THE DOBSON COLLIERY DISASTER.

Grey River Argus, 17 June 1927, Page 6

THE DOBSON COLLIERY DISASTER.

SITTING OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY. HEARING OF EVIDENCE CONCLUDED. Ex-Inspector’s “Probable” Theory.

lii? hearing of evidence by the Commission set up to inquire into the cause of the Dobson Colliery disaster was resumed at the Courthouse yesterday morning at 10 o’clock, and conclude! shortly after 6 p.m. During the course of the Inquiry, which has covered a period of six days, no less than thirty witnesses have given evvidence.

The Commission comprises Messrs E Page, S.M. (Chairman), John Watson (Superintendent of the Taupiri Col lieries), and Mr William Balderstone (Secretary, West Coast Miners’ Dis trict Council). Mr J. W. Hannan appeared on behalf of the Grey Valley Collieries, Ltd.; Mr W. J. Joyce, for the Deputies’ and Underviewers’ Union; Mr A. H. Kimbell (Under Secretary for Mines); and Mr J. A. C. Bayne (Chief Inspector of Mines for New’ Zealand) Mr A. J. Davis (District Inspector of Mines) representing the Mines Department. Others present included:—Mt

J. Smeaton (President of the Grey Valley Miners’ Union);. Mr R. J. Wearne (representative, West Const Miners’ District Council), Mr C. J. Strongman. Millerton Mine Manager (ex-Inspector of Alines), Air I. A. James (Manager of State Mine), and Air W Leitch (ex -Manager of Dobson Aline), and Air C. Hunter, General Alanager of Renown Collieries, and ex-Manager of the Dobson Mine. Oliver James Davis, Inspector of Mines for West Coast District, since j92C, and on * time mine manager at Point Elizabeth, stated that he had had 32 years’ experience in mining—at Denniston, Reefton, Blackball, Brunner and State coal mines. He had. in company with Air Strongman, inspected the dip workings at Dobson on November 19th. They found that most of the places were not being timbered as they should be in accordance with the law. He had not then statutory authority to do anything. On December 1. witness had with Air Hughes and Mr Bayne, carried out an inspection. Witness corroborated the evidence given by Air Hughes concerning same. They had found gas in three places in the rise workings. The main defect was the timbering, and he had warned them that if it did not improve, he wo.uld take them to Court. There was no gas in the dip sections. There was evidence of defective shot-firing, and had told the miners to prepare their shots better. He was not altogether satisfied with the arrangement of the air pipes. Witness and Air Bayne had discussed the matter in a general way, and differed. There was not much evidence of dust except in Carter’s level, and also a little in No. 2 dip, which was being covered with clay. He did not consider it a dangerous practice to let miners have a safety lamp as well as an electric one. An oil safety lamp, however, would be a danger, if given to a man who did not know’ how to us<» it. <He was surprised at the num- !<• r <>f men coming from the Obi Country who did not know how to use a safety lamp. Witness was in the mine after the dewatering of the stone dip lb* had lak<-n charge of one of the resell' parti's. On going down the mine they found a few’ brattice stop pings, one in the stone dip and one in the west level. In tho first level of No. 1 dip, found that the trucks hail been “blown inwards.” They could not get further owing to tho thick smoke, and could not get into No. 2 dip for the same reason. Mr Smeaton had announced the fact that he could see a fire up the main heading. As they knew’ there was gas in the rise workings they did not think it was safe to stay there, and later decided to get out of the mine. After discussion,

they had decided to seal the mine up. Witness corroborated Air Smeaton’s evidence concerning the matter. All the smoke seemed to come from the rise workings. As to how ignition occurred, witness thought that it would remain a mystery. It might possibly have been caused by falling rock or spontaneous combusion, but both seemed to be out of the question. The only remaining course, to his mind, was the leaving of a safety lamp there. He would not have adowed anyon.j to go into the mine, even with rescue apparatus. An extreme expedient would bo to fire the shots from the surface, instead of in the mine. To Air Smeaton: The timbering was not properly done at Dobson. To Air Hannan: The manager had done all that he had been asked to do, within his power. To Air Leitch: He could not take samples of his own, without consulting his chief. In reply to the Chairman, Air Leitch said that he intended doing his own testing, but had difficulty in getting apparatus. AVitness said that the samples of dust, he had taken had been tested in Wellington. Witness would be in favour of issuing oil lumps to each miner. The gas he had found in the mine was likely to cause only a local explosio •, unless it was propagated by coal dust. If brattice had been put in No. 2 w r est level, this area would have been clear

of gas. lie had objected to the motor being in No. 1 dip, and had ordered it to be removed. Since then, he had been satisfied with its position. If he had not been satisfied with the safety of the mine, he “would have been

kicking up a row.” To Air Joyce: He did not know of any other man in Little’s position, who would have gone back into the mine, when gas was reported under such circumstances.

To Air Bayne : There was not the slightest chance of getting a sample of .lust ill Noakes’ place. He did not think it possible to get dust to pass n 30 mesh sieve, in No. 2 dip, at the time the plnee was inspected (in November) The only place they were likelv to get it was in Carter’s level but ’it was doubtful, but they migh. have got some there, through a 20 mesh

To Mr Balderstone: There was not enough timber, and it was not put in

properly. He had not made out a - report on the day (mentioned) when he had inspected the mine. Air Balderstone: Aly opinion is that the law is faulty, and that the report of the Inspector should be posted at the mine on the day the inspection is carried out. Witness expressed the opinion that the present law was all right, if it was carried out. He had seen evidence of night shot-firing. To Air Watson: He did not see evidence of such shots having been fired in Noakes’ working place. TEST NOT ADEQUATE. To the Chairman: An incoming deputy would not examine all the work ing places in the mine, but would have inspected a place where gas had been reported. The preliminary explosion would be a gas one, and he thought, that it had been carried throughout the mine by means of coal dust. As far as ho could observe, there were not dangerous accumulations of coal dust, unless it was ignited by gas. Witness admitted that it looked as if the Government test for coal dust with a 28 mesh sieve was not adequate. That was his considered opinion. It was obvious that larger particles of dust were also a danger. He could not suggest any other remedy than cleaning the coal dust out, and stone-dusting The line of force had completed a ciicuit of the mine. The natural assumption was that the explosion had occurred where the men were working. Shot-firing and smoking would perhaps be the most likely cause. Witness thought that rescue apparatus should be provided at a central training stxtion to serve the mines in the vicinity. Monobel would cause an explosion if used in a blow-out shot. No explosive was flameless.

To Air Watson: He thought Hie present regulations in regard to testing damp coal dust were sufficient.

To Air Bayne: He had not -.'Bowed shots to be fired in a dry dusty area in the Liverpool mine. On the day he lu-d visited the mine (referred to) there was not sufficient dust there to cause an explosion, without an accumulation

of gas. To Air Balderstone: Up had not got a trace of gas (on that date) in ti.

■ip workings. To Air Smeaton: They had used mon ibcl at the State mine until they came cross a stone drive. Thev considered

it to be satisfactory. He had not taken any of the dust in his hand on that occasion, but did what Air Bayne did—kicked it with his foot. It was possible for the ventilation to become disarranged, and cause gas to accumu late. He did not think that an ex plosion could have occurred in Noakes’ place. A workman’s’inspector was ei-

titled to be present when samples of dust. were taken. To the Chairman: A strict method of shot-firing could be carried out in Qverv mine.

Charles J. Strongman, Local Mannger Westport Coal Coy., and ex Inspector of Mines for West Coast District, then gave evidence. His mining experience extended over a period of twenty-eight years, spent entirely on the West Coast. In 1925 he had received a communication from the Alinister of Alines, stating that be was apprehensive of gas in the Dobson mine. Air Kimbell read the letter, which stressed the necessity of a careful inspection being made. PROSECUTIONS. Witness stated that he had made the inspection, and a prosecution followed concerning the defective ventilation of the mine. On 18/6/25, he again visited the place with the Chief Inspector, and found that Die ventilation was still not quite satisfactory, but they accepted an explanation that the circumstances were exceptional. They had paid a surprise visit late at night on 19/6/25. as a result of which a prosecution was instituted against the manager and deputy Cyril Thompson, a conviction being entered in each case. On August 28, 1925, he had again visited the mine and had found things satisfactory. The underviewer had then sealed off a heading. Witness with the Chief Inspector had later discussed with Air Leitch, certain improvements to be carried out. On Alay 26, 1926, witness had inspected the fan. None of the men had then complained about the ventilation. He had tested gas on that occasion and found it of a mixture of two and a-quarter per cent. In November, 1926, there were indications of gas in one place in the dip workings, but this was due to the motor breaking down. Witness had not approved of the place where the motor had been installed, but after a discussion with the manager, it was installed to his satisfaction. Air Leitch and witness were “good scrapers” and there were generally “sparks flying” when they got together. Towards the end, Air Leitch had done everything witness wanted him to do. He had requested Air Hughes to see that the Underviewers did not have to fire shots. Witness had stated in that box on a previous occasion that a disaster could have occurred under certain conditions He had never entered the mine with out discovering gas. and often the of ficials were not aware of it. He hat alsq frequently complained of improper shot-firing. From the evidence he had heard, he had formed the opin ion that a sudden accumulation of ga: was likely to occur in the rise work ings. Latterly the ventilation of th* mine was generally good, but it die not carry the air up to the working face. A PROBABLE THEORY. AVitness had a theory, but that mus bo qualified by the fact that he ha

not seen the mine prior to the explosion. The most suspicious circumstances were in Noakes’ place, where there were evidences of a blown-out ■ shot. The conditions there were similar to those he had seen in a similar

explosion. The force of the shot would leave behind a negative pressure, and sweep everything in front of it. A vacuum having been formed, the inrush of the air would have broken the pipe, but the latter would not have collapsed. If the explosion continued up the dip, failing sufficient supply of oxygen it would cause carbon monoxide gas to generate and result in the death of the men by carbon monoxide poisoning, as had been found at the inquest. The most improbable part of the theory was in regard to the place where the body was found,. Witness had had occasions (elsewhere) to examine a shot, which had hung fire, and had exploded a short time afterwards, and it seemed possible that this had occurred in Noakes’ place. He considered this to be the most probable theory.

To Air Kimbell: He never was satisfied with the system of shot-firing in the Dobson mine. A prosecution he had been responsible for had resulted in an improvement in the methods employed. He had not seen a shot, fired in Dobson which he considered safe, but he was not empowered by the Act to make the methods safe, under the peculiar conditions obtaining at Dobson. Witness explained that the Act did not specify exactly how the shots should be prepared, and required to be amended to apply to the special conditions of the Dhbson mine. Witness considered that the Aline Alanager was highly skilled, and that discipline was maintained.

To Air Smeaton: Witness remembered Air Smeaton telling him that an honest effort was being made to put the mine in order. Air Smeaton had given him any information he required. There were suspicious circumstances attached to Noakes’ place, and it looked as if the deputy had gone away when the shot was fired. He thought that both tho officials and workmen should insist on the better preparation of shots.

To Air Wearne: “Stone dusting would not have saved the explosion, but careful shot-firing in his opinion would have dono so.” Stone-dusting would not have produced a great degree of safety, but only to a minor degree.

To the Chairman: Stone-dusting would have an effect, but it would not have removed the danger. To Air AVearne: “He had stated in a letter that the day had not yet come when stone-dusting was required, but

it would arrive.” To the Chairman: In his long experielice as a deputy, it had been one

continuous fight to see that shots were tired properly. Tr Air Joyce: He believed that deputy Little was quite a capable man,

end that Little’s action when gas was reported was quite proper. The Dob-

once, and they were capable. He considered that a shot-firer was an official of the mine if he took his duties seriously. but. he did not agree that his position should be a salaried one. To Air Bayne: Be did not consider Noakes’ place to be dusty, when he inspected it on November 19th. He did not mark the effect of the first

explosion, but his theory was that it originated in Noakes’ place. To the Chairman: Witness admitted that the evidence went to show that the explosion originated in the rise

workings. The proceedings wore then adjourn ’d for the lunch interval. “GAPS” IN THE THEORY. Continuing his evidence, after the proceedings were resumed, the witness, Strongman, admitted to Air Bayne that his theory hal a lot of “gaps,” which had to be filled in by imagination. If the explosion, had been at the face, it would tend to push the trucks outwards. A blow-out shot in Noakes’ [dace could not have been done by the shot firer, but would be done ny Noakes himself, either with the shot firing battery or the battery out of a safety lamp. It had been admitted, in the evidence, that all the batteries had not been accounted for.

To the Chairman: The safest method of shot firing was to hole a shot instead of undercutting the coal. To Air Bayne: A shot should be holed half the width of the face.

To Air Balderstone: Section 131 of the Act re the withdrawal of the men from the mine when gas was reported, did not, he contended, apply in Little’s ease, as the body of gas was not sufficiently dangerous. Witness admitted that if he bad his way he would withdraw all the men from a mine when gas was reported. Witness did not find that he had too much work to do, but while acting with the Inspector, they had set out to initiate a new system, and this certainly did involve more work than could be carried out by one man. He thought that he had got, round his district often enough in tho interests of safety. In some cases he had gone into a mine time after time, and did not have any complaints, and would not in such eases perhaps go there again for six months, being quite satisfied that everything was in order. Witness had, however, made frequent visits to the Dobson Aline. As tho Act stood at present, it was almost impossible to get a conviction, in the case of improper shot firing. Many of the regulations were based on those of the Ohl Country, and' did nbt apply to New Zealand; and most of the amendments to the Act had been made on the recommendations of the Department’s officials. His reports were not available to anyone outside the Alines Department. He considered that it was better to keep such reports secret, as they were dealt with sympathetically by the Department’s experts. It was stated in the Act that samples of dust should be taken at least every six months, and in view of the fact that an inspector could take samples at any time, witness thought this was sufiicient.

To the Chairman: He did not consider the staff at Dobson adequate—there should have been a deputy on the day shift to relieve the underviewer; that meant having one more deputy. In his opinion, the Dosobn Mine, officials had complied with the Act, in regard to stone dusting. He thought that a 20 mesh sieve should

be used to take samples of dust at | Dobson. It was not possible to elinn- 1 nate all danger likely to result from coal dust, and it would not be commercially practicable, and could not be done unless they cleaned the whole of the roadways. In the case of Dobson, witness had requested that the dust should be cleared up, and it had been done. The clearing up of dust, to any extent, was not practicable in old mines. A violent explosion goneri a ted by a blow-out shot could be carried throughout the mine by coal dust. ’He considered that a 20 mesh sieve i would be the finest practicable. He did not consider that the explosion was I due to the presence of electricity; ano f the danger due to electrical apparatus I was negligible, but before any electrical plant was used underground it should be passed by the. inspector. The coal seam at Dobson varied from 6 to 2.1 feet. To Air Kimbell: Witness submitted a comprehensive report each year, which was embodied in the Chief Inspector’s report, and laid on the table of the House of Representatives.

Air Balderstone remarked that such information would not be available for the benefit of the miners until twelve months after it had been obtained. Air Kimbell: Usually six months.

To Air Smeaton: AVitness thought that totally enclosed motors were the safest, and he also preferred oil-cased switches.

John Pollock, trucker, stated that on tho night of the explosion he had seen Deputy Lit Ho come to the bottom of tho dip at 10.20 p.m.

To Air Smeaton: Ho was not aware of the fact that tho time of the winch cabin clock was often ten minutes ahead of the town time.

To the Chairman: This happened six months ago. lie remembered the time, because he had gone to look, to see if it was getting near time to knock off. James Ford Coutts, trucker, stated that on the night of the disaster Deputy Little had come, into tho dip after 10 o’clock —about 10 minutes after Dando had come along. To Hie Chairman: He was trucking in the main drive. Ho did not know who was trucking for Blanche and Reid. CHIEF INSPECTOR’S EVIDENCE. John A. C. Bayne, Chief Inspector of Coal Alines, stated that he had acted in an official capacity for 23 years. Ho had been Chief Inspector since January, 1923. He had discussed the matter in reference to the circular letter with Mr Strongman. He believed that the matter was referred to in the “Argus” at that time. They had taken all the steps they knew of, to ensure safety, in regard to the electrical equipment, and he “must say, that the Department recommendations were complied with,” the apparatus being the best that could be got. The same difficulty had arisen with other mines, in securing a ]>l«mt for stone dusting. Inspector .Strongman had reported that he was very dissatisfied with the timbering, and had difficulty in having the regulations carried out. When witness had visited the dip section on November 19th, the ventilation was good. He had examined the sides to see if there was no dust adhering thereto. He had examined the dust by kicking it along the roadway. They had told Air Hughes that a sample could be taken, and he (Air Hughes) would have to see that it was done. He had noticed that the box of the gear was cracked. Noakes’ place was damp, and Black’s and Marshall’s place was slightly dusty. He was satisfied that a sample could have been

got on November 19th. There was no dry dust in Brammer’s place. In two of the working places, in the rise section, there was a very small amount of g as —just a “cap” near the face. They told the me to get out, because the timbering was no good. In another place they ordered that no shots should be fired there. Gas was found in No. 2 heading, but the place was fenced off, and it appeared to have been satisfactorily done. Every place was badly timbered. MANAGER WARNED. Witness had warned the manager, that the next time Air Davis (the Inspector) complained about it, they would be prosecuted. There was plenty of timber available. The safety lamps were in. most cases hung up near the working face. It seemed to him that they would have been better without the “third lamp,” for all the use that was made of it; ajid in the interests of safety, he thought it should not be issued. Men were found working in gas, despite the fact that they had safety lamps. Air Hughes had agreed to appoint another underviewer, as witness had requested. Even under the most dangerous conditions, it was difficult to get au explosion from coal dust—no matter how fine it was. Dust that would pass through 10 mesh sieve would carry on an explosion. He was satisfied that there was not sufficient fine dust in the Dobson Mine to start an explosion, ignited by gas. 'The roadways in this country were smaller than in the mines at Home, and the air current was therefore not so large. The Department had forwarded samples of dust to the British authorities for testing purposes. It was found that the dust passed through a 200 mesh sieve was the moat explosive. He did not think dust as fine as this could be obtained at Dobson. Dobson coal was not being worked wh<'i) the experiments were made. As a result of several conferences, they had agreed to take samples from a 20 mesh sieve. The Waikato Company had adopted it, but it had not been used at Dobson, and elsewhere on the West Coast. ... A’’ A NEW REGULATION. AVitness had had a conference with tho Under-Secretary and other officers of the Department re the question of revising the 'Stone dusting regulations. The British regulations still provided for a 28 mesh sieve. A new regulation, gazetted to-day by the Department, provided for dust to be tested with a 20 mesh sieve.

To Air Kimbell: There was plenty of air in the Dobson Mine, but the piping was not well maintained, and it was consequently not well distributed. He was satisfied that it could be improved. They were also not satisfied with the methods of shot firing. To the. Chairman: He had never seen such bad shots fired as there was evidence of in Noakes’ and Brammer’s place. He had found that, as a rule, the supervision was not so good on a night shift. Witness described the state of the mine after the explosion, his evidence being on similar lines to that of the previous witnesses. He was of the opinion that the line of force was from east to west. On Brammer’s level the trucks were tiltd downhill. Tho difficulty in regard to

the theory of the explosion having occurred in the rise workings was due to the fact that nobody was working there. He contended that the explosion might have been caused by three things: First of all, by a safety lamp being left in the mine; by spontaneous combustion; or by sparks generated by the falling of stone. The first theory was the most probable. He was not sure as to there being gas in Marshall’s place. If an explosion had occurred in Noakes’ place, the truck would have been blown up to the level; and if it had occurred in Brammer’s place, it would be blown across the level. He was of the opinion that it occurred somewhere in the rise workings. One objection he had to the theory that the explosion had occurred in Noakes’ place, by igniting the dust there, was because he considered th a; there was not sufficient dust there to cause an explosion that way. If gas was there, it might have been possible. He understood that the keys to the batteries were kept in the cabin, and he could not conceive of anyone opening an electric safety lamp to use for the purpose of firing a shot. Air Hughes mentioned that the interior of a battery was found on the site of the deputies’ cabin.

Witness was of the opinion that the ventilation complied with the Mines Act. They were more likely to get grunching with Samsonite than with monobel, because it was more powerful; and he preferred the use of the latter at a mine like Dobson. He also approved of the air brake switch as used at Dobson, and enclosed motors. He was aware that not sufficient care was taken in regard to safety during the year 1925. TRIBUTE TO OFFICIALS. Witness was of the opinion that the local Inspector had done all he could to see that the regulations were carried out, and he did not know’ of a case where an inspector had given so much attention to one particular mine. Mr Smeaton had given Mr Strongman every assistance, and it seemed to witness that Mr Smeaton had done more than any other workman’s inspector on the West Coast in the interests of safety. Witness did not think that rescue apparatus would have been effective in the case of the Dobson dis aster. WHAT REQUIRES ATTENTION. The points that required attention at Dobson, witness said, were: Ventilation, shot tiring and the prevention of accumulations of dust. He did not think it advisable to alter the existing regulations concerning shot firing, except in regard to the clause relating to the manner of putting in the cut. With cutting there was always the difficulty of having Hanking shots tired, and he thought that they were better 1 ‘ holed.”

To the Chairman: Limestone had a cooling effect on the coal. To Air Kimbell: Since the explosion a system of checking lamps had been instituted at Dobson, which it was proposed to give a trial for three He did that men were searched in every day. The inspectors considered everything from from the point of view of safety. He did not think that an inspector would report very candidly, if a copy of his report was posted at the mine mouth; and he thought that if it was done, the inspector would probably submit a separate report to the Department. To Air Hannan: The practice of the I Department was to deal with Mr 1 Leitch. Air Hughes had done his best ,to rectify anything that needed attention. To Air Leitch: His dealings had always been with Air Leitch, and the same with Air Strongman. THAT CIRCULAR LETTER. Air Leitch said that he had been told that day that the circular letter sent by the Departent (re dusting) was still in the office unopened. AVitness stated that he did not think the velocity of the explosion was sufficient to cool the coal dust. His view was that stone dusting would make a mine safe against the effects of a blowout shot, but it would have no effect in the case of a big explosion. Water spraying would lay off dust when a shot was tired, and so tend to prevent ignition. AVitness favoured the stone dusting all the mines in the Grey district, and said that he was instrumental in getting the circular drawn up concerning same. To Air Strongman: He was conversant with the instructions issued in regard to safety lamps. His opinion re the supplying of a third safety lamp (betwen two men), and he was not influenced in forming his opinion, in this respect, by the disaster, but had come to that conclusion while visit'-■ ; the mine some time previously. He was certain that had Air Leitch thought that there was an element of danger, ho would have been more cautious. O VENTILATION AT FACE. To Air Balderstone: He thought that the Act contained everything that was required in regard to the proper ventilation of the mine, and that it ensured that the working places were kept clear'of gas. Air Balderstone said that the whole trouble was that the air was not carried right up to the working place. Witness expressed the opinion that the inspector could take action in such cases.

Air Kimbell said that the existing law ensured that the working place was kept clear of gas. In reply to the Chairman, witness explained that it was impossible for the same quantity of air to sweep the working face as was in roadways. The law provided for a minimum of 150 cubic feet of air for each person at the working place. To Air Balderstone: The faulty timbering was due to the management, to some extent. The manager had dismissed men for bad timbering, and had, he thought, done his best to see that it was improved. Witness denied that he was blaming the miners for it. He admitted that there was general laxity in the management of the mine. On one occasion the manager had himself called his attention to the difficulty of timbering a new section. AVitness thought that if a lamp had been left in the mine, the blame would not rest with the miners, but to a large extent on the management. While at Paparoa he had no recollection of a lamp being left at a working face. Mr Balderstone: That shows how careful the miners are.

To Mr Watson: Despite the fact that oil lamps were tested, they were not infallible. To the Chairman: He would term Dobson as being practically damp

The proceedings then concluded.

throughout. He did not think that stone dusting would merely prevent a primary explosion. Witness pointed out that if the size of the mesh for testing coal dust was increased to any extent—“say to a 10 mesh”—it would be impracticable to supply the same percentage (50 per cent.) of stone dust. This concluded the evidence. The Chairman intimated that members of the Commission would visit tin State Mine to-morrow, and afterwards they would again inspect the Dobson Mine. He especially wished Mr Strongman to be present when they visited the Dobson Mine, and would also like the others concerned to come along He would like to say, on behalf of the Commission, that there had been a general desire by all concerned to help to elucidate the various questions that had arisen, and to assist the Commission in its w’ork, for which he desired to thank them. TRIBUTE TO MR SMEATON Mr Kimbell, responding, said: “Before these proceedings close, may I be permitted to pay a warm tribute to Mr Smeaton, for the able manner in which he has throughout the Inquiry represented the miners. It is also fitting to say that he has acted with commendable fairness to all other parties; and has been tne means of bringing forward a great deal of evidence; and added to that we must, I think, ■recognise the great assistance he has been himself, with his intimate knowledge of the Dobson Mine, and his lengthy experience as a miner; without which assistance the Inquiry would not have been quite so searching. The widows of the victims of the disaster may rest assured that he has done his best; and he is to be heartily congratulated. ’ ’ Mr Smeaton, responding, expressed his thanks to Mr Page and the other members of the Commission, for the great amount of consideration they had given to the case, it was the first time he had taken a part in such proceedings, and had only been informed that his services would be required two weeks beforehand. He wished to thank Mr Kimbell for his kind words, and all who had taken part for the assistance they had given. Their object in the Inquiry, throughout, Had been to try and find out what could be done in order to prevent such calamities in the future. EXPENSES.

Mr Strongman questioned what would be done about their expenses. Mr Kimbell stated that in regard to expenses, he would be willing to recommend that where the miners giving evidence had lost a day’s pay, they should be paid for the loss incurred; and that in the case of professional men, they would receive something towards their expenses, provided that it was reasonable.

Mr Strongman remarked that he had raised the question because he did not like ‘Heaving it to the tender mercies of the Mines Department.” Mr Kimbell said he wished to record his objection to that statement. The Chairman stated that he would make a recommendation in the matter.