The Grey River Argus TUESDAY, November 21, 1944. INVASION OF GERMANY.

Grey River Argus, 21 November 1944, Page 4

The Grey River Argus TUESDAY, November 21, 1944. INVASION OF GERMANY.

The present general offensive should see the armies of the Allies well over the German border ere whiter weather makes campaigning much harder- The main thrust appears to be roughly in the direction of Cologne, but in addition to the Ruhr area, Allied armies are nearing not only the Saar, but also the Rhine in upper reaches near the Swiss border. The obstacles are the greater, no doubt, towards the north, where American and British forces side by side are going through . the Siegfried Line, where “washing has at last been hung out by the invaders. It is ’ evidently good strategy to trust French knowledge of Ithe Belfort Gap, seeing that it has now been penetrated and the fortress itself is coming under attack. British forces now have entered German territory as •well as Americans, in the area of Geilenkirchen, and, before the momentum of the offensive slackens, the Saar territory should begin ito come into Allied occupation, as another of the gaps leading to the Reich is traversed by way of the Moselle River. However, the French Army on the extreme Allied right, advancing latterly with considerable speed, appears now ito be closer than any other army to the Rhine itself. In addition to the prospect of Alsace coming into their occupation, that of being now in the race ito the Rhine must further spur the French in their praiseworthy and impressive endeavour to justify the return of their status as a great Power by playing a major part in the final defeat of the Germans. General Eisenhower, while moving British elements into the more vital sectors adjacent to Aix-la-Chapelle, is credited with simultaneously attacking right from Belfort, up to the Dutch delta so as to upset the enemy’s strategy and prevent his freedom of manoeuvre, so that he shall be unable to move his forces from sectors of lesser pressure to those of greater pressure- At Ithe same time the Germans are doubtless mustering the maximum resistance in the Moselle and Aix-la-Chapelle areas, where, in spite of Allied progress, gains are not easy to make. The factor of air superiority is being again illustrated, as the area behind the enemy line in the Ruhr and the Saar has been pounded very severely for some time past, and German transport latterly has come in for heavy bombing. Probably pressure on the Allies’ part is now at a maximum, the Americans in particular employing artillery on a phenomenal scale. This pressure, -while its effect may not immediately be fully manifest, must weaken the German ability later Ito hold out very greatly indeed. If and when there should occur a still wider and deeper break in the defence it will be attributable quite as much to the present operaltion 'as to later ones in which lessening resistance allows a faster advance with considerably less effort and losses. It is to be presumed that the greatest test is not to be some 'later operations well within Germany, but is rather the operations now in progress, upon the result of which hangs the issue of whether the enemy can hold his own territory. He begins to lose it, very gradually no doubt, but inevitably, and his will to resisi probably will decline with his in- 1 ability to check that process.