BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS

Grey River Argus, 5 September 1939, Page 10

BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS

WITH GERMANY. RUGBY, September 1. The communications ' recently exchanged between the British and German governments are published as a White Paper. The correspondence which was outlined by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, begins with a letter •addressed by the Prime Minister on behalf of the British Government to Herr Hitler on August 22. He opened with reference to the precautionary measures which Britain had started to take, and said: “These steps in the opinion of the British Government have been rendered necessary by military movements which have been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the announcement of the GermanSoviet agreement is taken in some 1 quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made.

“Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet agreement it cannot alter Britain’s obligation to Poland which the British Government has stated in public repeatedly and plainly, and which it is determined to fulfil.”

Emphasising the British Government’s intention that there would be no possibility of misunderstanding its attitude as it was sometimes alleged there had been in 1914, Mr Chamberlain made a striking affirmation which he cited in the House of Commons on August 24 and if the case should arise, it “is resolved and prepared to empiov without delay, all the forces at its comand,” adding, “and it is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It would be a dangerous illusion to think that if war once starts it will come to an early end, even if success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged shoo’d have been secured.” The letter then proceeds as follows to its end: “Having thus made our position perfectly clear, I wish to repeat to you my conviction that war between oeur two peoples would be the greatest calamity that could occur. I am certain that it is desired neither by our people nor by yours, and I cannot see that there is anything in the questions arising between Germany and Poland which could not and should not be resolved without the use of force, if only a situation of confidence could be restored to enable the discussions to be carried on in an atmosphere different from that which prevails to-day. We have been, and at all times will be ready to assist in creating conditions in which such negotiations could take place, and in which it might be possible concurrently to discuss wider problems affecting the future of international relations, including matters of interest to us and to you. “The difficulties in the way of any peaceful discussion in the present state of tension are, however, obvious, and the longer the tension is mainlined the harder will it be for reason to prevail. These difficulties, however, might be mitigated, if not removed, provided there could, for the initial period, be a truce on both sides, and indeed, on all sides, to press polemics and end all incitement. If such a truce could be arranged, then al the end of that period, during which steps could be taken to examine and deal with complaints made by either side as to the treatment of minorities, it is reasonable to hope that suitable conditions might have been established for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland upon the issues between them—-with the aid of a neutral intermediary, if both sides should think that would be helpful. “But. I am bound to say, there would be a slender hope of bringing such negotiations to a successful issue unless it were understood beforehand that any settlement reached would, when concluded, be guaranteed by the other Powers. The British Government would be ready, if desired, (o make such a contribution as it could to the effective operation of such a guarantee. At this moment, I confess that I can see no other way to avoid a catastrophe that will involve Europe in war. In view of the grave consequences to humanity which may follow from the action of their rulers. I trust that your Excellency will weigh with the utmost deliberation the considerations I have put before you.

Hitler’s Reply, to Britain. “Herr Hitler replied on August 22 that Germany never sought a conflict with England and vainly endeavoured for years to win England’s friendship. Herr Hitler adde f j that he was prepared to settle the Danzig and tne Corridor difficulties by negotiation on a basis of unparalleled magnanimity, but England’s allegations regarding German mobilisation against Poland, aggressiveness to Rumania and Hungary, in addition to declarations aboui the guarantee., dispelled the Polish inclination to negotiate o n a basis tolerable to Germany. “Herr Hitler continued that the Anglo-Polish Pact could not change Germany’s determination to safeguard her interests. He shared Mr Chamberland’s anticipation that a long war could be expected in such an event. Germany, if England attacked her, would be found prepared and determined, preferring every misery and tribulation to sacrificing her national interests and honour. “Herr Hitler, referring to the Anglo-French measures for mobilisation, wrote: 'Since Germany never intended other than defensive military measures against England and France, nor intended a present or future attack on either, this announcement could refer only to a contemplated act of menace against Germany, I, therefore, inform your Excellency, that if these military arrangements are carred into effect, I will order the immediate mobilisation of German forces.’ I “Herr Hitler added: ‘I have, all my life' fought, for Anglo-German friendship. ’but British diplomacy has convinced me of the futility of it. No-

body could be happier than I should there be any change.’

“A transaction of the verbal communication to Sir Neyile Henderson by Herr Hitler on June 25 stated tnai Sir Nevile Henderson had expressed a hope that an Anglo-German understanding was yet possible. Herr Hitler had again mentally turned things over. He desired a move regarding England as decisive as a move regarding Russia, which led to the recent agreement. The assertion, in view of the comparative populations of the nations involved, that Germany desired to conquer the world was ridiculous. Poland’s actual provocations were intolerable. It rnade no difference who was responsible.”

Herr Hitler added that Mr Chamberlain’s speech was not calculated to change the German attitude. Its result, at most, would be an Anglq-Ger-man war, bloodier than the 1914--18 war. . Germany, contrary to last war, had nql to fight on two fronts. The Russo-German Agreement was unconditional, and signified the change oi German foreign policy, rendering Germany economically secure for the duration of the war. “The British Government replied on August 28 to Herr Hitler’s communications of August 23 and 25, stating that it fully shared his desire to make friendship the basis of Anglo-German relations, believing mutual understanding will bring blessings to both. The Note added that Herr Hitler’s proposals were very general and would require closer definition, but the British Government was fully prepared to take them with some additions, as subjects of the discussions, to which, if the German-Polish differences were peacefully composed, they would be ready to proceed as soon, as practicable. . . “The British Government. ■ entirely agreed with Herr Hitler that there must first be a settlement of the German-Polish differences, but every thing turned upon the method of it, and understanding on that point was essential. Such understanding should be effected by agreement between both countries .on the lines of safeguarding Poland, the importance of whose interests Herr Hitler recognised in his speech of March 28, but it should be understood beforehand that other Powers must guarantee any settlement, Britain contributing to its effective operation.” “Next evening, when our Ambassador saw Herr von Ribbentrop, he urged upon the latter that when these proposals were ready for discussion — we had heard no more about them—he should invite the Polish Ambassador to call and should hand him the proposals for transmission to his Government. Thereupon, reports oui' Ambassador, Herr von Ribbentrop, in most violent terms, said he would never ask the Ambassador to meet him. He hinted that if the Polish Ambassador asked him for an Interview it might be different. Now the House will see that this was on Wednesday night, which, according tq the German statement of last night, is now claimed to be the final date after which no negotiation with Poland was acceptable. It is plain, therefore, that Germany claims to treat Poland as in the wrong because she had not by Wednesday night entered upon discussions with Germany about a set of proposals of which she had never heard. “Now, what of ourselves? On that Wednesday night at the interview to which I have just referred, Herr von Ribbentrop produced a lengthy document which he read out in German aloud at top speed. Naturally, after this reading, our Ambassador asked for a copy of the document, but the reply was that it was now too late, a~ the Polish representative had not arrived in Berlin by midnight, and so we never got a copy of these proposals, and the first time we heard them was on the broadcast last night. “The British Government thought the next step should be direct discussions between the German and Polish Governments on a basis of safeguarding Poland and securing a settlement bv an international guarantee. Poland was willing to enter the discussions on this basis. Agreement ’as a result of such discussions would lead to a wider understanding between Britain and Germany. “The present tension, accompanied by frontier incidents, constantly en ■ dangered the peace of all. Such incidents should be suppressed, and unverified reports of them not circulated. The results of a decision to use force had been clearly set out in Mr Chamberlain’s letter of August 22. Doubtless Herr Hitler fully recognised them. The British Government, in reference to Herr Hitler’s suggestion of a reduction in armaments, believed that if a peaceful settlement were obtained the world would assist in the resumption of peaceful trade in place of war activities. A just settlement of the German-Polish issue might open the way to world peace. Failure might plunge the world into war —a calamity without parallel in history. “Herr Hitler’s reply to the British communication of August 28, handed to Sir Nevile Henderson on August 29, said: ‘The Fuhrer’s suggestions were made in order to re-express his desire for an Anglo-German understanding for co-operation and friendship in order to remove doubt that it could be bought at the price of the renunciation of vital German interests, let alone just and honourable demands. Germany submitted to Poland oral and written proposals up to Marcn, 1939, offering the possibility of a solution acceptable to both parties. Poland rejected them, using the rejection as a pretext for military measures, since intensified. Poland was in a state of mobilisation in the middle of August and encroaching on Danzig, making threatening demands and perpetrating barbaric maltreatment and persecution, which state of affairs, unbearable to a great Power, had now forced Germany to safeguard her interests.

Clash Might Have Been Avoided. ; “There is just one passage from a i recent communication, dated August . 30, which I should like to quote, be- . cause it shows how easily the final clash might have been avoided had there been the least desire on the part of Germany to arrive at a peaceful settlement. In this documnt we said: “Britain fully recognises the need for speed on the initiation of discussions, and the British Government shares the apprehensions of the Chancellor arising from the proximity of two, mobilised armies standing face to face. The British Government would, accordingly, most strongly urge that both parties should undertake that during the negotiations no aggressive military movements will take place. Britain feels confident that she could obtain such an undertaking from Poland if Germany would give similar assurances.’ I “That telegram, which was repeated t 0 Poland and brought an instantaneous reply from Poland dated August 31, in which it stated: ‘Poland is also prepared, on a reciprocal basis, to give

a formal guarantee in the event of negotiations taking place, that the Po-1 lish troops will not violate the fron-J tier of the German Reich, provided a . corresponding guarantee is given regarding the non-violation of the fron-, tiers of Poland by troops of the Ger- i man Reich.’ “We never had any reply from Ger-’ many to that suggestion, one which, ifj it had been followed, might have saved J the catastrophe which took place this’ morning. In the German broadcast last : night, which recited the sixteen points of the proposals which Germany put forward, there occurred this sentence. Tn these circumstances the, Reich Government considers that its offer is rejected.’ I must examine that statement. I must tell the House what are the circumstances. To begin with, let me say that these proposals | have never been communicated by, Germany to .Poland at all. j “The history of the matter is this.) On June 19, in replying to a Note we had sent Germany, the German Gov-, ernment said, among other things, that it would immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to, itself and would, if possible, place these at Britain’s disposal before the arrival of a Polish negotiator. It will f be seen by examination of the White Paper that Germany stated that it, counted upon the arrival of a plenipotentiary from Poland in Berlin on August 30: In the meantime, of course, we were awaiting those proposals.” | “Those are the circumstances in which the German Government said it: would consider that its proposals were; rejected. It is now clear that its ’ conception of a negotiation was that' on an almost instantaneous demand . the Polish Plenipotentiary should go , to Berlin, where others had been before him, and should there receive a I statement of the demands to be accepted in their entirety or refused. | “I am not pronouncing any opinion upon the terms themselves, for I do not feel calles upon to do so. The proper course, in our view, and in the view of all of us, was that these pro-' posals should have been put before the' Poles, who should have been given time to consider them and say whether, in their opinion they did or' did not infringe those vital interests of Poland which Germany had assured j us on a previous occasion she intended ‘ to respect.” ; “Only last night the Polish Ambas- 1 sador did see Herr von Ribbentrop. Once again he expressed to him what| indeed the Polish Government had; already said publicly, that it was will- j ing to negotiate with Germany about J disputes on an equal basis. What was. the reply of the German Government? , The reply was that without another | German troops crossed the Polish frontier this morning at dawn, | and are since reported to be bombing open towns. In these circumstan- | ces, there is only one course open to , us.” I Mr Chamberlain then informed the House of the document which the British and French Ambassadors had been instructed to hand to the German Government. “Yesterday,” Mr Chamberlain continued, “we took further steps towards the completion of our defensive preparations. This morning we ordered the complete mobilisation of the whole of the Navy, Army, and Air Force. We have also taken a number of other measures, both at home and abroad, which the House will not, perhaps, expect me to specify in detail. Briefly, they represent the final steps in accordance with prearranged plans. These can be put into force rapidly, and are of such a nature tha' they can be deferred until war seems inevitable. Steps have also been taken under the powers conferred by the House last week to safeguard the position in regard to stocks of commodities of various kinds.

All Services Prepared. “The thoughts of many of us must, at this moment inevitably be turning back to 1914, and to a comparison our position now with that which existed then. How do we stand this time? The answer is that all three services are ready, and the situation in all directions is far more favourable and reassuring than .in 1914, while behind the fighting services we have built up a vast organisation of civil defence under our scheme of air raids precautions. “As regards immediate man-power requirements, the Navy, Army, and Air Force are in the fortunate position of having almost as many men as we can conviently handle at this moment. There are, however, certain categories of service in which men are immediately required for both military and civil defence. These will be announced in detail through the press and the 8.8. C.” “The main and most satisfactory point to observe is that there is to-day no need to make an appeal in a general way for recruits such as was issued by Lord Kitchener twenty-five years ago. That appeal has been anticipated by manv months, and men are already available. So much for the immediate present. Now, we must look to the future. It is essential in the face of the tremendous task confronting us, more especially in view of our past experiences in this matter, to organise our man-power this time upon as methodical, equitable and economical a basis as possible. We therefore, propose to introduce legislation directed to that end. A Bill will be laid before you, which for all practical purposes will amount to the j expansion of the Military Training j Act. Under its operation all fit men between the ages of eighteen and forty-one will be rendered liable to military service, if and when called upon. It is not intended at the outset that any considerable number of men other than those already liable shall be called up, and steps will be taken to ensure that the man-power essentially required by industry shall not be taken away. “T‘here is one other allusion which ’I should like to make before I, end' my speech, and that is to record my satisfaction and the Government’s i satisfaction that throughout these last days of the crisis Signor Mussolini has< been doing his best to reach a solu- 1 tion. It now only, remains for us to set our teeth and enter upon this struggle which we ourselves earnestly endeavoured to avoid with determination to see it through to the end.

GERMAN RADIO BAN. BERLIN, September 1. The German Government has. issued a decree that anyone in Germany caught listening-in to radio messages from foreign countries is sub-j ject to penal servitude. ( Death is the penalty for those, caught passing on radio information from foreign sources. •