The Grey River Argus SATURDAY, October 31, 1942. UNIFIED SOUTH PACIFIC COMMAND NEEDED.

Grey River Argus, 31 October 1942, Page 4

The Grey River Argus SATURDAY, October 31, 1942. UNIFIED SOUTH PACIFIC COMMAND NEEDED.

The South Pacific campaign is being fought not only on the land, air and sea by the Americans, and also, in a. degree, by the Australians. They arc fighting it simultaneously in the press and over the radio. They at least are doing so to an extent that is not oxampled in the case of the other belligerents. The reason must 1m sought more in the custom of the two countries than in any peculiarity in. the actual Avar operations. There have been complaints about news of the operations being held back officially. It would be nevertheless a mislake to think that any factual vaccuum in the organs of publicity is being filled merely with r. continvei’sal stop gap. A comIparison between the South Pacific and the Mediterranean shows the Allies on the one hand kept to the defensive by more powerful opposition, and on the other putting the enemy on the defensive by superior strength. In both cases land, air and sea forces are all employed. There is, however, another contrast. It was lafter. not before, Allied, forces in the Mediterranean had to take up the. defensive that criticism became prominent as to the conduct of operations, whereas there has been criticism all along of the conduct of the Allied campaign in the South Pacific. Granted that in the latter ease more Allied territory outside the actual scene of hostilities has keen endangered than in the I former case, the public discussion ■ of Pacific strategy lias been main- 1 iy due to the American custom of i comparatively uneensored public, criticism in matters of public con- | corn. In Australia there is like- I Aviso |a disposition in the same direction. Whether it is preferable ' to the British practice of greater i obedience to official wishes., or is,'

instead, calculated to correct defects before they become irremedi able, remains to be seem No doubt, there is in America, and to '♦in extent in Australia, a tradition 'of open criticism, and in peace.! time it is a good and serviceable ; t radition. bn New Zealand | there have been complaints of censorship, but in the main pub-| lie and press are content to trust, those in the highest posts of re- 1 sponsibility. General. MacArthur ( affords an illustration of the eontilast mentioned. An American, j he is very fully trusted by the Australians, who consider, indeed,

that the direction of his command justifies the greatest confidence. In the United States, however, he has adverse critics as well as admirers, and some of the former arc inclined to question Australians as well as to question ' his capacity. This may appear at least premature uncertainty, but .' it is preferable to have the general situation publicly known if [ the public estimate has to be I changed, and likewise the control of operations. The effects of disappointment might be detrimental if this should be entirely unexpected. It, may even be , characteristic of democracy that co-ordination between branches of the fighting forces is .slow in coming, as appears to be the ease with the Americans-in at least the Solomons campaign. The argument at least for a unified command -appears to have gained ground as a result of the ' open . discussion, and there is also some I indication that General Mae-1 Arthur has vindicated his claim to be chosen more convincingly than any of the naval leaders. It is certainly clear that no leader will 01/tain a stronger effort on the part of the Australians than he, whilst his plan of attack is reckoned to have been better conceived than that originated in the Soqth Solomons.