TALK OF WAR.

Grey River Argus, 10 December 1926, Page 3

TALK OF WAR.

IN EUROPE 1 < _AI USSOLINI ’S A MBIT LON S. « Air Archibald Hurd, the British na j val critic, thus writes of the policy of Mussolini in expanding the Navy and J Mercantile Marine of Italy: —The Bri- ( tish peoples throughout the world are , vitally concerned with the balance of sea power, in its commercial as well as its war aspects. In particular, they , watch, though not necessarily in an , unfriendly spirit, every development of { naval policy in the Mediterranean, which is the essential highway between East and West, about 60 per cent of the ships which pass through the Suez « Canal being British-owned. Conse- ( quently Signor Mussolini’s recent statement that “Italy’s future lies on < tho sea” is not to be ignored in its possible reaction on British interests in view of the determined policy which is being pursued with a view to strengthening the Italian Navy and increasing the Italian mercantile mar- ( inc. Signor .Alussolini has told the Italian people, in speeches and lectures, that they must, revive the ancient glories of Roman sea power, which converted the Mediterranean into practically a domestic lake, over which Rome exercised almost unchallenged control. Whatever may be thought of the Fascist rule in Italy to-day, it is inconceivable that the country, after the post-war unrest which threatened to reduce it to the condition of Soviet Russia, has once more found itself, and is working with a will to fulfil the new ambitions of which Signor Mussolini has made himself the exponent. Industry is rapidly reviving, and Italian communications by sea, as by land, arc being improved and developed. Italy, which possessed less than 1,500,000 tons of merchant shipping on the outbreak of the Great War, now has upwards of 3,000,000 tons, and month by month is sending new vessels afloat. The same movement towards expansion is affecting the Italian Navy. Year by year the Navy Estimates continue to increase, as is revealed by the following figures showing the naval expenditure during the last five years: —1922-23, 770,000,000 lira; 1923-24, 870,000,000 lira; 1924-25. r 978,000,000 lira; 1925-26, 995,000,000 i lira; 1926-27, 1,040,000,000 lira. Of 5 the increase voted for the current yeai r about £1,500.000 is directly allocated '■.for new construction. The vessels now under construction include 2 cruisers

of 10,000 tons (the Trento and Trieste), 16 destroyers, 12 submarines, 4 mine-layers, 6 combined mine-layers and mine-sweepers, and 2 oilers, m pursuance of tho 1923-28 building programme, it is proposed to laydown immediately 4 more destroyers and 4 additional submarines. Sonic years ago I remember having a conversation with Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, as he was then styled, becoming after the outbreak of the Great War the Marquis of Milford Haven—on the naval situation in the Mediterranean. He was then a member of the Board of Admiralty. He possessed an intimate knowledge of European politics, and refused to shuw the belief that Italy, because she was a party to the Triple Alliance, would ever range herself in war against the British peoples. “Italy,” he said, “will never fight side by side with Austria.” When the emergency arose in the summer of 1914, the Italians lost !little time in freeing themselves from political trammels which had always been irksome to them, and the friendship which had existed between Italian and British peoples since the time of the struggle of Garibaldi and his companions for Italian independence, was cemented again in tho furnace of the Great War. The British and Italian fleets fought side by side, and the representatives of the two peoples sat side by side in the Palace of Versailles. A& a result of the Great War, AustroUlungary ceased to exist as a sea powe** and a thorn in the side of Italy was thus removed. A new situation in the Mediterranean was created. {Some irritation was perhaps not unnaturally, expressed in Italian, as well as 1 reach, newspapers, when, later on. the Board of Admiralty in London revealed that, it intended to revert to the traditional British policy which has always been based upon naval preponderance in the Mediterranean. This annoyance did not, however, persist when publicopinion in these two countries realised that the re-establishment of British naval power in Southern Waters was to be regarded merely as a natural movement in view of the distribution of the British Empire peoples. The result is thot to-day British naval pow er though numerically weaker than the! combined forces under the French and Italian ensigns, adequately reflect” British interests in the Middle Sea, and complete amity prevails. SUBSIDISED SHIPBUILDING.

Even more significant than the measures which arc being taken to strengthen the Italian fleet, is the programme of merchant shipbuilding which is now being carried out in Italian shipyards. Sir Westcott Abell, Chief Ship Surveyor of Llovd’s Register of Shipping, has recentlv remarked that “The outstanding event in the world’s mercantile marine over the past two or three years has undoubtedly been the revival of shipping and shipbuilding in Italy at a time when most other nations have been concerned mainly in cutting their ship losses.” Under the decree «f 1923, Italian shipbuilding is being heavily subsidised out of State funds, and now ships are being rapidly sent, afloat at a time when there is at least, 10,000,000 tons more shipping in the world than the trade of the world can employ. Last year Italy launched nearly three times as much merchant shipping as in 1913, and, though shipbuilding in other countries is severely depressed, the Italian output this year will probably represent a fresh record. What is to be the outcome of all this activity upon what is essentially an interna tional industry which can only be nationalised at tho expense of a country's taxpayers? The United States has illustrated the penalty which a country pays for the artificial stimulation of shipbuilding. The American taxnavers, it has been revealed, have already spent nearly £850,000,000 (pounds, not dollars, let it be noted) upon the building and operating of their State-owned fleet. The losses are going on year by year, while the value or the ships, as well as their efficiency, is decreasing as they get older. It has proved impossible to find employment for this costly fleet, with the result that, while America possesses 600 nor cent more tonnage than she did in 1914, the amount which can be kept moving by sea, even at a loss, is only two and a half times what it was. Will Italy in attempting to realise Signor Mussolini’s ambitions share the same fate? It is true that the . ships which she is building will be privately owned, but can remunerative employ ment be found for them? The main support of Italian shipping before the war was the emigration traffic, but the United States has now practically closed her doors. If Italian shipowners in these unfavourable circumstances incur losses, they will be tempted to demand from the .Government increased protection, with inevitable injury to Italian industry and to the burdening of tho Italian consumer. The interest of the Italians, as of others, lies in the fullest and freest access to tho cheap international freight market, and Sig nor Mussolini’s policy appears to tend in the opposite direction and may conceivably find expression in attempts to force the Italian people to use only Italian vessels.