The Grey River Argus WEDNESDAY, March 31, 1943. U.S. ROLE IN PACIFIC.

Grey River Argus, 31 March 1943, Page 4

The Grey River Argus WEDNESDAY, March 31, 1943. U.S. ROLE IN PACIFIC.

'The reluctance of the American. Government to give a definite guarantee of more material assistance, particularly a. further supply of aeroplanes, in the South Pacific, is an indication that tnc United States makes the Avar in Europe her first interest. Although the lack of equipment m the theatre commanded by General MacArthur has been stressed again and again by newspaper correspondents, and claims have been urged by political leaders in Australia, a deaf ear has been turned by the Washington authorities. The apathy of the United States in this matter may at present be difficult to understand. It was Japanese aggression that brought the United States into the war, but, after a strong initial effort in the Pacific American interest gradually became more strongly fixed _on Europe and the fight against Hitler. The recent successes of the American forces in Africa in support of the British Eighth Army have further detracted attention from the Pacific. The possibility of opening up a second front in Europe through gaining control of Tunisia seems to doniinat'e considerations of strategy in America. General MacArthur s determined efforts receive secondary consideration. The question thus arises whether America is aiming to unite with England to make a combination of Western Powers to keep the rest of Europe m check, thus making- the final step of her abandonment of the Monroe Do.ctrine, which asserted that her whole interest was m the Western Hemisphere. At

present she. seems to regard her Pacific interests as subordinate to ensuring an Allied victory in Europe and contents herself with aiding; Australia and New Zealand to sustain the Avar against the Japanese. Yet the opening of a second front in Europe may be a blow against Japan, not only by releasing large American and British forces against her but by ensuring a .Russian victory over Germany, and making Russia what she was before the be- ‘ ginning of the present war—a i strong bulwark against too grave i Japanese ventures in China, America, apart from other considerations, has not neglected to assist Russia, and it is possible that Russian superiority may prove a very important factor in influencing the war in the. Pacific. An Allied supremacy extending from America to the east of Europo would localise the struggle into a comparatively narrow sphere in the Pacilic. it may bo a long-sighted policy on the part of the United Nations to achieve this, but at present it does not .satisfy leaders in the Pacific. They feel that an Immediate advantage over Japan would remove the danger, not

onlv of al tack upon Australia and New Zealand, but also of the development of Japan into a thoroughly well-equipped power, who, after making use of the enormous booty she has alreaay gained, could, put herself in a position to menace the roads to Europe through India. . Japan, is seen not merely as a violent aggressor, dangerous because of the fighting strength of her army, but a nation whose gains might make her position more, impregnable as time goes even if she made no further conquests. America at present seems to be going the long way round to checking her power, and her neglect of more direct methods is causing some uneasiness in Pacific countries.