The Grey River Argus SATURDAY, January 20, 1940. A BEST SELLER.

Grey River Argus, 20 January 1940, Page 6

The Grey River Argus SATURDAY, January 20, 1940. A BEST SELLER.

It is recorded that something of a record in the sale of State papers has been set in Britain by the Blue Book recounting the relations of Poland just prior to her decimation by Germany with the latter country. It is well that the terrible ordeal of the Polish people, should be made widely known abroad. It is calculated to increase the moral force behind the physical force of the Allies. But one reason why British people should study the action of Germany towards Poland is that Germany deliberately designed her cruelty to terrorise the British public. That is the meaning of the utterly unjustifiable destruction of the Polish capital and untold thousands of its inhabitants. Yet Poland’s martyrdom may well prove the origin of the failure ot the enemy. If Germany to subject Britain to similar treatment the world will learn al! about it, and the Americans and other neutrals will not hesitate a moment to join the Allies. Germany, meantime, is concentrating her efforts against Britain. She has yet the superiority in men to attack France, but she seems disposed first to blunt the British attack, which hits her so hard economically. A land victory, the French Army being what it is, would, if it could be had, cost Germany so much that there might not be much fight, left in her. Thus the main enemy attack, which has yet to begin, j may be concentrated on Britain. Here is where the German treatment of Poland comes in. ’Hie air force is what the enemy has to rely upon in tackling Britain. His warshaps are as good as outed. The fate of the “Graf Spec 1, is a lesson not to be forgotten. The U-boats arc proving steadily less and less effective, and the mines .are not stopping British sea traffic.’Thus, it were unwise to jump at the conclusion that, because the British Air Force can claim so far to have shown an ascendancy in personal fighting capacity—a factor of greater importance in Hie air than even on the sea or land—the enemy's myriad aircraft can be anywise discounted. So much air reconnoitring over the North Sea, as over land generally, is very significant. The Germans have strictly confined air bombing Io the sea, but have gained data ns to the land. British aircraft have been more aggressive as regards German land objectives — for one reason because Germany now is unable to offer them much in the way of a sea objective. British shipping is an obvious objective of the enemy airmen, ■who have not yet done much Io the convoys, but should vast air fleets be sent out, it will remain to be seen what happens. At the same time, the German bombers, o.nce they are properly on the job, would naturally concentrate on Britain’s ports, especially London’s < docks and ap proaches, and east coast ports. It can be taken for granted that if, and when, an air offensive against Britain is launched, Germany will calculate upon heavy loss; but if London and other important ports can be made much more dangerous and much less tenable, it will be an obvious and important objective to attain or attempt. In addition the export and import trade would be attacked to intensify the economic effect. Finally, there is the tactic used against Poland of decimating the civilian population. Britain, for all the balloon barrages, anti-aircraft guns, and superior chasers, would suffer greatly from bombs owing to the density of her population. It is undeniable, however, that indiscriminate bombing of civilians would only be worth while in the final analysis if it created a panic sufficient to disorganise the war effort. But the prospect for Germany in an effort' to single out Britain is not hopeful after all. An attack would not break up the national morale. The attackers would suffer in a manner calculated rather to upset their own morale. Yet.it is even yet

doubtful if Germany is not contemplating such an effort, although she may realise, that of itself it could not prove decisive. 11 would do much damage, but to have even' a strong ‘ihfluence it would require to be kept up, and it could not be kept up. Nevertheless, the reports’ of the most active side of Britain’s present war effort are to be viewed in the light of what may happen. If Britain is singled out-, then she can only be singled out by the German air force.