Germans would resent more generally and lastingly any loss of territory’ than they would resent utter disarmament. It, however, is acknowledged that disarmament must entail definite control of the Germans by the British and Americans for about a generation. At the same time, it is contended that, if deprived of territory, the Germans, by renewing of their characteristic agitation and threatening, would cause the Western Allies to grow quite tired of maintaining any territorial transfers. Yet the fact appears to be very obvious that, if the Germans, could thus threaten, it would only be because disarmament had become, in actual fact, only a farce. Moreover, if any territorial change would be thus temporary, why ■ should it be deemed in Poland’s sole case'to be quite otherwise ? It is going to be an impossibility completely to prevent any and every sort of German rearmament. This is not, of course, to say that the projected German underground movement cannot be thwarted. The most important point seems to be the extent of the territory and of people which the Germans could influence in such efforts as they do make to rearm. It is assumed by those who would leave them as /much as possible of territory and of population-that, otherwise, Germans must all leave any transferred area, just as is proposed for them in the case of East Prussia. 'But quite a host of Rhinelanders and Bavarians probably would much prefer to remain where they are in the event of the Ruhr being put under international control, the other area west of, the Rhine under French control,' and say Bavaria united with Austria. Thereby the hard core of Germany would be reduced in potency alike industrially, territorially and numerically. Bismarck, when he brought the components of the post-1870 Reich under Prussian domination, did

not create a colierent country. It

has been really the Prussians who have ever since dragooned the others into a predatory unity.'Yet it is said that, while leaving this great unit, the most of the population can be educated in a decade to forget what has been instilled, not merely for a generation, but ever since the the Prussians became dominant. It is a reasonable view that, if the Allies would tire in a decade of preventing German irredentism, or the regaining of any transferred territory, then the Allies will not by any means prove tireless for al! time in keeping the Germans completely disarmed. The latter job would be, for any length of time, the harder job. It would be increasingly so to the exent that the Prussians and their traditions inside the Reich retained influence. over greater areas and greater numbers. If any Allied country can be cut up to the extent- of more than one third, so can an enemy country whose policy is always predatory. There is less call to-day for appeasement, in the direction indicat’d than there was in the years before 1939.