The Grey River Argus FRIDAY, July 24, 1942. INVASION OF PAPUA

Grey River Argus, 24 July 1942, Page 4

The Grey River Argus FRIDAY, July 24, 1942. INVASION OF PAPUA

Though not yet there in large numbers, the entry this week of the Japanese into .Papua marks a new development in the .South West Pacific theatre. It denotes the enemy’s determination to return to the attack on Australia, and, probably, to gain air bases cn the mainland of the continent. The immediate objective is obviously Port Moresby. That outpost is only one hundred miles distant from the scene of the enemy’s first Papuan landing, at Buna. Although Papua is occupied by Allied troops. Buna had no garrison. There the enemy evidently intends to form an air base, as rvell as an advanced army and navy base, the port being opposite Port Moresby, and the Japanese are expected also to attempt the capture of an island at the eastern tip of Papua, paving the way for an (approach along the southern coast to Port Moresby, which would be a stepping stone towards Port Darwin. No doubt the Prime Minister, Mr. Fraser, during his present visit to Australia will have been discussing this latest grave development: in the situation. In London and Washington it is fully acknowledged that New Zealand, as well as Australia, is menaced directly so long as the Japanese retain the initiative in this theatre, and their latest venture is tangible evidence of their continued initiative. It must never be forgotten that, while the unity cf the British Commonwealth is

a moral asset, it is not a sti'ategiI cal asset, since it entails defence of the integrity of territories which are as widely scattered as | 'they possibly could be. This strategical drawback is habitually ignored even in official pubi licity, probably because of the [ comparative loss of British mari- | lime power, the pre war theory having taken it for granted that i n invincible fleet gave virtual control of steaming distances essential for the Empire’s protection. The situation to-day of the British territories in the Pacific still i etains a. large element of the unexpected, the proven vulnerability of the Malay Peninsula, not to mention all of the other territory now held by Japan, having never been foreseen. Hence i the position of Australia, and New |Zealand is uncertain, in spite of naval set backs, especially in respect of aii- operations, which the enemy earlier encountered in the l region of his new advance, as well as in the Mid-Pacific. No doubt Allied strategy has in the greatest degree possible been ad'apted to the present situation, hut not in. the same dgree has public ; opinion been so adapted. It had ; earlier seemed that the enemy

had become preoccupied with China, and had, by air attack, been halted, but ho is now coming on again. It need therefore be no surprise now to find land lighting develop in Papua itself, as the enemy is unlikely to be given a free land passage across to Port Moresby. At the same time, the Allied air force has maintained superiority .from the outset, and even caused the enemy serious loss in his advance to Buna. This fact prompts the expectation that the Japanese lire destined now to encounter far stronger opposition than they have yet met. At the same time, their strategy is demonstratably directed against the British territories in the South West Pacific, and, in the critical general war situation, every one of the territories must be ready for the emergency.