WEST FRONT

Grey River Argus, 5 January 1940, Page 12

WEST FRONT

RIVAL LINES. A military correspondent at London wrote recently:—l prophesy the use of giant tanks up to 100 tons in weight, and of parachute troops, as the Nazi solution of their problems. Along the Frontier between France and Germany stretch the tremendous works of the Ligne Maginot and

What are these defensive works? What is the theory behind them, and what the strategy and tactics of attack upon them? Those are questions that the staffs are now preparing to answer in practice, while the whole world wonders and waits with held breath. Note that I called the German defensive works by their correct title —the “Siegfried Position,” not “Line.” To understand modern defence it is necessary to examine briefly how this new type, of fortification arose. In 1914 the Generals drew a line on a map, the troops dug a trench along that line, and orders were passed down to “hold it to the last man and the last round.” Those were simple days. And the casualty lists were overlong. But a number of young German Staff officers, studying the war with enthusiasm and care, began to evolve a new type of defence. While von Falkenhayn commanded nothing could be done; but after his failure at Verdun the acute and fertile bram of Ludendorff took over.

It was on the wet but bracing morning of April 10, 1917, that a young officer fresh from experiments on the Eastern Front in holding up the Russian mass attacks, stepped from a military car in front of the headquarters of the German Sixth Army behind Arras. The previous day it had been struck a terrific blow by the British Armies under Allenby and Horne, and was then reeling back stunned and shaken. The young officer took over the defence showing to the protesting senior officers of the staff the special instructions from Ludendorff himself to give him a free hand. Three miles behind the Arras trenches was a reserve line, a thin system of double trenches given the high-sounding name of the “Wotan Line.” While the broken German divisions sternly sold every yard to the advancing British who were

pouring through the Arras breach, this officer, young Colonel von Lossperg, toured the rear areas rounding up every man he could find, and sec them all to work turning the. "Wotan Line” into the "Wotan Position.'” Immediately in front of those two thin trench-lines he dug a network of trenches over an area 2,000 to 4,000 yards deep. Over the remaining area right up to the line where the armies were battling he scattered

a series of rifle-pits and machine-gun nests. All through that day and night he swept up every spare man and gave him a trenching-tool. With the grey break of the next dawn, he withdrew them all from the finished system and started, on an entirely new one behind that again—the “Wotan-Stellung II.”Instead of a rigid, thin line held by crack troops and subjected to the full weight of the enemy’s artilleryfire, a “forward zone” is lightly held with troops whose aim js to disorganise the enemy’s advance. Behind them lies the real - "battle zone,” where the stiff resistance is to be put- up. Behind.that.again, out of reach of the worst artillery-bombardment and out of observation, the counterattack formations rest and wait their moment to fling themselves on the enemy’s exhausted offensive.

It is true that the defence to-day is exceedingly powerful, but I am not sure that too much confidence should be placed in it. The Reichswehr . Command has certainly developed new theories of war, as demonstrated in Poland, and it is possible that by combining great concentration of armoured divisions with high mobility and break-through power, aided probably by attempts to disorganise the Allied rear by parachute landings of .men, light tanks and field-guns, they hope to succeed in a drive against the Maginot Line. Alternatively, they have the option of applying the favourite German enveloping movement, either through Switzerland or HollandBelgium. The former is highly unlikely so late in the year, and though that country is easy to enter from Germany her valleys are difficult to embouche from into France. That presents fatal conditions when the Swiss Army and the Allied Air Force are taken into account. But the 1 Dutch-Belgian turning movement offers better possibilities.

What is the nature of the actual Franco-German frontier? From the Swiss border near Basle, it runs northwards along the Rhine, which has steep high hills along its banks here and flows swiftly and deep. In fact, it presents a most difficult natural barrier to both sides. After about 100 miles, the frontier swings sharply westwards away from the Rhine, near Karlsruhe, following up the Lauter River across the flat wooded Rhine Valley to Wissemburg. The nature of the country, the fact of the big salient in the French .line caused by the bend in the frontier, and the existence of roads and a main railway make it certain that at least a part of the German attack will be made here.

West of this region is the difficult wooded and mountainous Hardt district, but west of that again lies the best area of all for mechanised formations to manoeuvre. Along a 40-mile front, and especially on the 12-15 mile east of the Saar, is an industrial area with excellent com-

munications, and with a forested plateau between Pirmasens and Saarguemines that would mask German concentrations from observation. West of this district, to the Luxembourg frontier, lies high land held by the French, with the strong fortresses of Thionville and Metz just behind; the whole area is a strong defensive nexus and unlikely to be stormed frontally. I have indicated the most likely points of attack. The main weapon must be weight combined with swiftness and suddenness of attack.