LONDON-BERLIN AXIS

Grey River Argus, 30 August 1939, Page 5

LONDON-BERLIN AXIS

(By Thomas Barton.) There is much to be said for the view that the decisive force m European working for war is not the Berlin-Rome Axis, but that which joins the Berlin and City Stock Exchanges. After all, Rome is only a provincial branch of the Big Firms. Behind the intrigues and shifting play of political forces, lies the reality of the F.8.1.-Reichsgruppeindustrie agreement, which was temporarily shelved in March after the fall of Prague. Let it never be forgotten that this agreement between the dominant forces of British and German industry was signed on the day after the German Army marched into the Wenceslas Square, and was at first defended by Hudson and the Premier m the Commons. . This ties up closely with the atiaii of the £l,ooo-million loan.” Hudson is one of the “Unilever M.’sP. so-called from their connection with that great combine. His father owned the Hudson soap firm, whose millions went to inflate the strength of the giant concern. And Unilever’s have always been prominent on the Anglo-German Fellowship and all bodies aiming at raprochement with the Nazis. Why? It is simple. The Nazis have frozen all the huge European assets of a number of firms, including Unilevers, Dunlop and Imperial Chemicals, and also have a close grip through the Steel Cartel on the British steel industry. In the hope of salving these assets or loosening the grip of competition, these groups are one of the major forces behind “appeasement’, and between them they control most of Britain’s economic structure. The key point is, of course, , the Bank of England. Norman was the pivot on which thet “affairs of the Czech gold” revolved. Pressure from the same quarter upon the Treasury has reduced the £5O-million loan required by the Poles to a magnificent £8 millions Rumania, which asked for help soon after Munich, was given a paltry millions credit after long negotiations. Greece is supposed to receive £2 millions. The Nazis are aware, of course, that this makes nonsense of the East European military pacts. Let us examine the Polish position, for instance. There are 300,000 men in the standing army, the total supply of rifles available in Poland is 450,000. Yet the Poles wish to mobilise a million extra trained men in the first hour of war. The famed Polish cavalry are almost unarmed, except for their lances. All the ballyhoo recently unloosed in Britain about “the might of our Polish ally” was released for just this purpose—of disarming public opinion and sabotaging the loan to Poland.

The breaking wide, open of the negotiations over an "appeasement loan” was due to an indiscretion in the Spanish Embassy, not to any leakage in Whitehall. The plan was first raised in the Norman-Schacht interviews early this year. Sir Horace Wilson and Mr Hudson discussed it further on March 23, immediately after the capture of Prague. Hudson raised the question with Right Republican and anti-Roosevelt big business when he was in New York at the World’s Fair opening; early in July there was open discussion on it in financial circles there, and a premature half-break of the news caused a mild boom on Wall Street on July 11. Just before seeing Wohltat to take up the question again, Hudson canvassed the proposals with the Spanish Ambassador, the Duke of Alba. This was the mistake. The Duke thought the matter was still in embryo. He went to the French Embassy in search of more details, for the Duke has never been celebrated in the Diplomatic Corps for acuteness of perception. The French immediately grasped the disastrous effect on Polish morale of any such scheme unless nipped in the bud at once. They broke it wide open into the European press. And Mr Chamberlain had to meet a restless House and,' with the assistance of a few terminological inexactitudes, to disown the plan. But there are many gentlement in the City who are determined that the London-Berlin Axis shall yet win the final victory.