Grey River Argus FRIDAY, May 24, 1935. ARGUMENT AND ARMAMENT

Grey River Argus, 24 May 1935, Page 4

Grey River Argus FRIDAY, May 24, 1935. ARGUMENT AND ARMAMENT

Variations in the attitudes whieh European Powers have adopted of late may appear to be almost keleidoscopie. The changes nevertheless, are rather superficial. Less notice is to be taken of what is said than of what is done. What has so far been don. by the other Powers either singly or collectively, since Germany began doing things on her own initiative, has gone to show that Germany remains suspect. Nor does she lack reason on her own accounts for suspicion too. When Im recent round of diplomat!-, visits had been arranged. Britain preceded them with the an nouncement of her policy of re armament, whilst Germany followed up the Saar plebiscite will her re-enactment of conscription. When at Berlin the Chancellor was talking peace with the British Foreign Minister he. took the opportunity to-compare their res-

pective air forces, remarking that they were about equal in strength. The object of that, observation might have been to suggest that they could make common eattse. either from a consideration of greater opposition in other quarters, or greater strength between themselves. Even if such equality appeared then in British eyes as less reassuring than Germans might imagine, the suggestion of co-opera-tion could scarcely have been scotched, because it has again been advanced by the Reich Chancellor in his policy statement at the opening of the Reich--tag. The British spokesman. Mr Baldwin, on the eve of succeeding to the Premiership, gave th? declaration of Herr Hitler quite a good reception- He has promised that every endeavour will be made to explore the possibilities of each and every new avenue of conciliation and security that may have been opened up by the Chancellor of Germany. The press of London sounds precisely the same note. Herr Hitler has cast doubts on the wisdom, if not the altruism of France and Rus sia, and has extended Italy no olive branch, while he has left the Central European difficulty exactly as uncertain as it was before. But it is rather a surprise to find him quoting the Covenant and ideals of the League of Nations to illustrate his argument against the arrangements which the League Powers propose to keep the peace. More depends, of course, upon the spirit in which he does this than upon the lette" of the Covenant. Where Hitlerdoes score is in his contention that none of the Powers whieh at Versailles decreed German disarmament with a proviso to disarm themselves also in due course has at all acted up to such promise. To give at least one reason is to raise the question of German sincerity in quoting the Peace Treaty. That reason is the I fact that Germany had been rearming secretly for a long time before she began so doing openly. That explains, for one thing, her sudden claim to possess aerial equality with Britain. Another reason, belated admittedly, was the attitude of Germany to Austria. There is even the question of her attitude to the demilitarised zone between her and France, as to which sh e is openly dissatis. lied. What, however, must be regarded as the divining rod in the present situation is not what the Governments say to each other, but what they are doing. Labour spokesmen in Brita’n are testing and proving the truth of this conclusion. They ask why. if the Government sets by Hitler’s' speech as much store as it professes to do, there is not a. call for a fresh conference of all of the interested Powers in order to try out the genuineness and reliabilty oi the professions of the Chancellor of Germany. On the other hand, the very occasion which

Mr Baldwin has chosen to say Britain takes the Nazi leader seriously in the matter of conciliation is the very occasion when the British Parliament is being asked to sanction the strengthening of the Air Force in a threefold degree. It might be replied that a stronger Air Force does not commit Britain to a policy of hostility towards Germany, or a link in a chain hemming tiermany in, but in that case there is needed an explanation as to what may be the purpose of so great an air force increase- It is manifest that if Germany is as ready as she says to enter an air convention to limit armaments, anl if such a convention is the first object of British policy, as claimed the suggestion of the Lboaur Party to put the matter up to Hitler in a. tangible way would b e practical polities indeed. It may at the same time be admitted that Britain’s Air Force is not relatively as strong as her Navy, and that while other Powers have a superiority there may be a risk. The question is where the risk may be—what designs are there anywhere to render the risk serious. To give the answerone would need to know as much as those with the best knowledge of the international situation. A Power that spontaneously refrains from competitivfe armament may give the best proof of its pacific intent, but not necessarily the best guarantee of a pacific result. A Power that is competitive might take advantage of one that was not. The only line of progress is one to whieh every Power professes itself attached. That is agreed limitation for a start, and then agreed reduction of armament. The thing is doubtless in only an experimental stage yet. but there is hope for it. The charge is made that European Powers have forgotten past professions in their distrust of Germany. Yet it is for Germany to allay that distrust. She alone can do it! It may turn out that her use for rearmament is merely to obtain, weight in the councils of the nations—to demonstrate equality—but that method is naturally open to doubt. This doubt holds also against other Powers unless ;hey cau show the risk of attack. It is not as yet, argued that any Power plans to attack Gcrmany The boot is on the other foot. The statesmen of Europe have to conceit their action so as to dim inate the spirit of aggression. Tharmaments are not themselves tin- root oi* the matter. It is the purpose in view.