NEW GALLIPOLI?

Grey River Argus, 19 January 1940, Page 5

NEW GALLIPOLI?

POSSIBLE IN BALTIC. LONDON, November 20. Writing in an English journal a naval correspondent askes: “What about a “Gallipoli” attack in the Baltic? "Many of us are amateur strategists in these anxious days and dark nights; speculation as to the manner by which Great Britain and her ally might conceivably profit from the hard lessons of the Dardanelles campaign may be, therefore of some interest.

Let us compare the geographical similarities, which may be said to exist, broadly speaking, between the Peninsula of Gallipoli, and the Isthmus of Schleswig-Holstein and then proceed a step further to examine the means by which the experience of 1915-1916 might be applied in the present conflict.

Twenty-five years ago the ultimate objective of the combined naval and military expedition was Constantinople—as it was then called. A successful assault on the province of Schleswig-Holstein would, we suggest, procure rewards immeasurably more attractive. Command of the Baltic, possession of the Kiel Canal, and, in consequenc e of proximity to the German naval bases in the Elbe and Weser, wellnigh complete elimination of the Üboat menace.

Some military strategists held (and hold) the opinion that the Allied attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula, which was directed against localities in or near the Hellespont, was, from its inception, misconceived.

FLANK ATTACK. According to them, the then famous Bulair Lines extending across the four-mile wide neck of the peninsula should have been the primary objective by an assault in flank by a force landing in the Gulf of Saros, Imbros and Samothrace being utilised as advanced Allied bases. The obvious end in view would have been, of course, t 3 cut off reinforcements and supplies to the Gallipoli garrison from military bases and depots on. the Turkish hinterland.

Let us envisage an imaginary line from Newstadt Bay (south of Kiel) to Hamburg as being our present-day Bulair Line, and consider the German islands of Fehmern (in the first instance) and Rugen (subsequently) as being the contemporary counterparts of Imbros and Samothrace. In the campaign of 1915-1916 our mine-sweeping trawlers were confronted with the stupendously difficult task of clearing the narrow waterway—about four miles in width —between the Asiatic shore and Gallipoli. From both shores they were the targets of mobile artillery, which was able to operate against them without serious challenge. The tas>< ended in failure.

MINEFIELDS. In the case of an amphibious expedition such as we are now examining it is well-nigh pertain that our ships would encounter elaborate and densely-sown minefields in the three inlets to the Baltic the three channels known as the Sound (where, during a famous naval engagement, Lord Nelson confessed his inability to see with a non-existent eye) and the Great and Little Belts. All of them flow between the islands and/or the mainland of neutral Denmark and Sweden. The central one, the Great Belt, has an average breadth of twenty miles, and hence the operation of sweeping it reasonably clear of mines could proceed without the infringement of neutrals’ territorial waters.

The trawlers would be able to carry out their task without encountering the major interuption of closerange gunfire. Doubtless harassing attacks from overhead, and also possibly from below would render sweeping operations dangerous and difficult, but embarrassments such as these can be or ffiould be open to appropriate counter measures. GREAT FORCE NEEDED. A major operation such as this would necessarily have to be made in great force. Half measures would invite disaster. The Allied navies enjoy an immense preponderance over a combined Nazi-Soviet fleet, and hence they could prudently spare an impressively powerful squadron with which to undertake a "side show” of this magnitude while at the same time retaining overwhelmingly superior sea-power in the North .Sea and Atlantic.

Mine-sweeping trawlers would necessarily lead the armada, with destroyers in close support. This vanguard of light craft would in turn rely upon the protection of a dozen or more powerfully armed light cruis ers following astern. Battleships, monitors and aircraft carriers' would bring up the rear. With a swept channel through which to proceed the "heavy” ships could then, without undue imprudence, make for Neustadt Bay to pr*|pare, as was done at Anzac, St*»da

and elsewhere, for the landing of an expeditionary force. An impressive escort of destroyers and anti-subar-ine craft would be, of course, indispensable. A naval demonstration in force towards the harbour of Kiel itself in order to deceive the enemy as to the real objective. A fast squadron of minelayers might then seal the eastern flank by laying a mine barrage from the island of Rugen to the Swedish shore, and this acomplished, the troop transports could reasonably be expected to reach the disembarkation area without serious mishap. Fed with prompt and adequate reinforcements the two or more army corps might well hope for success in establishing themselves athwart the neck of the isthmus—about 40 miles—to Hamburg. Assisted by

the guns of the fleet and by determined co-operation in the air by the R.A.F. attacking across the North Sea from their British bases, we suggest that complete success might well attend an operation of this character. POSSIBILITIES. Putting aside over-sanguine and unwarranted optimism, could we not hope for domination of the Germa* i seaboard from Kiel to Stettin and the immobilisation of all German naval activity in the Elbe and Weser estuaries? In making this comparison between a hypothetical assault of 1940 with the historic one of a quarter oi a century ago, the factor of very much shortened lines of communication should not be disregarded.