SERBIANS RETAKE VELES. BULGARS ENTER USKUB. BULGARIANS CLOSE TO AUSTRO GERMANS.

Grey River Argus, 28 October 1915, Page 5

SERBIANS RETAKE VELES. BULGARS ENTER USKUB. BULGARIANS CLOSE TO AUSTRO GERMANS.

I — - (Reed. 8. is p.m.) LONDON, October 26. • Official — The Serbians have retaken Veles. A British submarine sank a Turkish munition transport In the Sea - Marmora. ATHENS, October 26. Telegrams state that after the second son of King 1 Ferdinand had headed the Bulgars triumphal entry into Uskub the Serbians retired in good order and entrenched on a mountainous line at Perlipe 25 miles from the Greek frontier. They hope to prevent the capture of Serbian Macedonia before the Allied reinforcements arrive. The Bulj?ars claim to have captured Neprotin. making- a junction witK the Austro-Germans imminent, and enabling- them to forward big- g-uns and munitions t:o Turkey without traversing- Roumania. DEMAND FOR ROUMANIAN INTERVENTION. BUCHAREST, October 26. Telegrams indicate that M. Filipescu is heading- popular demonstrations to force the Government to use the army to prevent the junctioning which will endang-er Roumania's existence! M. Filipescu, in a violent speech from the window of the Political Club, ended: "We will overthrow the father and Britons will also overthrow the son." DEBATE IN THE LORDS. SOME PERTINENT QUESTIONS. STATEMENT BY LORD LANDSDOWNE. (Reed. 8.55 p.m.) OONDON, October 26. Lord Loreburn asked whether the Government was determined to despatch troops to Salonika with the approval of the highest naval and military advisers ; whether the Government would give assurance that full provision was made for communications with the force,' and for supplies of men and material to the satisfaction of the Na-val and Military advisers. He would not complain if the Government felt that there should be some delay in answering the questions, but there were reasons why the Government should not deprecate a discussion in order to shield themselves from criticism, but he believed that they had overrated the -harm which was done by Parliamentary discussion. -They had also underrated the consequences in a democratic country. If Parliamentary discussion was stifled and discouraged the discussion was merely transferred from Parliament to the newspapers. None expected, the Government to divulge all their strategical plans, but they might make a general statement regarding what he believed he was putting to them. We witnessed the Dardanelles affairs and we didn't know whether they were commenced with or without tHe advice of Naval and Military authorities. Was the Salonika adventure to be : a repetition of the Dardanelles? He did not question that the Government were genuinely anxious that the Balkans expedition should be successful but the country would like an assurance that the enterprise was carefully thought out beforehand. The greatest dangers any cquntry can suffer from are unpreparedness and indecision! " Lord Cromer said that he felt cer : tain that it would be the case that he centre of gravity of the war was transferred for the time being "from; west to east. They should give i general indication how they intended to meet the situation. A good dear of friction existed which could be avoided, if the Government had not thrown so impenetrable "a Veil round their opinions and plans of action. Lord Kitchener had then been singularly parsimonious in his utterances in the House of Lords. His statements never contained much more than could be r^ad in the daily papers. The country wanted something- to show that the Government had a real grasp of the' situation. Lord Cromer concluded by saying; that he dissociated himself with any attempt *to upset the Government, but it was impossible for a Cabinet of 22 to conduct the war efficaciously. A small but strong executive bbdyv/?.s required, chosen without reference tq» party from men representing- the best! talent in the country in the direction!

lof official, political, naval, military and Eastern affairs. DF The speech deeply impressed the House. Lord Lansdowne replying 1 , admitted D. that personally he was strongly of the opinion, that the efficiency of the Cabinet was apt to vary inversely with 6. its numerical strength. *he Turning to the Salonika expedition, 3ate he said that he could quite understood re- the view that our commitment with ring France in Gallipoli and Egypt might seem distasteful to the Lords. That :acy situation was complicated by enterand ing new entanglements and a new the theatre of war. Serbia had made a direct appeal to the British Gbyernnis- ment and we had sent such troops as srn- were available. It was a small rty. force because only a small force :ing could be collected in time. . The French had despatched the and force now apparently engaged With >ra- the Bulgarians. :h. These steps were taken with great na- promptitude because promptitude was of the utmost moment, and they were taken after full and deliberate consultation with the Cabinet's Military and Naval advisers. We regarded 13,000 Britishers as -. the precursor of a larger force. RO Events were moving very rapidly in the Balkans, and two recent developments had profoundly affected the military and political situation. The' first was the attitude of the :en Greek Government, and the second the progress of the campaign in rk- northern Serbia, which rendered the • (highly improbable that the Serbians could withstand the Austro-Gerrhans • . atta <*s for any great length of time he Seeing that. Serbia was stabbed -v ad the back by Bulgaria the French and try Untish Governments realised that in when further reinforcements' reached a .the eastern Mediterranean it would les be necessary to take careful stock of the position. '* . of General Monro, who was due. to ared rive .to-day, had been mstruqf>d to report as soon as possible all aspects it- of the situation. tK He combatted the impression that id the civilian politician was in the habit ns of devising great strategical plans ut and combinations and imposing these on the Government's professional advisers. Not in any Government - with which he had been connected .ihad . it been possible for amateur strategists to impose such plans. Lord Kitchener had been present at every p . Cabinet meeting, and a party to all a . its decisions. It was almost gro--5e tesque to suppose that Lord Kitcheng. er would allow himself to be deflected > s from, his course by the pressure of his civilian colleagues. There -were h mixed problems whicji had to be cbrit ] sidered, not merely from the Naval c and military viewpoint, but on broad ._ moral and political grounds. He wished to enforce the fact that whatever opportunities Were given the Naval and Military Advisers the ultimate responsibility rested on the ; Government. No Government could be allowed to shelter itself behind the advice of its experts. In^view of the pressure exerted on the various fronts against Germany it was natural that the Central Powers would look for a new direction to seek a satisfactory c decision. The choice fell, as it was ;- obviously likely to fall, to push a through Bulgarian thus threatening } our Gallipolian forces and perhaps - Egypt, to say nothing of vaster ast pirations which 1 perhaps lay behind. - He paid a tribute to Serbia's won- - derful gallantry in struggling against - a third invasion. Greece was bound to Serbia by geographical propinquities, common - interests and treaty obligations. 1 Only through Greek territory would - help possibly reach the Serbians ; The goodwill bf Greece was obvious--1 ly of the first importance, anci it. was - at M. Venezelbs' instance that they 1 undertook to provide s a force to en--1 able Greece to fulfil -hef treaty bbliga- ■ tions. VVe^had taken prompt steps to re- ■ lieve Serbia, and he assured the House that the Government was unlikely to b^e ied to precipitate action. Lord St. David said that if the Government had had their eyes open in the early stages of the war they must have known that they could have secured communication with Serbia through Durazzp. ■■• . Baron Middleton said that the main cause for the want of confidence, in the Government lay in the impossibilities of conducting war under tne present system. The Cabinet had a. meeting of the Defence Committee one day, of the War Council the following day and the Dardanelles Com- • mittee the next, day which implied a want of continuity. Lord Curzon said that, there. was a - single committee directihgr 'its attention to the prosecution of the war firstly called the Efardahelles Committee. The latter assumed general control of the whole war. The questira of a smaller Cabinet was under Mr Asquith's consicleratiori. THe Governrnent was also considering, a railway from Durazzo to Serbia. y ■• , ;_. ' "".-.' '/ ■• (Reed. 5b p.m.) iI^HAJ^E3T, tictober 27. The junction of tne Bulgarians -and Germans -is imminent.