DALADIER’S REPLY

Grey River Argus, 31 March 1939, Page 7

DALADIER’S REPLY

TO MUSSOLINI Denies Italy Made Proposals READY TO EXAMINE ANY [Aus. & N.Z. Cable Assn.l PARIS, March 29. “France awaits the Italian proposals,” was the French Prime Minister, M. Daladier’s broadcast, reply to Signor Mussolini. M. Daladier recalled a Note from Count Ciano, on December 17, stating that Italy did not consider the 1935 agreement valid, He also recalled a speech by Signor Mussolini on March 26, declaring that the Note of December 17 set out clearly the Italian problems as Tunisia, Djibouti, and the Suez Canal. “I affirm that the of December 17 did not contain any precise points,” he said. “Its essential argument was that, the conquest of Ethiopia, and the formation of the Italian Empire, created new rights in favour of Italv. I need not say that we cannot accept this argument. It would mean that each new conquest would create new claims without limit.” M. Daladier announced his intention of publishing the Note together with the French reply, given several days after its receipt. M. Daladier declared that France had remained faithful to her engagements. “France does not refuse to examine any proposals which may be made to he",” he added. Reiterating that the claims remain unspecified M. Daladier said that no one could argue that they bad been presented, bv newspaper articles or street cries.

M. Daladier said that F >hce wanted peace, but if war were imposed, or became the alternative between freedom and dishonour, the whole nation would arise to defend its liberty. He had sought full plenary dowc-s. because it was necessary to take, rapidly and silently exceptional measures for the defence of the country. France listened calmlv to noisy claims, because she knew that negotiations could only reveal she was right. France's position had been made clear. “We will not cede an inch of territory, nor a single one of our rights,” he said. M. Daladier described the chai'/.s of ni-treat’yo'y of Italians in Tunisia as inventions. He referred to 900,000 Italians living in France, who had not complained of its hostility. Referring to the Munich agreement, he said that France had not ceased her evidence of goodwill towards Germairv, but consequent events in Czechos’ovakia had dealt the severest blow to her persistent efforts. None could denv that war would .be a catastrophe to all nations. “In the name of France, I invite the collaboration of all Powers who. like ourselves, are ready to collaborate for the maintenance of peace, but who would rise against aggression, with one bound. I know these words will find a brotherly echo in the hearts of friendly nations in Europe across the Channel, and even across the Atlantic,” he added.

ITALY'S DECEMBER NOTE.

THE FRENCH REPLY. PARIS, March 30. The text of the Italian Note, handed by Count Ciano to the French Ambasador on December 17, shows that the French Government, on December 2, desired to know whether Italy considered that the agreement of 1935 was still in force, and would still

serve as a basis for Franco-Italian relations. The agreements comprised a treaty for the settlement of reciprocal interests fn Africa, and a series of instruments related thereto. The exchange of ratifications did not follow, and negotiations were never even begun for a special convention regarding Italians in Tunisia, so the treaty was never completed. France’s attitude on the Abyssinian campaign was certainly in conformity with the intention of the agreements, which were never put into force, and thus were made null and void. Moreover, they were over-reached by history. The French Foreign Affairs Committee is unanimous, that the Italian Note of December 17, did not formulate precise demands. (Received March 30, 5.0 p.m.) Further details of Italy’s December

Note to France (now published by M. Daladier) show that the Note described the sanctions which were imposed on Italy during the Abyssinian campaign as having altered the general political situation. It also details the constitution of the Empire of Italy, this creating new rights and interests. The Note says: "In these conditions, the past agreements could not remain as the basis of French and Italian relations, which must be examined again if an improvement is desired. I The French Government replied on December 25, pointing out that applications of the present agreement had been started, Italy being ceded 2500 shares in the Addis Ababa Railway Comnanv, while, in various negotiations, until as late as April 22, 1938, the agreement was taken as valid. The French Note also referred to France’s moderating influence at the League at Geneva regarding the Italian action in Abyssinia, concerning which Signor Mussolini on several occasions had expressed appreciation.