The Grey River Argus THURSDAY, March 21, 1940. RISE IN WAR TEMPO ?

Grey River Argus, 21 March 1940, Page 6

The Grey River Argus THURSDAY, March 21, 1940. RISE IN WAR TEMPO ?

That there is a demand on the Allied side for swifter and more drastic fighting is becoming evident. The public are not allowed, of course, to gain any great insight into the plans of those responsible for- the conduct of the campaign, or, at anyrate, into those plans so far as they apply to the future. There have been reviews in plenty of the conduct of the war heretofore, as instanced by this week’s debate in the House of Commons on the defeat of Finland, and the part played by the Allies and the Scandinavian countries by way of helping Finland. Whatever critics may say of the British Prime Minister as a war maker, his word is nowhere questioned, and when he claims that the Allies have no reason for misgiving in their relations with Finland, it can be taken for granted that northing more could have been done than was done. The former War Secretary, Mr Horc-Belisha, points out the advantage the Allies would have derived from a continuance of Finnish resistance, saying that it might have deprived Germany of vital sup plies of metal. He recalls the long stand she made in the last war against the blockade, and opines that now she is in even a stronger position. That conclusion would explain why there is an undeniable uncertainty about the whole war situation, and why so much attention, not to mention questionable press conjecture is being directed to the diplomatic aspect of the campaign. But Mr Hbre-Belisha does not indicate how Finland could have been better supported when he merely savs the Allies had prepared substantial forces for that purpose, and implies that such ■ preparation meant that more help could have been given It is clear that to land men in Finland the Allies would have required to follow the bad example of the enemy and do the very thing they are fighting to stop. They would have had to use agI gression against Norway am 1 Sweden, which opposed a transit of Allied troops, and m any case, would have had to put Scandinavia in a position where war would extend to its territory. Yet there seems real reason for the impression that the Allied camp no less than that of the enemy is in some degree of hesitation. The latest development in France, the resignation of the. Government, while it may mean mainly a reshuffle of portfolios, is somewhat unexpected. The reason foi surprise is, doubtless, the fact that events leading up to the Cabinet crisis have been largely a war-time secret. Possibly there, is in France also an itch to see a more offensive policy on the Allies’ part. It is scarcely credible that the explanation would be a disposition to rely more upon diplomacy’ than upon force. The ’ raid this week by the. Royal AuForce on Germany’s most, dangerous seaplane base, while a retaliation in the military sense for the enemy raid three days earlier on a British North Sea base, may at the same time have another signficancc. It may be calculated not only to show critics on their own side what the Allies can do when they wish, but also to show the enemy his “nerve” war is a game that two can play. The best line to take in judging the merits or otherwise of the Allied war policy is to consider its effect on the enemy. If he has not yet been attacked except on the economic front, he certainly has not made much use of such | superiority as he at the outset may’ have had in men and aircraft. The Allies are not so eager as he to rely on diplomacy. They may have had moral reverses due to enemy aggression, but it is against others, and not against I them, that such aggression has

prevailed. The fact of the matter is that the Allied forces have yet been but slightly tried out, and to the extent of this trial they have proven superior to the enemy’. It is so in the air and at sea. There is a. significant contrast between the treatment of I Poland and Finland and that of Allied territory by the enemy aircraft. Except for the blockades, there has been only what might, be called token warfare between the Allies and Germany, as compared with that in the Baltic region. The enemy, even more than the Allies, is playing a waiting game. So grim, however, is the struggle for which both sides have been preparing that they are naturally’ prompted before launching it, to ascertain if there remain not some alternative less terrible to contemplate. To the extent that the tempo of war rises now it, may be judged that an alternative is lacking. What such a realisation means, critics of the experts who carry’ the real responsibility may’ only’ graduallycome to feel.