BREACH OF PROMISE

Grey River Argus, 20 March 1940, Page 4

BREACH OF PROMISE

APPEAL AGAINST DAMAGES. WELLINGTON, March 18. The Court of Appeal is hearing an appeal by York Hutchinson, of Gisborne, sheepfarmer, against Catherine May Davis, of Gisborne, a widow. The case was heard before Mr Justice Smith and a jury on May 31 and June 1 and 2 last, when £1250 damages were awarded against the appellant for a breach of promise of marriage. It is expected that the hearing will last two days. At the conclusion of the case a motion that judgment be entered for

the defendant was dismissed by the Judge, and from this dismissal the present appeal was brought. The grounds advanced in support of the motion were that the promises alleged by the plaintiff were illegal and void and that there was no corroboration for either promise as required by lhe Evidence Act, 1938. In this act there was a special section requiring corroboration in actions for breach of promise. Counsel for the appellant, after reading the evidence given at the trial by the respondent, submitted; that there was no evidence that the second promise alleged to been made in November was a n°w <md independent promise. The only reasonable inference from the evidence

was that what then took place was at most a imported ratification of the first promise, which was unquestionably illegal and void. He did not intend to proceed with the izgunisnt that there was no corroboration of this promise and the appeal would be ‘ based on the illegality. Counsel mr the appellant submitted that because of the illegality of the alleged promise of marrage, which was established by respondent’s own evidence. th° case should have be.n withdrawn from the jury and a nonsuit entered in favour of the appellant. If that argument were unsound, then the appellant was entitled at least to a new trial, because the jury’s verdict was clearly against the weight of evidence. The jury had to

determine whether the alleged promise of marriage was a new contract, or merely a ratification of ’an earlier promise. He contended that the only reasonable view open to the jury was that there was not a fresh promise’ in November 1939. The case will be continued to-mor-row.