INVASION POINTS

Grey River Argus, 5 June 1943, Page 5

INVASION POINTS

FOUR POSSIBLE London Canvas of Situation ITALY INDICATED [British Official Wireless! (Rec. 5.5) RUGBY, June 3. Reports from Axis sources indicate that the enemy views with growing alarm the prospect of landings by Allied troops on the Continent of Europe. The reports .seem mainly concerned with the. Italian coast. Public expectations in Britain are mainly fixed on that theatre. . „ Yet other parts of Europe are by no means neglected in reviews of the situation. It is recognised that the possibility of a Continental land offensive has been created by the resistance of Russia, which continues to absorb some two-thirds of the Axis land forces, about half the air strength, and the greater part of the military and industrial resources of the enemy. In the first place, Sicily'and Sardinia are regarded as likely objectives for invasion, as there an invasion would have a fighter umbrella. These two islands, if in Allied hands, would be stepping stones to north shores of the Mediterranean, and safeguards to shipping passing through to the east. It nevertheless is pointed out that Italy has disadvantages, as well as advantages, as an invasion objective. Its conquest would give access to southern Germany, France and the Balkans, and would eliminate a large hostile fleet. On the other hand, the Germans, by stiffening the Italian Army with troops and with specialists, could make the invasion undertaking a ver" formidable one. They hope, by lighting a rearguard action throughout the summer, to delay the Allies while they make a third attempt to defeat Russia. Even if the Germans lost Italy, they would still keep Italian labour in Germany and would no longer need to supply coal, steel or oil to their ally. The southern rampart of the Germans’ inner fortress would still be intact along the Alps. Another possibility for the Allies, in the south, is thought to be a descent on Greece and its islands, from Cyrenaica and Egypt. They would be helped by the population, and mignt, therefore, hope to establish landings in spite of the distance across the sea from their shore-based aircraft.

It is recognised that Greece leads to no vital objectives except across vast stretches of mountains, but a possibility that, with help from friendly populations the Allies could cross those barriers and reach the Danubian Plain is taken into account.

The coasts of northern France and the Low Countries probably are the most strongly held area on the Continent, but they offer a long stretch of coast within easy reach of all types of aircraft from England, and also a flat campaigning ground leading, at no very great distance, to vital objectives in Germany. A fourth possibility envisaged is Norway. Her long coast offers many opportunities, but her isolation from the main theatres is thought to rule her out as a main objective. No doubt is felt, however, that at the most imipqjrtant ;points of (Europe, the coast defences would be likely to provide means of stiff resistance, which it might prove costly to overcome. The fortifications may be immensely strong at the most vulnerable and accessible points, but at others they would be less so, and over long stretches do not exist, though most of the latter places may be within range of gun or battery. The value of such defences, however, is seen to depend on the strength of the reserves and air forces available to support them. Not only must tactical reserves be ready to seal breaches, but a strategic reserve also to defeat an offensive and expel the invader. Perhaps the Allies’ biggest problem is the assembly and arrangement of shipping to transport men, equipment and stipplies, and to maintain them for an indefinite period. This problem is now in some ways slmplier than it was for the North African landings, because distances at present involved are so much shorter, and shipping resources have been increasing for many months past. The situation, as seen from the enemy’s viewpoint, is thought to turn on the ability of the Germans to hold the Allies in the outworks' of their Continental (fortress unitil they have had a third opportunity to attempt to cripple Russia. Another powerful blow at Russia is still thought to be probable, though the Germans themselves have been discounting such event. Confidence, however, is expressed that this year’s campaign will be more favourable to the Russians than last. Meanwhile the air offensive against German industries and German and Italian airfields and communications is universally regarded as an essential preparation with which to facilitate the task of the United Nations’ troops.

Balkan Shock Troops TO COUNTER ALLIED INVASION

(Rec. 10.20) NEW YORK, June 4. The “New York Times” Istanbul correspondent reports: German commandants in the strategically vital defence areas throughout the Balkans are hastening the formation and training and provisioning of special units of shock troops. These units are designed to fight independently, and to form a Central command, when cut off from supplies and communications during the expected Allied invasion. The. correspondent says: The units of shock troops range in size from a regular company up to a brigade. They are officered by Germans who have distinguished themselves in fighting arainst Russian and Yugoslav guerrillas. The units include Germans. Bulgarians, and Croats, with a sprinkling of Hungarians. They receive higher pay and increased rations, with promises of prompt promotion.

(Rec. 1.7.) LONDON, June 4. Algiers radio says: The tension in Italy has reached the highest point. Public opinion is most anxious and every day less confident as to Italy's anti-invasion defences. Following a mass exodus of Italian workers from factories to escape Allied raids, the Government decreed that workers who leave will be court-martialled as deserters. It is reported desertions have had a devastating effect on Italian industrial production, especially in Turin’s aircraft factories and chemical works